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This thesis investigates the effect of alliance experience onto stock-market 
value creation. Building on existing research, this thesis centres on the distinction 
between general alliance experience (i.e. the overall experience of managing alliances) 
and relational experience (i.e. the experience of managing alliances with the same 
partner). As existing research has identified significant heterogeneity in value creation 
from these types of alliance experience, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate 
conditions under which alliance experience is more valued by investors. This thesis 
therefore disentangles alliance experience into three further dimensions, namely the 
quality of previous relational experiences, the interrelationship among the two 
experience types and a temporal dimension of how the two experience types are 
accumulated in different rhythms over time.  
Firstly, by using signalling theory, I hypothesize that the quality of the 
previous partnerships emphasized at announcement positively influences value 
creation and this effect is moderated by signaller, receiver, and intermediary 
characteristics. Secondly, in order to investigate the interrelated effect of both types of 
experience, resource-based, learning and trust-based arguments are used to build an 
interrelated alliance experience theory. I argue that high levels of general alliance 
experience create overconfidence in alliance management processes and this 
negatively affects the value creation of relational experiences. This effect is 
hypothesized to vary based on firm characteristics. Thirdly, building on organizational 
learning, resource-based and trust-based perspectives, I propose that both general 
alliance and relational experiences are negatively affected by irregularity in the 
rhythm in which they are accumulated.  
This thesis investigates the effect of these quality, interrelationship and 
temporal dimensions onto value creation through multiple event studies in the global 
biopharmaceutical industry in a sample of R&D alliances between 2003 and 2012. 
Results indicate general support for the arguments and provide evidence that 
experience-related contingencies affect firms’ ability to create value from alliance 
experiences. 
Key words: Strategic alliance, alliance experience, general alliance experience, 
relational experience, event study, experience quality, experience spill-over, rhythm 
IX 
Acknowledgements 
This PhD has been an exciting journey and many people have walked 
alongside me during this time. Others have inspired or helped me to take this route at 
some earlier point of my life. There are many people who have contributed to this and 
I am deeply thankful to each and every one of them, however, I would like to 
highlight a few here. First and foremost, I would like to sincerely thank my 
supervisors, Martin and Hilary for their unwavering support, their insightful ideas, 
mentorship, and inspiration to go the extra mile and of course their continued belief in 
me throughout every stage of the PhD process.  
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to everyone at the Centre for 
Strategic Management at LUMS, Professor David Pettifer, Professor Gerry Johnson, 
Dr Andrea Herepath, and Dr Kathryn Fahy for providing me with valuable advice for 
the professional world of teaching and research. I would also like to thank Vickey for 
her continued optimism and happiness which has brightened so many days. Sadly, I 
will never be able to personally thank Dr Andy Bailey for his belief in me to become a 
member of staff during the final months of my PhD: I will always be indebted to him 
for my first academic position! Besides the Centre, I would also like to express my 
thanks to the Graduate Management School at LUMS for the help with all the 
administrative aspects.  
I would also like to sincerely thank my examiners Professor Tomi Laamanen 
(University of St. Gallen), Professor Christian Stadler (Warwick Business School), 
and Professor Stefanos Mouzas (Lancaster University) for their valuable feedback and 
for sharing the special viva voce day with me. In addition, there are numerous 
anonymous reviewers and participants at various conferences, such as the European 
Academy of Management Conference 2014, British Academy of Management 
Conference 2014, the Strategic Management Society (SMS) Conference 2014 
including the Doctoral Consortium who provided valuable feedback for the different 
empirical chapters in this thesis. Additionally, reviewers for the Academy of 
Management Conference 2015 and SMS 2015 have provided me with useful 
suggestions for taking this research project even further. 
I was fortunate enough to have received scholarships during the PhD process. 
Therefore, I would like to acknowledge both Research and Development Management 
X 
(RADMA) Ltd. and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
(ES/J500094/1) for their generous support. 
Moreover, I would like to thank my friend Tristan for those frequent and 
fruitful discussions at Lily Grove about paper development, research ideas and for just 
philosophizing about anything in this world. With regards to data, I have to thank 
Timo for his great assistance in all the coding procedures. Of course, the entire LUMS 
PhD cohort and especially the infamous C3 office in LUMS have made so many 
nightshifts really so much better. There are numerous other friends in Lancaster, at 
home in Germany and worldwide who have shown an incredible amount of 
understanding for the busy times during the PhD process and still provided me with a 
level of support I really could not have asked for. 
A significant impact on my PhD has to be attributed to my dearest Nannan. 
Her love and support throughout this journey even over the long-distance has been 
exceptional. I know it was not easy but I suppose I also need to thank Apple for 
introducing FaceTime! 
I would of course like to thank my entire family including my host family in 
the USA for their continued support and understanding for the busy moments. In 
particular, I want to thank my grandmother who has encouraged me to start this PhD. I 
hope she would be proud of this achievement now. 
Words cannot express how grateful I am to my parents and Vera for their 
generous heart and support in every way possible and in all stages of my life leading 
up to now. Their sustained and astonishing backing and advice has been incredible 
and makes me feel deeply indebted! Consequently, I want to dedicate this work to 
them! 
1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Strategic alliances are important means for organizations to enter new markets, 
access knowledge, develop capabilities or improve current market position (e.g. Das 
& Teng, 2000b; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; 
Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; 
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Parkhe, 1991). Particularly, in competitive 
environments where flexibility is key to success (D'Aveni, 1994), the temporary 
nature of alliances enables organizations to expand their firm boundaries while at the 
same time limit their resource commitments. As a result, the number of strategic 
alliances worldwide has been growing exponentially (e.g. Hagedoorn, 2002). One 
industry in which alliances are particularly important is the biopharmaceutical 
industry, where the complexity of innovation, efficiency pressures and the uncertainty 
associated with the R&D process drive organizations to engage in multiple strategic 
alliances (e.g. Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). While growth rates in alliance formations 
have slowed down over the years, organizations perception of the importance of 
alliances has increased. For instance, the ‘IBM CEO Survey 2012’ has indicated that 
the importance of alliances to CEOs has grown by around 25% compared to 2008. 
This actually means that nowadays around 70% of CEOs regard strategic alliances as 
essential to their organizations future competitiveness. 
Despite such increased emphasis to engage in strategic alliances, difficulties in 
managing them remain on high levels. Around 30 to 70% of all alliances are classified 
as failures (Kogut, 1989; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008; Park & Russo, 1996). When 
managing strategic alliances organizations are essentially faced with a dilemma. On 
the one hand, the fast-paced nature of the business environment makes alliances 
essential. Yet, on the other, the temporary nature makes them particularly difficult to 
manage. More specifically, alliances are subject to severe complexity arising from 
tensions between collaboration and competition among the partners (Hamel et al., 
1989). As organizations choose to ally in a distinct product area, each partner remains 
independent and thus faces the danger of strengthening a competitor in the same or 
other areas. Consequently, organizations may not effectively trust each other or if they 
do, trust may get exploited (e.g. Das & Rahman, 2002). Therefore, organizations face 
an important trade-off: Either to control the alliance partner and thus, limit flexibility 
and possibly knowledge exchange or to trust the partner, thereby improving flexibility 
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while risking exploitation by the partner (e.g. Gulati & Singh, 1998). As each alliance 
is ‘unique’ towards either control or trust requirements, understanding the respective 
dangers and benefits of each alliance is challenging (De Man, 2014). 
Firms differ in their effectiveness to manage such trade-offs and effectively 
their alliance management. Hewlett Packard or Eli Lilly, for instance, are well-known 
for their alliance management practices (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Sims, Harrison, 
& Gueth, 2001). One key component to improve alliance management identified in 
existing literature is to accumulate alliance experiences. Such experiences enable 
firms to ‘learn by doing’ (Epple, Argote, & Devadas, 1991). As firms increase their 
experience with alliances, they move further down the learning curve and thereby 
increase their effectiveness (Epple et al., 1991; Huber, 1991). In the alliance context, 
such firm-level alliance experiences are value creating (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). More specifically, such experiences provide important 
learning opportunities (Sampson, 2005), while also improving legitimacy among 
potential future partners (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Essentially, experience is a 
unique component of developing replicable firm-level ‘alliance capabilities’ as it may 
improve alliance value creation (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). 
The main problem the literature identifies is that the simple accumulation of 
alliance experience is insufficient for explaining organizations superior alliance 
management (e.g. Sampson, 2005; Simonin, 1997). For instance, while accumulating 
experience may provide expertise to individuals in organizations, it does not 
necessarily address how this expertise is utilized and shared. Building on the 
capability-based view of the firm, experience by itself may only provide means to 
generate routines necessary to apply lessons learnt from experiences (e.g. Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002). However, in order to 
generate effective alliance capabilities, more than the accumulation of experience is 
needed. Consequently, researchers have called for studies to “go beyond semi-
automatic stimulus-response processes and tacit accumulation of experience” (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002: 341) as studies investigating these provide only “crude approximations” 
(Kale et al., 2002: 750) of the capability-building process. 
Research has therefore branched out into two different directions to explain 
how firms can generate value from gaining alliance experience. One branch of 
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research focuses on investigating mechanisms other than experience which can 
facilitate the further utilization of experiences. Such alliance management mechanisms 
have the objective to capture, store and disseminate experiences throughout the 
organization (Heimeriks, Duysters, & Vanhaverbeke, 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & 
Singh, 2007) in order to complement experience in capability development (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). In the context of alliances, research finds that the institutionalization 
and integration of knowledge, alliance functions and knowledge management 
processes facilitate alliance value creation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heimeriks & 
Duysters, 2007; Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 2007).  
Another stream of alliance research, however, continues to focus on how 
experience by itself can generate value (e.g. Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). This stream of research has 
recognised that experiences “lie at the foundation of building alliance capability” 
(Kale et al., 2002: 750). As they are essentially inputs to the learning mechanisms 
described above, understanding the impact of alliance experience on developing 
alliance capabilities is essential. As of now, studies have focused on the identification 
of various alliance experience types and how these impact value creation differently. 
More specifically, previous studies have identified differences in the importance of 
alliance experience in general (General alliance experience) and the experience with 
the same partner over multiple alliances (Relational experience) (Gulati et al., 2009; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). More 
importantly, research has actually found that these experience types affect entirely 
different levels of capabilities. Whereas general alliance experience (GAE) impacts 
firm-level processes, so-called alliance capabilities, relational experience impacts 
dyad-level processes, thus very specific processes with the same partner, so-called 
relational capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Wang & 
Rajagopalan, 2015). The value creation ability of experiences differs as well, with 
relational experience having more positive influences onto value creation than general 
alliance experience (Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002). 
This thesis builds on this second stream of research, focusing on alliance 
experience itself and the distinction between firm-level alliance experiences and dyad-
level relational experiences. While prior studies have improved our understanding that 
such alliance experience types have different value creation impacts, significant 
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unexplained heterogeneity remains in the literature with several studies finding both 
positive (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002; Zaheer, 
Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010) and no or even negative value creation effects (Hoang 
& Rothaermel, 2005; Sleptsov, Anand, & Vasudeva, 2013; Swaminathan & 
Moorman, 2009; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015).  
While this heterogeneity has been recognized in prior studies (Gulati et al., 
2009; Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015), existing research has so far considered factors 
influencing the value creation ability of alliance experiences only to some extent. 
Existing studies have differentiated among different alliance experience types and 
investigating various firm, environment and partnership characteristics which 
facilitate the value creation of these experience types (Gulati et al., 2009; Reuer & 
Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). However, these existing studies have only provided a 
starting point to further investigate “the importance of differentiating alliance 
experience trajectories” (Zollo et al., 2002: 711). Surprisingly, the way experiences, 
thus the ‘trajectories’, are accumulated has not received a lot of attention in existing 
literature. In order to fill this research gap, this thesis explores which other experience 
dimensions may contribute to explaining how alliance experience can facilitate the 
development of alliance value creation (please see Figure 1.1 on the next page). This 
leads to the following overarching research question: 
How do different dimensions of both firm-level alliance experience and dyad-level 























In order to answer this overarching research question, the first empirical 
chapter (Chapter 4) investigates a quality dimension of experience in the context of 
repeated partnerships, thus relational experiences. This is in contrast to existing 
literature which has primarily focused on the quantity of prior experiences. While 
organizations may have accumulated a large number of such experiences over time, 
these may or may not have been value creating for firms (Goerzen, 2007; Gulati et al., 
2009; Zollo et al., 2002). Investigating the quality of previous alliance experiences 
provides further clarity as to whether prior experiences have actually been valuable for 
firms and thereby contribute to the development of dyad-level relational or firm-level 
alliance capabilities, respectively. In line with this, previous studies such as Hoang 
and Rothaermel (2005: 343) have called for more research in this area by stating that 
“alliance experience variables should also reflect the quality (…), not only their 
quantity.” As the first study using signalling theory in the context of repeated 
partnerships, I therefore investigate whether firm executives’ sending signals to 
investors about the quality of prior experiences with the same alliance partner may 
reflect the development of a relational capability and thus is reflected in a positive 
value creation for the announcing firm. Signalling theory predicts that executives will 
only send such signals about the quality of prior partnerships if the partnership is 
Chapter 4 
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indeed effective and thus a relational capability may have been developed. Otherwise, 
executives may face reputation costs. Thus, not signalling these prior experiences may 
therefore indicate that capabilities have not been developed and firms’ relational 
experience means that they may have entered repeated partnerships for inertial 
reasons. Understanding that identifying the actual quality of a previous experience is 
challenging, this chapter investigates the perceived quality from an external investor 
perspective. More specifically, it aims to investigate whether such quality signals sent 
by executives positively impact the alliance value creation. Moreover, this chapter 
aims to investigate factors which mitigate or exacerbate the effect of these signals. 
The research questions of Chapter 4 are therefore: 
How does the signalling of relational experiences impact the valuation of a 
subsequent alliance? What impact do signaller, intermediary and receiver characteristics 
have on the effect of the signal? 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) investigates an interrelationship 
dimension between both firm-level general alliance experience and dyad-level 
relational experience and their impact on value creation. While existing research has 
differentiated between experience types of dyad-level relational and firm-level 
alliance experience (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 
2002), such experience types have largely been considered in isolation. Existing 
research in other corporate development fields has found, however, that different 
experience types can be interrelated as experience in one type may positively or 
negatively spill-over onto another (e.g. Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Mulotte, Dussauge, 
& Mitchell, 2013; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). Drawing on organizational learning and 
resource-based literature, this chapter develops theory for a spill-over effect between 
firm-level general alliance experience and dyad-level relational experience. More 
specifically, I argue that high levels of general alliance experience may not only have 
declining effects on value creation due to overconfidence, but this may also decrease 
the effect of relational experiences onto alliance value creation, thus leading to a spill-
over effect. Moreover, I investigate whether such a spill-over effect is moderated by 
firm-level uncertainty and the alliance management mechanisms. The research 
questions of Chapter 5 are therefore: 
7 
How does the extent of firm-level general alliance experience (GAE) influence the 
value creation effects of dyad-level relational experiences? How do firm-level uncertainty 
and alliance management mechanisms influence the interrelationship between the two 
levels of experience? 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) investigates a temporal dimension of 
both general alliance experiences and relational experiences and their effect on value 
creation. While experience is a temporal dimension by itself, the accumulation of it 
over time may vary significantly causing different demands for organizations to utilize 
lessons learnt from experience. More specifically, I investigate how the accumulation 
of both alliance and relational experiences in different temporal rhythms over time 
affects value creation. Recent research has indicated that such rhythms are important 
for explaining performance heterogeneities in the context of alliances (e.g. Shi & 
Prescott, 2012). While this has helped our understanding of rhythms, we do not know 
whether this relates to the rhythm of general alliance experience only or also to 
repeated partnerships. Moreover, it is unclear how firm-specific factors influence the 
ability to mitigate or exacerbate the impact of such rhythms on value creation. This 
chapter therefore draws on the organizational learning, resource-based and inter-
organizational trust literature to argue that irregularity in accumulating alliance and 
relational experiences has negative value creation effects. The chapter also identifies 
firm-specific factors that may mitigate or exacerbate the negative effects of 
irregularity in accumulating alliance or relational experiences, respectively. The 
research questions of Chapter 6 are therefore: 
What effect do irregular General Alliance Rhythms (GAR) and Partner-specific 
Alliance Rhythms (PAR) have on alliance value creation? How can slack resources, 
absorptive capacity, and GAE mitigate or exacerbate the potentially negative effect of 
irregular GARs and PARs on alliance value creation, respectively? 
In order to investigate the effect of these three experience dimensions onto 
alliance value creation, I study the formation of non-equity strategic alliances in the 
global biopharmaceutical industry over a ten-year period between 2003 and 2012. The 
biopharmaceutical industry is in this regard a frequently used context in studies for 
strategic alliances due to their high alliance activity and the importance of non-equity 
alliances to competitiveness in the industry (Hagedoorn, 2002; Hagedoorn & Narula, 
1996). In order to investigate the effect of the various experience dimensions onto 
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alliance value creation, I use a stock-market based measure of alliance value creation 
generated from an event study. Frequently used in the strategic alliance field, such a 
methodology has been shown to provide valuable insights into the role of experience 
in alliances from an investor perspective (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Das, Sen, & 
Sengupta, 1998; Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; 
Merchant & Schendel, 2000). 
This thesis addresses various issues which persist in the literature on strategic 
alliances. Most importantly, this thesis finds that alliance experience is critical to 
creating value from alliances. This contributes to previous studies which identify the 
importance of alliance experience in predicting the value created from each alliance 
(e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009). However, findings of this thesis 
provide evidence that more fine grained approaches to alliance experience are needed 
as research has shown that the interpretability of experience depends on numerous 
aspects of experience itself (e.g. Levitt & March, 1988). By developing a quality, 
interrelationship, and temporal dimension, this thesis provides a potential starting 
point for deviating from count-based measures of experience to more fine-grained 
measures investigating the actual effectiveness of experience accumulation. This 
thesis therefore also contributes to studies investigating the importance of experience 
in capability development. While previous studies have oftentimes emphasized how 
important institutionalized mechanisms are in the way firms can benefit from 
experience (e.g. Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), this thesis 
takes a step back and finds that the importance of how experiences are actually 
accumulated may even be more critical than institutionalized mechanisms. In 
particular, investors who cannot observe such mechanisms directly through publicly 
available information may rely more heavily on such publicly available information of 
experience. Moreover, by investigating experience dimensions, this thesis contributes 
to studies which have investigated contingency effects in the strategic management 
field (e.g. Contractor, 2012). More specifically, this thesis finds that the quality, 
interrelationship, and the temporal dimension of alliance experience represent 
contingencies for creating value from alliance experience. This thesis also has 
managerial implications. Most importantly, findings indicate that investors react 
significantly to experience-specific information. As the announcement of alliances in 
the form of press releases triggers investment reactions by investors, findings of this 
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thesis indicate that managers of announcing firms may actively influence how 
investors perceive these experience dimensions through, for instance, impression 
management in alliance press releases.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Firstly, the Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the broader strategic alliance literature. Secondly, Chapter 3 describes the 
methodological underpinning for the three empirical chapters. This methodology 
chapter aims to delineate the overarching research philosophy, methods and the key 
dependent, independent and control variables used throughout all three empirical 
chapters. Thirdly, the abovementioned empirical chapters then follow in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6. All three empirical chapters consist of a brief introduction, theory and 
hypotheses, methodology, results and discussion sections. Fourthly, a general 
discussion and conclusion section in Chapter 7 provides an overview how the various 
results from the empirical chapters link together in answering the abovementioned 
research question. Moreover, general contributions of this thesis are provided.
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES WITHIN THE 
FIELD OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
This literature review provides an overview of the strategic alliance literature 
with a particular emphasis on how firms can generate value from strategic alliance 
experiences. Research on strategic alliances is embedded in the field of strategic 
management. In order to move from the general to the more specific, this review 
firstly provides a short overview of the strategic management field in Section 2.1 
before considering alliance research more specifically. As a first step, dyadic alliance 
literature is introduced in Section 2.2. This stream of literature is primarily concerned 
with the formation and management of individual alliances between two alliance 
partners. As firms engage in dyadic strategic alliances, researchers have used a 
multitude of different theoretical perspectives investigating how, when, and with 
which objectives firms engage in alliances. I introduce these in Section 2.2.1, before I 
review literature on the differences in governance mechanisms for such alliances and 
the management of the alliance lifecycle from formation to post-formation in Section 
2.2.2. The ways in which strategic alliances impact value creation has also been of 
particular interest to researchers and literature is reviewed in Section 2.2.3. As 
existing literature finds that a significant amount of alliances do not meet the 
performance expectations (e.g. Park & Ungson, 2001), the remaining part of the 
literature review focuses on research which investigates how firms improve their 
alliance management by gaining so-called alliance capabilities (e.g. Heimeriks et al., 
2007). In this line of reasoning, existing research has distinguished between firm- and 
dyad-level alliance capabilities (e.g. Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). I first review 
literature on firm-level alliance capabilities in Section 2.2.4. This subsection is further 
divided into two primary components as identified by existing literature: General 
alliance experience and alliance management mechanisms (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Heimeriks et al., 2007). Existing research finds that beyond firms’ ability to more 
successfully manage alliances, alliance partners can among themselves develop such 
capabilities. These capabilities rest on the partnership level between the two 
partnering companies, so-called dyad-level relational capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). These are reviewed in more detail in Section 2.2.5. A graphical overview of the 

















2.1 Strategic management  
The field of strategic management has started to develop in the 1960’s with the 
works of Chandler (1962) on structure and Ansoff (1965) on corporate planning. Due 
to its long history, strategic management has various definitions. One of the earliest 
definitions by Alfred Chandler (1962) emphasizes that the objectives of strategic 
management are “the determination of the long-run goals and objectives of an 
enterprise” and how organizations tend to achieve these objectives  through “the 
allocation of resources” (Chandler, 1962: 16). Essentially, strategic management 
therefore “consists of the analysis, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes 
in order to create and sustain competitive advantages” (Dess, Lumpkin, Eisner, & 
McNamara, 2014: 7). This relates to the planning of deliberate strategies and the 
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FIGURE 2.1: Literature review overview 
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implementation of these within the organization. These strategic choices may happen 
on the business unit level, or at the level of the corporation.  
Grant (2002: 72) defined strategic management by asking two key questions: “where 
does the firm compete and how does it compete?” The latter (‘How?’) refers to 
business-level strategy and is concerned with issues of market positioning and how 
firms can achieve competitive advantage in the markets they operate in. Most fields of 
strategic management are based on the business-level of a firm. An overview over the 
strategic interest groups of the Strategic Management Society nowadays shows twelve 
different groups of which corporate strategy is one. For instance, other fields refer to 
competitive strategy, behavioural strategy, strategy practice, and stakeholder strategy. 
The former question (‘Where?’) refers to corporate-level strategy and deals with 
issues of firm scope or ‘domain selection’ and where and by which means firms select 
businesses to operate in (Grant, 2002). 
 
2.2 Strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are one key option for scope expansion. They are defined 
by Gulati (1999) as: “(...) any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between 
firms that involve exchange, sharing or codevelopment, and it can include 
contributions by partners of capital, technology or firm-specific assets” (Gulati, 1999: 
397). Such partnerships can consist of two partners in dyadic alliances or more than 
two partners in multi-partner alliances (Lavie, Lechner, & Singh, 2007). In contrast to 
M&A, the two partnering firms continue to act as independent entities (Yoshino & 
Rangan, 1995). In essence, the organizations share the benefits of joint operations as 
they both contribute elements in agreed-upon key functional or strategic areas but 
retain the benefit of control in other parts of their operations (Yoshino & Rangan, 
1995). Therefore, firms may collaborate in one area, whilst being competitors in 
another (Hamel et al., 1989). Partnerships between organizations and the exchange, 
sharing or co-development of resources, products or capabilities are not a new 
phenomenon as alliances have been used for many decades (Hagedoorn, 2002). The 
importance of collaborations, however, has increased in recent decades due to 
amongst other reasons simultaneous cost and innovation pressures leading to a 
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growing demand for more flexible, lower commitment modes of expansion (De Man 
& Duysters, 2005; Hagedoorn, 2002).  
Strategic alliances have attracted significant interest from researchers 
investigating various contexts, stages, types, or even levels. This literature review 
firstly concentrates on the theoretical perspectives used in strategic alliance research. 
Following this, I focus on reviewing the different stages of the alliance process, the 
so-called ‘alliance management lifecycle’ of strategic alliances before the various, 
oftentimes contradictory performance effects of strategic alliances are discussed. After 
identifying that alliance performance does not always meet the stated objectives, this 
review then centres on development in the literature on alliance capabilities which 
have been shown to facilitate firms’ ability to manage alliances more effectively. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of theoretical lenses in strategic alliance research 
In order to understand why strategic alliances are formed and what 
implications they might have on value creation, this literature review focuses on four 
of the most frequently used theories (e.g. Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002): the 
resource-based view (RBV), organizational learning (OL), social network theory 
(SNT) and signalling theory (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hamel, 1991; 
Kogut, 1988). In the early stages of the alliance literature development, most research 
had followed a transaction cost perspective (TCE) and argued that alliances may help 
to lower the transaction costs associated with spot-market transactions such as the 
enforcement costs (e.g. Stuckey, 1983). TCE has first been applied as a means to 
analyse why firms enter strategic alliances over other means such as spot-market 
transactions or M&A (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Kogut & Singh, 1988). This has 
been extended to discussions how firms enter alliances through different types of 
alliance governance modes (Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004). However, as the literature 
has gradually recognized the limitations of TCE’s focus on only cost and efficiency 
(Khanna, 1998), this perspective has been complemented with strategic, learning, and 
social objectives (Das & Teng, 2000a; Khanna, 1998; Teng, 2007). In the following, 
these theoretical perspectives are first introduced and then their relevance to the 
alliance literature is provided. 
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2.2.1.1 Resource-based view (RBV) 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm has frequently been applied in the 
context of strategic alliances (e.g. Das & Teng, 2000b; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Lavie, 
2006; Mowery et al., 1996; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). The RBV argues 
that organizations can gain a competitive advantage when they possess bundles of 
resources which are valuable, rare, non-substitutable and non-imitable (Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). While the TCE perspective has been a 
major focus in past research on alliances, RBV scholars believe that organizations 
mainly form alliances not because of cost reductions but because alliances enable 
them to gain access to such valuable, rare, non-substitutable and non-imitable 
resources in order to gain a competitive advantage (Das & Teng, 2000b). More 
specifically, according to the RBV, strategic alliances enable organizations to 
exchange, share or co-develop resources, products or capabilities (Das & Teng, 
2000b; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). In this regard, 
organizations are most likely to form alliances when they are in need of specific 
resources or have a strong bargaining position and want to exchange their valuable 
resources for other resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Even though M&A may be the default option to ‘acquire’ resources, 
particularly exchanges in which not all resources are valuable enough to justify an 
acquisition, or when resources are based on tacit knowledge, alliances provide a more 
effective resource-accessing form of organizing (Das & Teng, 2000b). By essentially 
only ‘accessing’ resources (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004), firms can close the gaps 
between desired and actual resources without engaging in a lengthy acquisition 
process (Das & Teng, 2000a). In particular, firms with a broad range of technological 
knowledge are therefore more likely to engage in a strategic alliance (Zhang & Baden-
Fuller, 2010). Specific resources to be accessed in strategic alliances can be related to 
certain locations which facilitate the entry into a new market (Garcı́a-Canal, Duarte, 
Criado, & Llaneza, 2002), or the long-term goal of accessing specific knowledge 
resources so that a specific capability can be transferred (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1991). 
Especially in competitive environments (D'Aveni, 1994), organizations may not 
possess all the necessary resources and alliances allow for the access of these 
resources (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998). Organizations may therefore engage in 
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alliances for both input and output activities or alternatively use it for marketing or 
R&D activities (Sampson, 2007). 
One drawback of the traditional RBV’s applicability to strategic alliances is 
that it assumes that resources are owned and controlled by one firm (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). In strategic alliances, however, resources are essentially shared 
across firm boundaries. Therefore, more recent research has provided RBV extensions 
to an alliance level (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). In a first attempt to extend the 
RBV to strategic alliances, Dyer and Singh (1998) find that firms’ enter strategic 
alliances because of the potential to generate  relational rents. Such rents are derived 
from the partnership itself and are the direct result of the combination, exchange or 
co-development of each partner’s firm-specific resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998). What 
makes these relational rents so unique is that firms would not be able to generate these 
by themselves or even through M&A as the partnership enables firms to also access 
the alliance partners’ portfolio of alliances. Through such network resources, firms 
can also access further resources (Gulati, 1999). Also, on a dyadic level, firms benefit 
from resources which are actually owned and controlled by the direct partner such as 
the partner firms reputational or legitimacy resources (Saxton, 1997; Stuart et al., 
1999). This indicates that firms’ existing linkages and the position in their alliance 
portfolio make them an attractive partner beyond firms’ own resource endowments 
(Goerzen, 2007; Koka & Prescott, 2008). Therefore, Lavie (2006) proposed that the 
incentive for firms to enter alliances is not merely due to the re-configuration of 
shared resources. Instead, non-shared, unintended resource transfers among partners 
dyadic or network resources may also occur. Such spill-over of resources may 
essentially be a key motivation for firms to enter strategic alliances (Lavie, 2006). 
Overall, the RBV has been one of the most frequently used theories underpinning why 
firms enter into alliances for strategic objectives. It has been extended to the alliance 
level and research has indicated that the connectedness of resources and re-
configurations with internal resources create incentives for firms to engage in strategic 
alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). 
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2.2.1.2 Organizational learning (OL) 
Similar to the RBV, alliance researchers embracing an organizational learning 
(OL) perspective assume that organizations can enhance value by transferring 
organizational resources from the partner firm. OL is distinct from the resource-based 
view, however, as it is primarily concerned with the knowledge transfer of processes 
or products from the partner firm (Argote, 2012; Huber, 1991). Research in the 
knowledge-based tradition emphasizes that knowledge derived from learning is a 
unique resource (Grant, 1996). Alliance literature has used OL in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, firms may learn through alliances to improve their knowledge of a certain 
geographical market for instance. Secondly, research has drawn on OL literature to 
explain how firms learn from previous alliances in order to improve their alliance 
management. This section is structured around these two distinct research areas. 
 Learning through alliances 
With efficiency, pace and knowledge accumulation critical to an 
organization’s success, learning becomes an important component to achieving 
competitive advantage (Hamel, 1991). Strategic alliances help organizations to learn 
from their partners and enhance their own knowledge resources with the partner’s 
knowledge (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2008; Inkpen & Crossan, 
1995; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Lyles, 1988; 
Simonin, 1997, 2004). Research finds that knowledge transfer through learning is one 
of the key objectives for organizations to enter strategic alliances and that the strength 
of learning opportunities determines how knowledge is transferred effectively 
(Simonin, 2004).  
While organizations may increase their knowledge base through alliances 
(Hamel, 1991), several factors such as the knowledge ambiguity (Simonin, 2004), or 
inert managerial beliefs may hinder knowledge transfer across alliance partners 
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). On the contrary, organizations may engage in so-called 
‘learning races’ which means that both partners try to internalize the other partner’s 
knowledge faster, consequently destabilizing the collaboration process altogether 
(Hamel, 1991; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998). More recent research 
has indicated that organizations actually may not intend to acquire the knowledge 
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indefinitely but instead only access it for the purpose of one alliance (Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004).  
 Learning from alliances 
Another approach frequently investigated in existing alliance research relates 
to learning from alliances to improve the alliance management. As the name suggests, 
alliance management relates to the process of managing strategic alliances (Ireland et 
al., 2002). This process involves several distinct stages from alliance formation to 
termination which are described in more detail in Section 2.2.2 (‘Alliance 
Management Lifecycle’). By building on learning curve arguments that organizations 
can improve the productivity in their respective strategic actions by continuously 
engaging in them (Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995), 
researchers have investigated whether firms can improve their alliance management 
through gaining experience in managing them. While research finds that organizations 
can benefit from such experience (Anand & Khanna, 2000a), these positive benefits 
are shown to be limited to the first few experiences (Sampson, 2005). Building on 
this, research finds that firms with significant experience may even have negative 
performance effects (Zollo et al., 2002). Research proposes that learning curves are 
not applicable for alliances (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Others 
have argued that such negative performance effects can instead be attributed to the 
difficulty of the learning context for alliances themselves (Zollo, 2009). One such 
learning mechanism which makes it difficult to effectively integrate knowledge is 
superstitious learning (Heimeriks, 2010; Levitt & March, 1988). Essentially, this 
refers to the misattribution of cause and effect in learning. When causal relationships 
between inputs and outputs are particularly ambiguous and performance is difficult to 
assess, firms tend to ascribe their performance to routines they feel comfortable about, 
thus, learning superstitiously (Levitt & March, 1988). If these routines are formed at 
times when firms have received positive performance feedback, then such routines are 
likely to be reinforced and only adapted if organizations are unsuccessful for long 
periods of time, thus resulting in overconfidence (Levitt & March, 1988). The context 
and dynamism surrounding strategic alliances makes it particularly likely that firms 
learn superstitiously (Zollo, 2009). Moreover, similarly to M&A, the relatively rare 
occasion of alliance announcements makes the performance assessment more 
challenging, therefore making misattribution in cause and effect even more likely 
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(Zollo, 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that firms are more overconfident in their 
alliance management leading to inferior alliance performance (Heimeriks, 2010). In 
summary, OL theory provides valuable insights into why firms form strategic 
alliances and how firms’ performance heterogeneity from alliances can be explained. 
 
2.2.1.3 Social network theory (SNT) 
The RBV and the OL perspective have contributed significantly to alliance 
research by focusing primarily on the level of the dyadic alliance. Whilst this has 
contributed to our improved understanding into the alliance formation reasons, 
governance structures and performance heterogeneity, these perspectives have largely 
considered firms on a dyadic level. However, organizations quite often manage 
multiple interrelated alliances in so-called alliance portfolios or networks (Goerzen, 
2007; Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Hoffmann, 2005; Rowley, 
Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Shipilov, 2006). Research has shown that organizations 
have incentives to enter alliances beyond the dyadic alliance itself, but instead with 
the perspective of the entire network or portfolio of alliances (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). 
For instance, an alliance with a certain partner who has a large densely connected 
network of partners may provide the organization with more lucrative future alliance 
partnerships or contacts. Through the formation of alliances, organizations therefore 
enter social networks of inter-connected alliances which further enable organizations 
to benefit from social capital. In turn, this may enhance the innovation level (Ahuja, 
2000), or facilitate the transfer of knowledge (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005).  
The theory on which most of the existing works on alliance portfolios rests is 
social network theory (SNT) (e.g. Wassmer, Dussauge, & Planellas, 2010). SNT has 
originated from sociology and regards networks as consisting of multiple dyadic 
relationships. Due to a sociological underpinning, research in this tradition has 
primarily looked at networks of acquaintances or friends (Granovetter, 1973). 
Nevertheless, SNT has contributed significantly to alliance portfolio research. Its 
exponential increase (Borgatti & Foster, 2003) may have contributed to research on 
alliances which has only recently become a distinct theoretical field. In particular, the 
social capital and the embeddedness streams of literature have contributed to work on 
alliance portfolios (Wassmer, 2010). From a SNT perspective, portfolios consist of an 
egocentric network with a multitude of direct ties (Rowley et al., 2000). Network 
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theory has contributed to the development of the configuration of alliance portfolios as 
many studies have focussed on the topic of structural and relationship-specific aspects 
(tie strength and depth) of networks (e.g. Rowley et al., 2000). 
 
2.2.1.4 Signalling theory 
While the above theories primarily focus on firm-, dyad-, or network-related 
aspects for alliance formation and the ability to create value from alliances, these 
theories fall short in establishing a direct relation to how the formation of alliances is 
received by external stakeholders. In this respect, alliances function as signals to 
investors to either indicate increased future profitability or to signal a capability to 
more successfully manage strategic alliances. The theory on which this is built is 
called signalling theory which is essentially concerned with reducing the differences 
in information possessed between two transaction parties (Spence, 2002), in the case 
of alliances between the firm engaging in an alliance and (potential) investors into the 
firm. Signalling theory is built on the ideas developed by Akerlof (1970) in his famous 
‘lemon’ example in the second-hand car market in which he shows that in situations 
where one party cannot draw any inferences about the quality of an asset, markets are 
likely to collapse because of the reluctance of one party to engage in a transaction. 
Stiglitz (2000) has emphasized that such information asymmetry exists on two 
different levels. Firstly, the quality of the information causing the asymmetry is 
difficult to assess in many instances. Secondly, there might be information asymmetry 
concerning the intent of one subject towards the other. Winning the Nobel Prize in 
2001 for their contribution to Information Economics, George A. Akerlof and Joseph 
E. Stiglitz have emphasized adverse selection as a consequence of information 
asymmetry while Michael Spence has stressed ways to reduce information asymmetry 
through signalling – the eventual birth of signalling theory.  
Spence (1973) in his work on labour markets identifies that a high level of 
information asymmetry between employers and job applicants regarding the ‘true 
qualities’ of the latter exist. He finds that signals can be used to differentiate high 
quality from low quality applicants. Furthermore, he defines such signals as “activities 
or attributes of individuals in a market which by design or accident, alter the beliefs 
of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market” (Spence, 1974:1). In the 
context of the labour market, Spence (1973) finds that high quality job applicants use 
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their level of education as a signal to differentiate themselves from lower quality 
applicants in order to gain employment. In order for signals to credibly convey quality 
to the other party however, the signal, for instance education, must be too costly for 
other parties with low quality activities or attributes to imitate. As applicants with 
inferior qualities bear significant costs to replicate such education levels, according to 
Spence (1973), education reflects an effective signal to differentiate between low and 
high quality applicants.  
While the development of signalling theory has started in the field of 
economics (Spence, 1973) as a response to research indicating the problems 
associated with information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970), it has since been frequently 
applied in the contexts of finance (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Easley & O'Hara, 2004; 
Flannery, 1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984) and also management (Certo, 2003; Ndofor & 
Levitas, 2004). More specifically, management research has applied the idea of 
signalling qualities in multiple contexts, such as amongst others in initial public 
offerings (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010) or product awards (Soh, 
Mahmood, & Mitchell, 2004). While the above may seem complex, the actual process 









Signalling theory recognizes two primary actors which are firstly the sender of 
the signal (‘signaller’) and secondly the ‘receiver’ of the signal. Signallers can be 
firms (e.g. Montiel, Husted, & Christmann, 2012), or individuals within the firm (e.g. 
Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). These may then deliberately or by accident send signals to 
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FIGURE 2.2: Graphical illustration of signalling theory 
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the receiver. Signals  can refer to any corporate action or simply the announcement of 
them, such as certain executive member appointments (Certo, 2003), product 
certifications (Montiel et al., 2012), or press releases (Carter, 2006) of corporate 
development activities, such as strategic alliances (Park & Mezias, 2005). Receivers 
can refer to either individuals or firms concerned with a financial or societal interest in 
the signaller, such as stakeholders. Research oftentimes identifies potential investors 
or shareholders who may lack certain information about the signaller’s organization as 
receivers of signals (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). These receivers then 
interpret the signal and feed their evaluation back to signallers through investment-
related responses. Signalling theory also recognizes that the transmission of signals 
from the signaller to the receiver may occur through the use of intermediaries such as 
media outlets or financial analysts. For instance, media outlets may distort the effect 
of signals by not reporting on them (Carter, 2006). Additionally, expert opinions such 
as financial analysts may exacerbate or mitigate the effect of signals (Ozcan & 
Overby, 2008).  
In the context of strategic alliances, signalling theory has also frequently been 
applied (e.g. Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013; Stuart et al., 1999). Almost exclusively, 
the alliance formation itself represents the signal to receivers which are most often 
investors. One critical distinction is that two different types of alliance signals in 
particular exist. Firstly, the alliance partnership itself may send a signal to investors 
(e.g. Ozmel et al., 2013; Park & Mezias, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999). In this case, 
forming the alliance helps to reduce information asymmetry regarding the firm’s 
future profitability. For instance, forming alliances with prominent alliance partners in 
contrast to less prominent alliance partners may send a signal of legitimacy to 
investors and create a positive value creation (Ozmel et al., 2013; Stuart et al., 1999). 
This is because the alliance formation sends a signal of higher future profitability to 
investors.  
Secondly, the underlying firm-specific characteristics of the announcing firm 
also send a signal to investors (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009). In 
contrast to the abovementioned alliance formation signals, these signals reflect the 
ability to manage strategic alliances more successfully. For instance, firms’ experience 
in managing strategic alliances signals a firm-level alliance or dyad-level relational 
capability to more successfully manage (repeated) alliances to investors (Anand & 
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Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009). In order to further discuss the difficulty of 
managing strategic alliances, the following subsection introduces research on the 
various stages of alliance management. 
 
2.2.2 Alliance management lifecycle 
Despite clear alliance objectives such as the reduction of transaction costs, 
resource accession, learning from alliance partners or benefiting from the entire 
network of alliances, as described above, the process of managing strategic alliances is 
inherently difficult. While each alliance differs in terms of the management 
requirements (De Man, 2014), research has, however, identified common, repeatable 
stages of each alliance. Therefore, firms can potentially learn about the process of 
managing the alliance lifecycle as described in the OL literature above. The alliance 
management lifecycle consists of three identifiable areas: alliance formation, alliance 
governance and design and post-formation alliance management (Kale & Singh, 
2009). Other researchers have noted that the alliance lifecycle may consist of up to 
seven distinct stages, such as choosing an alliance strategy, selecting partners, 
negotiation, setting up the alliance, operation, evaluation, and modification (Das & 
Teng, 1997). For matters of simplicity, and due to significant overlap between the 
different views on the components of the alliance management lifecycle, this literature 
review uses the three stage alliance development process based on Kale & Singh’s 



















FIGURE 2.3: Alliance management lifecycle overview 
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2.2.2.1 Alliance formation and partner selection 
All alliances begin with a formation decision. After the objectives of the 
strategic alliance have been agreed upon within the organization, due diligence for 
alliance partners may begin (Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009). A large stream of 
literature has argued for the importance of partner selection criteria and has 
emphasized the importance of certain elements such as trust (Anand & Khanna, 
2000a; Gulati, 1995b), commitment (Das & Rahman, 2001), complementarity 
(Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Harrison et al., 2001) and financial payoff (Dyer & Chu, 
2000) when selecting an alliance partner. A misfit in any of these characteristics may 
lead to the failure of an alliance (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). While these 
characteristics are critical to alliance success, Shah and Swaminathan (2008) develop 
a framework to identify the relative importance of them. Using a managerial control 
and contingency approach, they find that the alliance project type and the resulting 
process manageability and outcome interpretability determines which partner 
characteristics are most critical (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Trust among the 
alliance partners may be essential in alliances which are difficult to manage in terms 
of processes and when the outcomes are uncertain, calling for an extended period of 
due diligence (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). On the contrary, due diligence may be 
reduced and the potential financial payoff prioritized in alliance projects in which 
processes are easy to manage and the outcomes are more certain (Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008). R&D alliances have a high level of uncertainty, the processes 
are difficult to manage and, hence, from a control perspective, trust is the most 
important criteria in this alliance context (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Partner 
selection essentially depends on a trade-off between the potential to reach alliance 
objectives weighed against the risk of opportunism. Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland (2008) 
find that in important alliances, firms are likely to select partners based on the amount 
of previous alliance partnerships with them. In such instances, firms are likely to 
select ‘friends’, thus firms with a significant amount of previous partnerships with the 
firm or partners with whom they have not partnered before. However, ‘acquaintances’, 
thus partners with whom firms have little partnering experience, are least preferred 
because these firms are more familiar with the weaknesses of the partner company and 
thus may more easily engage in opportunistic behaviour (Li et al., 2008).  
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The criticality of due diligence in the partner selection stage can be further 
reduced through the investment of irreversible assets in the partnership, which by 
itself indicates a high level of commitment and trust (Parkhe, 1993). Following TCE 
logic, this makes the assets for the alliance relationship-specific, thereby limiting the 
chance for opportunism by the alliance partner (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Even though 
this may make the partnership more stable, it may essentially also harm the 
effectiveness of an alliance from a benefits or strategic perspective as it limits an 
organizations flexibility (Das, 2005).  
Shah and Swaminathan (2008) consider the partner choice explicitly based on 
an integrated framework of minimizing risks while still meeting strategic objectives. 
Other studies have focused more explicitly on the goal of enhancing strategic 
competitiveness and have used a RBV perspective (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). According to these studies, firms may form alliances when they are in a 
position of weakness, such as in need of specific resources or in a position of strength, 
such as well-connected top management in order to improve their bargaining position 
(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Therefore, 
firms partner decision will likely reflect how well the partner either meets the resource 
requirements or whether the partner is also in need of critical resources (Baum et al., 
2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Intangible benefits, such as legitimacy in the 
industry, are also critical when deciding on an appropriate alliance partner (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). In general, the alliance formation process is political 
and dependent upon the effective negotiation of the contract and conditions, thus, the 
better connected, large enterprise with a stronger social position usually has a 
bargaining power advantage over the smaller partner (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). However, previous experiences between the partners may also have an 
influence as they help to increase trust and facilitate the mutual achievement of 
alliance goals (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Gulati, 1995a) and hence organizations are 





2.2.2.2 Alliance governance and design 
After a firm has engaged in due diligence and chosen an alliance partner, firms 
need to decide on governance and design choices (Kale & Singh, 2009). Alliances in 
general can be seen as a hybrid organizational form as they combine both elements of 
hierarchy and markets (Powell, 1987; Williamson, 1991) for which there are 
important governance and design decisions to be made in order to increase the 
effectiveness of alliances (Kale & Singh, 2009). These essentially relate to decisions 
of trust and control (De Man, 2014). While strategic alliances can be distinguished 
along various different dimensions, the most frequently used distinction is the equity 
versus contractual (non-equity) dimension. While non-equity arrangements are similar 
to market exchanges and allow for significant flexibility, they come at the expense of 
losing control. The effect for equity arrangements which are similar to a hierarchical 
structure is the opposite as they allow for control while being limited in terms of 
flexibility (Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Several factors influence the decision whether 
equity is recommendable in an alliance: Transaction costs (Pisano, Russo, & Teece, 
1988), the perceived risk level (Das & Teng, 1999) and learning reasons (Mowery et 
al., 1996) have been identified as decision criteria for organizations in evaluating the 
choice between equity and non-equity partnerships.  
 Equity Joint Ventures 
Joint venture (JV) research has been particularly prevalent in strategic alliance 
research (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Hennart, 1988; Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Inkpen, 
2008; Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Klijn, Reuer, Buckley, & Glaister, 2010; Lyles, 1988). 
Through shared equity ownership in a new venture, firms can effectively learn from 
one another while reducing risk for opportunism through ‘shared hostages’ in the form 
of equity (Hennart, 1988). JVs can distinguished among majority equity joint ventures 
and minority equity joint ventures (Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Majority equity JVs 
refer to the creation of a separate new entity in which two or more partners hold 
ownership stakes. Research has found that firms are likely to push towards the 
formation of JVs when the partner has tacit knowledge-based resources while the 
focal firm has property-based resources in order to improve access to partners’ 
knowledge resources while at the same minimizing opportunism (Das & Teng, 
2000b). Minority equity JVs refer to one or both companies taking a minority equity 
position in the partner firm without gaining full control. The equity stake thereby 
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serves as a means to tie the destiny of both companies together (Das & Teng, 1996). 
This may reduce the risk of opportunism for firms which primarily contribute tacit, 
knowledge-based resources against partners which primarily contribute explicit, 
property-based resources to the alliance (Das & Teng, 2000b). JVs can also be 
distinguished among multiple objectives. JVs may either be scale or link ventures. 
Scale JVs have the objective of maximizing economies of scale (Hennart, 1988), such 
as the well-known Nissan-Renault JV in manufacturing and procurement (Yoshino & 
Fagan, 2003). Link JVs on the contrary involve collaborations between organizations 
with complementary skills or markets (Hennart, 1988). This means that firms may 
collaborate in areas which may not be their primary focus.  
 Non-Equity Contractual Alliances 
Non-equity alliances can take the form of bilateral contractual partnerships, 
such as joint R&D operations, complementary asset or skills partnerships or R&D 
consortia as well as unilateral contractual partnerships, such as licensing agreements 
(Das & Teng, 2000b; Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). In contrast to equity alliances, they 
are based on contracts instead of equity to bind the companies together. While equity 
arrangements provide firms with the perceived reduction in potential partner 
opportunism, this may essentially only be a perceived feeling of certainty. Essentially, 
partner firms can still exploit a firm’s resources as the boundaries to the JV may be 
blurry (De Man, 2014). Moreover, the cost of setting up a JV can be substantial as 
discussions may revolve not only about the areas of collaboration but also about the 
financial and organizational aspects of setting the venture up (De Man, 2014). This 
process can be resource- and time-consuming. Das and Teng (2000b) argue that if 
both firms have knowledge-based resources, this will likely result in learning races 
with both firms aiming to learn and terminate the alliance as soon as objectives are 
achieved. Therefore, as a result of this and the above mentioned cost and resource 
demands of JVs, firms may form bilateral contract alliances. These offer the flexibility 
of rapid formation and termination. Consequently, it is not surprising that non-equity 
contractual arrangements are most prevalent in the field of R&D in general and in 
knowledge-intensive sectors such as the pharmaceuticals or the information 
technology industries, in particular (Hagedoorn, 2002).  
27 
Unilateral contract arrangements are usually structured in the form of licensing 
agreements (Anand & Khanna, 2000b). Such arrangements may include a more 
limited amount of interaction between partners than in bilateral agreements. In 
addition, such arrangements require detailed specifications of the licensing resources. 
Due to the difficulty of providing explicit specifications of tacit knowledge, such 
licensing arrangements usually involve the transfer of property-based resources such 
as patents or specific molecules in the pharmaceutical sector, for instance (Das & 
Teng, 2000b).  
 
2.2.2.3 Post-formation alliance management 
Once an alliance is formed and design choices have been made, the actual 
management of the alliance begins. Whereas the partner selection, and the alliance 
governance and design have received significant attention throughout the evolution of 
alliance research, post-formation alliance management has not received as much 
attention in the literature (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). Being able to manage this 
stage of the alliance lifecycle can be termed an alliance management capability and 
encompasses all the key elements needed for managing an alliance after it has been 
formed (Schreiner et al., 2009).  
The process of managing the alliance relationship is the actual key to an 
effective alliance (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Reuer et al., 2002). This is because there is 
the danger of a constant tension between cooperation and competition among the 
alliance partners (Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna et al., 1998). While trust is an essential 
element for the stability of an alliance (Ireland et al., 2002), recognizing and managing 
potentially deceitful, opportunistic behaviour by an alliance partner at this stage is 
essential (Das, 2005). Negative experiences in terms of cooperation with a specific 
partner  due to low veracity and commitment (Ariño, 1997) may make it necessary for 
organizations to have mechanisms in place to limit the potential for opportunistic 
uncooperative behaviour (Das, 2005). More specifically, Das (2005) identifies six 
mechanisms to prevent deceitful behaviour which should be selected according to the 
potential likelihood for such behaviours by alliance partners at different stages. The 
mechanisms are “contracts, governance structure, mutual hostages, monitoring, 
participatory decision making, and staffing and training” (Das, 2005: 708). While 
contracts and governance structure are more important in the early stages of an 
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alliance formation as described in earlier sections, the most effective mechanisms in 
the post-formation stage are rather the monitoring and participatory decision-making 
(Das, 2005). Such mechanisms can effectively be introduced into alliances by means 
of inter-organizational routines such as steering committees which facilitate 
monitoring and communication among the alliance partners (Zollo et al., 2002). As 
emphasized by Schreiner et al. (2009), coordination, communication and bonding with 
the alliance partner are essential at this stage (Schreiner et al., 2009). 
Before an alliance is eventually terminated, either planned or unplanned, 
roughly 40% of all alliances experience changes in their governance structure through 
contractual changes, board changes or possibly changes in the supervision of the 
alliance partner (Reuer et al., 2002). Thus, being prepared for instability is essential 
for firms. Previous alliance experiences influence the post-formation changes but, 
most importantly, alliance specific characteristics such as a low division of labour, or 
a high relative importance of the alliance, may make post-formation governance 
changes more likely (Reuer et al., 2002). 
Due to inter-organizational conflict (Mohr & Spekman, 1994), or when one or 
more organizations have reached their alliance objectives (Hamel et al., 1989; Inkpen 
& Beamish, 1997; Yan & Zeng, 1999), an alliance may be terminated. Alliances due 
to their temporary nature have been described as “mere transitional devices” which, in 
addition to their complexity, makes them “destined to fail” (Porter, 1990: 612-613). 
Alliance partners’ access to complementary resources and a high strategic importance 
of the partnership may however decrease the termination likelihood (Lunnan & 
Haugland, 2008). The unstable nature of alliances is supported by high termination 
rates which indicate that roughly 50% of all alliances fail and end up being terminated 
prematurely (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Kogut, 1989). Terminations have therefore 
frequently been used as an indicator for the failure of an alliance (Park & Ungson, 
2001). It is not surprising that failure rates are highest after the initial ‘honeymoon 
phase’ of the alliance has passed (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Lunnan & Haugland, 
2008). Reasons for the termination of alliances in general can include dysfunctional 
conflict among alliance partners (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Doz & Hamel, 1998) 
which may develop when controlling an alliance partner to reduce information 
asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour (Hamel, 1991). Additionally, the incorrect 
management of conflict can lead to the termination of alliances (Kale et al., 2000). 
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Nevertheless, terminations are not necessarily failures but may instead be the result of 
partnering organizations reaching their alliance objectives (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; 
Yan & Zeng, 1999). 
 
2.2.3 Alliance effect on value creation 
As indicated above, the management of strategic alliances is inherently 
difficult. While some firms are more effective in managing alliances, others have 
difficulties to manage them. One key means to evaluate performance of strategic 
alliances refers to the value created by alliances. The concept of value creation is 
central to the field of theory and particularly to the RBV (e.g. Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Barney, 1991). In essence, existing research finds that competitive advantage is 
created through valuable resources. Value creation in that sense is the primary focus 
of any corporation, albeit different types of value creation exist. These may refer to 
stock market, accounting book value or other factors which ultimately may impact a 
firm’s economic profits such as innovation. Previous studies have therefore used a 
multitude of different measures for value creation which can be distinguished based 
on ex ante and ex post value creation. Ex ante value creation refers to the value 
created before an alliance is even undertaken and refers to stock market based 
measures upon the announcement of an alliance, while ex post value creation refers to 
the value created after the alliance has been formed. Examples of this include the 
innovative value created (e.g. De Man & Duysters, 2005), the operational 
performance (e.g. Pangarkar, 2003), and the managerial assessments of the alliance 
(e.g. Zollo et al., 2002). The ultimate processes which impact the value created are 
based on economic rents. The next subsection therefore focuses on the rents created 
by strategic alliances before a more thorough introduction of alliance value creation is 
presented. 
 
2.2.3.1 Rent generation of strategic alliances 
Value is created through earning economic rents. Alliances have the potential 
to create various economic rents beyond the most common types of ricardian and 
quasi-rents which are derived from purely internal efforts (e.g. Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Peteraf, 1993). While ricardian rents refer to scarce resources a firm may 
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possess, quasi-rents refer to the added value a firm can contribute to a specific 
resource which another firm may not be able to do. These types of rents are based on 
the traditional RBV. Dyer and Singh (1998) and Lavie (2006) extend this to the 
alliance context and argue that firms can benefit from alliances through additional 
types of rent. More specifically (1) internal rents, (2) relational rents, (3) inbound 
spill-over rents, and (4) outbound spill-over rents may be generated. As these form the 
basis for the empirical results of alliance value creation, which follow in the section 
below, these will be discussed here. 
Firstly, firms can extract internal rents from the resources not shared with the 
partner. For instance, while the reputation of the partner is not a resource shared by 
the partner, it can still either positively or negatively affect a firm’s resource base 
(Stuart et al., 1999). 
Secondly, relational rents are the primary means by which firms gain 
advantages from strategic alliances. The relational view, as developed by Dyer and 
Singh (1998), argues that firms generate rents which neither firm could generate by 
itself. As the resources of the firm are shared, such relational rents are generated. 
These rents stem from complementarity between the resources, knowledge-sharing 
routines and relation-specific assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This leads to common 
benefits for both alliance partners (Khanna et al., 1998).  
Thirdly and fourthly, firms can also gain private benefits through accessing 
related but non-shared resources of the partner firm. Such rents are termed inbound 
and outbound spill-over rents (Lavie, 2006). They derive from opportunistic 
behaviour of either alliance partner. Such behaviour is not unusual in alliances and 
oftentimes both partners do the same by engaging in so-called ‘learning races’ 
(Hamel, 1991). Both partnering firms have mechanisms in place to prevent such 
opportunistic behaviour through patents or specialized assets, for instance. 
Additionally, causal ambiguity of key resources can protect against opportunism 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). However, through mechanisms, such as partner firms’ 
absorptive capacity and bargaining position advantages, such spill-overs are still likely 
to occur in favour of one alliance partner (Lavie, 2006).  
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2.2.3.2 Ex ante alliance value creation 
As mentioned above, value can be created either ex ante or ex post of the 
alliance formation. Ex ante refers to the expectation that organizations can turn the 
potential economic rents into value during the alliance. The ex ante reaction of 
investors thus represents the expectation that economic rents as described above are 
going to be earned. This is in contrast to ex post value creation which refers to the 
value created essentially during or after the alliance, such as the achievement of 
strategic objectives such as, for example, innovation. This thesis focuses on the value 
creation ex ante of the alliance formation through abnormal stock market returns 
which has been the focus of many studies investigating the effect of alliances onto 
value creation (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Merchant & Schendel, 
2000). Reasons for the use of ex ante value creation are due to the temporal nature of 
alliances and the multitude of alliances managed by firms which makes ex post 
alliance value creation particularly difficult. Therefore, this thesis relies on 
abovementioned previous research using abnormal stock market performance as a 
means to investigate how different alliance experience dimensions impact value 
creation. 
The most frequently used ex ante value creation measure is the value generated 
by strategic alliances upon their announcement through so-called cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). By using an event study methodology as introduced in the 
seminal paper by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), several studies have 
identified positive CARs to strategic alliance announcements by stock market 
investors (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997; 
Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; McConnell & 
Nantell, 1985). The CAR directly reflects investors’ opinion on the ability of each 
alliance to increase value for the firm (Kale et al., 2002). This presents an advantage 
over ex post value creation as the direct value creation effect of strategic alliances can 
be more easily extracted (Koh & Venkatraman, 1991). Moreover, ex post 
measurement of value creation is subject to further difficulties. While other studies 
have investigated the effect onto managerial assessments (e.g. Zollo et al., 2002)This 
includes biases in managerial assessments and the difficulty of extracting the effect of 
single alliances due to the multitude of other confounding events. 
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 Under the assumption that investors are effectively able to predict the value of 
an alliance, the ex ante value creation provides a long-term view of the firm to 
generate economic rents and essentially superior value creation through alliances. This 
builds on the stock market efficiency hypothesis, which has been created by Fama 
(1970) who argued that weak, semi-strong and strong forms of market efficiency 
exist
1
. While the stock market seems to at best be semi-strong efficient as the recent 
financial crisis has indicated, in the context of strategic alliances, the stock market has 
been found to be efficient as market movements around the alliance announcement 
indicate (Gulati et al., 2009). While the reaction of markets to alliance announcements 
may indicate (semi-strong) efficiency of the markets, studies have also tested whether 
short-term CAR for alliance announcements reflects the long-term or other levels of 
analysis in alliance performance in order to support the efficient market hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence indeed finds support for the efficient market hypothesis in 
different strategic alliance contexts (e.g. Kale et al., 2002; Koh & Venkatraman, 
1991). The use of ex ante value creation measures in this thesis and other previous 
studies (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Merchant & Schendel, 
2000) therefore includes the investor expectation for ex post value creation measures. 
This thesis essentially focuses on three aspects of alliance experience (Signalling, 
Learning dynamics and temporal aspects) and their effect on value creation. Existing 
research has indicated that in all three aspects, investors are well capable to estimate 
the value created due to signalling (e.g. Park & Mezias, 2005) learning effects (e.g. 
Anand & Khanna, 2000a) and temporal dynamics (Rindova, Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 
2010). Combined with the stock market efficiency this makes the ex ante value 







                                                     
1
 (1) Weak form efficiency predicts that the stock market price reflects all past publicly available 
information, (2) semi-strong form of market efficiency includes all publicly available information 
which adjust to new information, (3) while the strong form efficiency predicts that stock prices upon an 
announcement reflect not only publicly available information but also private and insider information 
(Fama, 1970) 
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2.2.4 Firm-level alliance capability 
The effect of alliances on the various value creation measures, as described 
above, has been shown to vary by firm (Anand & Khanna, 2000a). Hence, there is 
evidence which shows that some firms have developed superior capabilities to manage 
strategic alliances effectively. Therefore, this section shifts from the dyadic alliance 
level to the firm-level (please refer to a graphical overview of this in Figure 2.1 
above). In line with this, both anecdotal evidence and empirical research shows that 
certain firms are more capable of managing strategic alliances than others. For 
instance, the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly (Sims et al., 2001) and the electronics 
company Hewlett Packard (Draulans, De Man, & Volberda, 2003) have been 
particularly successful at managing strategic alliances by developing specific alliance 
processes. Such processes facilitate the management of alliances by modifying and 
improving the various operating routines important for the day-to-day management of 
the alliance lifecycle, as explained earlier in this chapter. These skills as described 
above essentially become a capability within the firm through “(…) a learned and 
stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002: 340). An alliance capability is therefore regarded as a dynamic 
capability (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Kale & Singh, 2007) as it enables firms to 
“extend, modify or create ordinary capabilities” (Winter, 2003: 991). Moreover, 
several researchers argue that alliance capabilities need to be considered as dynamic 
because “it enables firms to achieve greater alliance success by helping them develop 
or improve their lower-order partnering skills to manage different phases or aspects in 
alliances more successfully.” (Kale & Singh, 2007: 982)  
While there is coherence on the fact that alliance capabilities exist and can be 
classified as dynamic capabilities, ambiguity exists regarding the composition of 
alliance capabilities and how exactly they may improve performance. In order to 
provide a clearer overview of the various components of an alliance capability 
identified in existing literature, I provide several definitions identified in existing 
literature before suggesting an alternative definition. An alliance capability has 
previously been defined as firms’ “mechanisms and routines that are purposefully 
designed to accumulate, store, integrate, and diffuse relevant organisational 
knowledge through individual and organizational experience” (Kale et al., 2002: 749), 
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the “ability to create successful alliances, based on learning about alliance 
management and leveraging alliance knowledge inside the company” (Draulans et al., 
2003: 152), which results in a “higher order resource that is difficult to obtain or 
imitate and has the potential to enhance the performance of the firm’s alliance 
portfolio” (Heimeriks et al., 2007: 374). These definitions complement each other as 
each one targets a specific underlying process and objective. The first one by Kale et 
al. (2002) focuses on the various processes related to experience, institutionalization 
and integration. Draulans et al. (2003) focus on the objectives of improving dyadic 
alliances through specific processes, whereas Heimeriks et al. (2007) focus on the 
dynamic capability itself while also emphasizing the overall objective of making 
alliances successful on a firm-level.  
More specifically, existing research identifies that firms can develop such an 
alliance capability by the underlying processes of (1) gaining alliance experience (e.g. 
Anand & Khanna, 2000a) and (2) by developing alliance management mechanisms 
consisting of alliance management institutionalization (e.g. Kale et al., 2002) and 
integrating processes throughout alliance organizations (e.g. Dyer et al., 2001; Kale et 
al., 2002). This section is structured around these two underlying components of an 
alliance capability
2
, beginning with general alliance experience. 
 
2.2.4.1 General alliance experience (GAE) 
As a general requirement for firms to successfully replicate alliance success, 
firms need to have managed alliances in the past. In particular, the alliance 
management lifecycle requires specific knowledge and essentially experience in order 
to avoid mistakes. The stream of literature on strategic alliance capability has built on 
literature of learning curves within the OL literature (e.g. Epple et al., 1991; Huber, 
1991; Levitt & March, 1988) which has argued that as firms accumulate experience 
they can improve their performance (Argote et al., 1990). More specifically, they 
become more effective and efficient the more they engage in a certain activity.  
General alliance experience (GAE) refers to all previous alliances a firm has 
managed in the past (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
                                                     
2
 An overview of empirical research for the identified components of firm-level alliance capability is 
provided in Appendices 2.1-2.3 
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Rothaermel, 2005). Some research slightly adapted this to include only previous 
alliances of a specific type (Kale et al., 2002) or only those formed in more recent 
years as knowledge may decay (Sampson, 2005). By means of prior experience, firms 
can improve their alliance performance through the accumulation of experience as it 
allows for the generation of specific knowledge about how to manage all stages of the 
alliance management lifecycle (Child & Yan, 2003; Lyles, 1994; Simonin, 1997). In 
particular, it allows for “(…) develop[ing] realistic expectations and avoid[ing] gross 
mistakes” (Child & Yan, 2003: 288) with the processes involved (e.g. alliance 
management lifecycle). More specifically, it may lead to improved communication 
between partners (Mohr & Spekman, 1994), may lead to an effective goal setting, 
effective management of alliances and can therefore lead to higher levels of alliance 
success (Child & Yan, 2003; Lyles, 1988). Besides learning benefits, accumulating 
alliance experience also improves the centrality of the firm within the network. 
Therefore, firms are better positioned to enter subsequent strategic alliances when they 
have gained experience (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
The empirical results, however, show that the effect is more ambiguous than 
the learning curve literature has predicted. Some research has found that alliance 
experience can have a positive effect on performance (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Pangarkar, 2003; Sampson, 2005). However, other 
research has found evidence for a non-linear relationship between alliance experience 
and performance (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Draulans et al., 2003; Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2005; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). In particular, small firms tend to benefit more 
significantly from alliance experience. In a similar line of reasoning, Sampson (2005) 
finds that only the most recent experiences are valuable for an organization. Other 
research finds that the benefits drawn from alliance experience depend on the specific 
type of alliance (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006) and type of 
experience (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010). Some research even identifies negative 
effects of alliance experience. More specially, GAE may not necessarily avoid early 
terminations (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997), while also the managerial 
assessment towards alliance performance may be non-positive (Reuer & Zollo, 2005; 
Zollo et al., 2002) 
These results built on research which finds that experience itself can be 
“confusing” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 97). The following quote by Levinthal and 
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March (1993) further elaborates on the difficulty of benefiting from simply 
accumulating experience: “Experience is often a poor teacher, being typically quite 
meager relative to the complex and changing nature of the world in which learning is 
taking place. Many of the same cognitive limits that constrain rationality also 
constrain learning. Learning from experience involves inferences from information. It 
involves memory. It involves pooling personal experience with knowledge gained 
from the experiences of others. The difficulties in learning effectively in the face of 
confusing experience are legendary. Even highly capable individuals and 
organizations are confused by the difficulties of using small samples of ambiguous 
experience to interpret complex worlds” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 96-97). 
Empirical results therefore indicate that the quantity of GAE is insufficient on 
its own, however, is an important contributor to explaining how firms can consistently 
improve alliance performance. This is in line with literature on capabilities which 
finds evidence that having experience by itself is not necessarily a predictor for higher 
levels of capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). As such, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for developing 
superior alliance capability (Simonin, 1997). Instead, the literature finds that 
supplementary processes around how alliance experiences are institutionalized (Kale 
et al., 2002) and integrated into alliance management processes (Heimeriks & 
Duysters, 2007) have a large impact on the alliance capability development. The 
following section elaborates on the impact of these. 
 
2.2.4.2 Alliance management mechanisms 
Existing research indicates that firms may benefit from processes which 
essentially integrate the knowledge from experience and disseminate it throughout the 
organization (Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 2007). Such 
processes are based on the ‘4I model’ developed by Crossan et al. (1999). Essentially, 
they develop a learning model which proposes that experience goes through a process 
of intuition among organizational members that make sense of the experience. 
Subsequently, lessons learnt may become integrated and institutionalized within the 
organization. Existing literature has primarily emphasized the processes of integration 
and institutionalization of knowledge generated from alliance experience in order to 
develop a firm-level alliance capability. 
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 Institutionalized alliance management mechanisms  
According to CBV and OL literature, organizations can benefit from 
experience through routinisation of behaviour in order to ensure replicability (Winter, 
2003). In order to generate such routines in the alliance context, existing literature 
identifies functions and other structural processes. As such, alliance functions may 
store experiences learned, and enable organizations to effectively draw lessons from 
the formal structures in alliances (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2001; Simonin, 1997). 
Organizations such as Eli Lilly have been shown to institutionalize alliance 
management practices in an alliance function (Sims et al., 2001). Most generally, 
these functions allow organizations to capture and codify alliance experiences (Kale et 
al., 2002). These can be either from own experience or best practices transferred from 
other organizations through vicarious learning (Harbison & Pekar, 1998). 
Subsequently, an alliance function can provide a platform that allows for the sharing 
of best practices at all stages of the alliance management lifecycle (Kale et al., 2002). 
The communication and dissemination of such best practices throughout the 
organization can occur via databases, websites, seminars, workshops in order to 
further coach management in such alliance practices (Harbison & Pekar, 1998; Kale et 
al., 2001). 
However, the effects are wider-ranging. As emphasized by Dyer et al. (2001: 
38), an alliance function also “increases external visibility, provides internal 
coordination, and eliminates both accountability problems and intervention problems”. 
Through the dissemination of alliance knowledge throughout the organization, 
alliance functions can also improve legitimacy within the organization. A frequent 
problem with alliances among employees is the ‘not-invented-here-syndrome’ and the 
oftentimes widespread belief among managers that alliances with partners are not 
necessary (Harbison & Pekar, 1998). Through alliance functions becoming ‘centres of 
excellence’ and emphasizing the benefits of alliances, the institutionalization may 
therefore improve legitimacy within the organization (Heimeriks, Klijn, & Reuer, 
2009; Kale et al., 2002). Additionally, it may improve external visibility towards 
stakeholders (Heimeriks et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002). For instance, it may signal 
commitment to potential strategic alliance partners, thereby attract potentially new 
alliance partners and signal a firms’ ability to successfully manage strategic alliances 
to shareholders (Kale et al., 2002). Such institutionalization not only has an impact on 
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current or potential individual alliances but also directs the companies’ overall 
partnering strategy (Hoffmann, 2005). In particular, it may improve the coordination 
of alliances in large portfolios and managing them simultaneously (Goerzen, 2005; 
Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Wassmer et al., 2010).  
Significant heterogeneity in institutionalization can be observed across 
organizations. Essentially, alliance institutionalization can occur on a continuum from 
‘ad-hoc management’ (no institutionalizing) over ‘lone ranger’ (very small number of 
in-house alliance experts but no knowledge sharing) to ‘institutional’ (formalization of 
processes, dedicated staff and knowledge repositories) (Harbison & Pekar, 1998). The 
level of institutionalization has been found to vary according to various dimensions. 
Firstly, the level of GAE influences a firm’s institutionalization (Heimeriks et al., 
2009). As the level of GAE increases, the institutionalization has been shown to 
increase as well in order to manage the increasing amount of experience to store and 
disseminate (Heimeriks et al., 2009). Secondly, the extent of alliance 
institutionalization appears to differ by country with more institutionalized alliance 
processes in the USA than in European companies (De Man, 2005) 
Similar to alliance experience, empirical evidence indicates that the effect of 
such institutionalized alliance functions on alliance performance in general is mixed 
(Heimeriks et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002). A dedicated alliance function seems to be 
valued by investors as organizations receive higher positive abnormal returns upon 
announcements of alliances. However, the reasons may be even more fundamental by 
allowing organizations to manage alliances more successfully and more therefore to 
be more likely to meet the alliance objectives in the long-term (Kale et al., 2002). 
However, institutionalized processes have also been shown to have negative effects on 
performance at high levels of experience due to inertia, overconfidence and 
superstitious learning (Heimeriks, 2010; Heimeriks et al., 2007). This indicates that 
there are limits to institutionalization of alliance experience and that the level needs to 
be appropriate in relation to the level of alliance experience.  
 Integrated alliance management mechanisms 
Effectively, the integration of learning processes takes the institutionalization 
one step further. They serve the purpose of creating interactive systems within the 
organization in order to improve understanding of the experiences. Such integration 
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alliance management processes are comprised of three underlying components. 
Firstly, tool-based processes such as intranet and databases provide firms with the 
ability to articulate and capture lessons of previous alliances and best practices 
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998; Heimeriks et al., 2009). Additionally, the introduction of 
performance reporting practices such as scorecards can improve alliance performance 
(Bamford & Ernst, 2002). Secondly, alliance management training such as 
communities of practice enables firms to share alliance knowledge throughout the 
organization (Draulans et al., 2003; Heimeriks et al., 2009). Thirdly, third-party 
relationships to consultants help firms to further improve their best practices and also 
provide ad-hoc help to manage alliance-related problems for which the firm does not 
possess the necessary capabilities (yet) (Draulans et al., 2003; Heimeriks et al., 2009). 
In summary, the alliance management process is to a large extent based upon the 
knowledge-based view as accumulating alliance knowledge is the main priority in 
order to improve alliance performance (Grant, 1996). Additionally, the alliance 
management processes consist of articulation, codification, sharing and the 
internalization of alliance knowledge (Kale & Singh, 2007).  
Based on the learning framework by Crossan et al. (1999), the literature has 
referred to such processes as integrating alliance management which occurs at the 
group level (Crossan et al., 1999). Empirical evidence indicates that the effect of such 
alliance management processes on alliance performance in general is also mixed 
(Heimeriks et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2001). Their impact on alliance performance is 
more positive for firms with high levels of alliance experience (Heimeriks et al., 
2007). Essentially, such experiences provide more variation and may therefore help in 
the selection of the value creating processes. Both mechanisms are complementary for 
organizations to effectively convert alliance experience into alliance knowledge 
(Heimeriks et al., 2007). As the CBV has emphasized, the development of capabilities 
is evolutionary (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The sequential 
process for an alliance capability is to first gain experience, and then institutionalize it 
in order to capture this experience. Lastly, the use of integrating processes to spread 
the alliance experience throughout the organization is suggested (Heimeriks et al., 
2007; Kale & Singh, 2007). While such mechanisms may have positive effects on 
alliance performance (Kale et al., 2001), recent research has found that the effect of 
codified alliance processes can be negative for alliance performance. Essentially, this 
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is dependent on the alliance lifecycle stages with alliance management processes for 
some stages being more beneficial than for others. More specifically, Heimeriks, 
Bingham, and Laamanen (2015) find alliance management processes are more 
valuable for early stage partner selection and late stage alliance termination phases, 
whereas, for the post-formation management stages it may even have negative effects 
(Heimeriks et al., 2015). This is because flexibility is more important when actually 
managing the alliance than in standardized early and late stages of the alliance 
lifecycle (Heimeriks et al., 2015). This indicates that alliance management 
mechanisms may also have detrimental effects on alliance value creation and may not 
be the key to achieving superior alliance performance. 
 
2.2.5 Dyad-level alliance capability 
2.2.5.1 Relational experience 
While firm-level alliance experience and alliance management mechanisms 
may facilitate the management of alliances through an explicit focus on the alliance 
lifecycle, the ability to transfer these across other alliances is limited as each alliance 
is ‘unique’ due to differences in alliance partners. These may require different 
management approaches (De Man, 2014). Firms may however reduce the uniqueness 
of an alliance by partnering with a familiar partner in multiple repeated partnerships
3
 
(Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). As this may translate into higher alliance 
performance, research has shown alliance capabilities may also exist on the dyad-level 
between two partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). Building on 
the relational view as introduced above, the literature has referred to these as dyad-
level relational capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). Firms have been 
found to develop relational capabilities by managing repeated partnerships, thereby 
gaining relational experience (Dekker & Abbeele, 2010; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2000; Li & Rowley, 2002), or partner-specific 
absorptive capacity (Zaheer et al., 2010). Existing literature identifies two reasons 
why relational experiences may lead to relational capabilities: These are the 
                                                     
3
 Repeated partnerships refer to new or extended partnership agreements between two firms which have 
collaborated in a previous partnership before. In this context the term “Repeated partnership/ties” (e.g. 
Goerzen, 2007; Hagedoorn, 2006; Xia, 2011) has primarily been used. Also the term “repeated 
exchanges” has been used in prior literature. As it has predominantly been in the context of supplier-
buyer partnerships (e.g. Elfenbein and Zenger (2014) and not strategic alliances in general, I rely on 
repeated partnerships in this thesis. 
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development of trust and the generation of partner-specific routines. However, other 
research has doubts whether relational experiences are beneficial as they may be 
entered due to network inertia. This section therefore endeavours to present both the 
positive and negative outcomes of repeated partnerships. 
 Trust as a result of relational experience 
Trust has frequently been investigated in the field of strategic alliances (Dyer 
& Chu, 2000; Fang, Palmatier, Scheer, & Li, 2008; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Zaheer, 
McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Partnering firms may develop trust among each other as 
they partner repetitively (Gulati, 1995a; Muthusamy & White, 2005). This may in turn 
reduce transaction costs (Granovetter, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) and 
eventually lead to more successful alliances (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). This is 
because the familiarity between alliance partners may provide firms with the ability to 
(1) reduce efforts for accumulating information about the partner in due diligence 
(Dyer & Chu, 2003), which then (2) improve the control process (Dekker & Abbeele, 
2010). This has led several researchers to propose that trust essentially reduces the 
need for control of the alliances partner (Gulati, 1995a; Zollo et al., 2002). Thus, trust 
and control of the alliance partner can be regarded as substitutes (Corts & Singh, 
2004). Other research however indicates that trust facilitates the ability to control 
(Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Ryall & Sampson, 
2009). This research considers firms as learning from previous partnerships in order to 
improve subsequent contracts with the partner (Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Vanneste & 
Puranam, 2010), thus leading to trust and control being considered as complements. 
While this debate is still ongoing in existing literature, the effect of repeated 
interactions on trust is positive (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Increased trust 
among partners leads to increased knowledge sharing and reduces the number of 
conflicts (e.g. Abrams, Cross, Lesser, & Levin, 2003) and therefore facilitates the 
interaction quality between organizations (Arrow, 1974). 
 Partner-specific routines as a result of relational experience 
Derived from a dynamic capability perspective (Zollo & Winter, 2002) and the 
relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), both partnering firms may establish shared 
partnering routines and capabilities (Zollo et al., 2002). These can include an 
improved understanding for the other partners’ culture and management processes but 
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can also lead to explicit mechanisms for improving coordination among partners or 
problem-solving  (Zollo et al., 2002). For instance, partner-specific knowledge 
exchange routines can include frequent steering committee meetings (e.g. De Man & 
Roijakkers, 2009; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Kaplan, Norton, & Rugelsjoen, 2010; 
Pangarkar, 2003). Such processes are difficult to manage as they involve the 
coordination and communication among partnering companies (Pangarkar, 2003). 
Introducing such processes eliminates several key problems with strategic alliance 
management such as the risk for opportunism (Das, 2006).  
A key aspect for introducing such routines is that they are relation-specific, 
thus, they may not be applicable in other partnerships. Such relation-specific asset 
investments are key aspects for the relational view as introduced by Dyer and Singh 
(1998). Based on Williamson (1985), such investments can either be related to sites 
(e.g. headquarter or factory location), physical (e.g. specific machines or equipment), 
or human  (e.g. specific know-how held by partnering firm employees). An example 
for relation-specific asset investments is the relocation of facilities close to the partner 
in order to facilitate knowledge exchange. For instance, Toyota’s alliance partners 
have moved their development and production facilities close to Toyota’s facilities 
indicating substantial commitment to the partnership (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). 
 Network inertia as a result of relational experience 
Other research in the alliance field argues that repeated partnerships may lead 
to a negative effect on performance (Goerzen, 2007; Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 
2006). Drawing on Burt (1992) and Granovetter (1973), Goerzen (2007) argues that 
partnerships with the same partner offer redundant information and resources. As 
such, they may be more cost effective to maintain but offer less benefits than 
partnerships with new partners. Relying on familiar partners may therefore reduce the 
long-term effectiveness of the partnership itself (Goerzen, 2007). Kim et al. (2006) 
contribute a network inertia perspective to this. They argue that as partnering 
organizations have repeatedly engaged in alliances, they become inert and do not look 
for alternative partners. Thus, they continuously enter repeated partnership for inertial 
reasons (Kim et al., 2006) and alliances with relational experiences therefore lead to 
negative effects on performance (Goerzen, 2007). 
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 Ambiguous effects of relational experience  
The abovementioned mixed results of repeated partnerships therefore indicate 
that there might be issues with using relational experience as a proxy for relational 
capabilities. Due to both positive (trust and partner-specific routines) and negative 
(network inertia) reasons to enter repeated partnerships, it is not surprising that 
empirical evidence is mixed.  Several studies in existing research have found positive 
alliance performance effects when relational experiences existed. For instance, 
research has found that they positively impact managerial assessments (Zollo et al., 
2002), termination outcomes (Reuer & Zollo, 2005), and value-creation measures, 
such as stock market response (Gulati et al., 2009), indicating that these partnerships 
have effectively developed relational capabilities through trust and/or partner-specific 
routines. However, other studies have found negative effects on alliance performance, 
such as financial or project performance, thus, indicating that network inertia among 
partners may have been generated (e.g. Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; 
Pangarkar, 2003). 
In order to provide clarity to this theoretical and empirical issue, it is not 
surprising that recent literature has used more fine-grained approaches to identify 
conditions under which firms can benefit from relational experiences. Several studies 
have focused on governance and firm-level aspects in relation to relational 
experiences. These studies find, for instance, that firms in non-equity alliances benefit 
more from relational experience than those in equity alliances (Reuer & Zollo, 2005; 
Zollo et al., 2002). This is because equity is an alternative supplementary governance 
mode to trust-based capability mechanisms to reduce opportunism by one alliance 
partner (De Man, 2014). Thus, relational experience has a stronger effect when 
managing non-equity alliances (Zollo et al., 2002). Other research identifies that firms 
benefit more from relational experience when there is a high level of uncertainty 
surrounding the firm as the familiar partner provides more certainty under these 
circumstances (Gulati et al., 2009). Additionally, firm’s with more technological and 
financial resources benefit more from relational experiences as the trust generated 
through these resources acts as a safeguard to protect these resources (Gulati et al., 
2009). Moreover, research indicates that large firms tend to benefit less from 
relational experience than smaller firms (Park & Kim, 1997). Results have been 
attributed to the small firm in a repeated partnership being more effective to 
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appropriate the knowledge from the larger partner (Park & Kim, 1997). Even other 
research focuses on the trust developed itself and finds that it may take longer than 
expected (Gulati & Sytch, 2008). This is because organizations and its boundary 
spanners need time to set up routines in order to start trusting each other (Mayer & 
Argyres, 2004). While such contingencies have improved our understanding of the 
effect between relational experience and performance, a recent meta study has 
provided some evidence that the effect of trust-based processes on performance still 
depends on many unobserved moderators (Vanneste, Puranam, & Kretschmer, 2014). 
 
2.2.6 Summary 
This literature review on strategic alliances has set out by providing an 
overview why strategic alliances are formed and how they fit into the corporate 
strategy literature. After that, it has gone through the dyadic alliance research and has 
analysed the reasons for and stages of strategic alliances. Moreover, the review has 
indicated that performance results are ambiguous and that firms rely on superior 
alliance management practices. However, as also shown finding the right mix of 
experiences and alliance-related processes is critical but immensely difficult. In order 
to contribute and improve our understanding how firms can more successfully manage 
alliances, this thesis investigates various dimensions of both general alliance and 
relational experience.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis on different dimensions of alliance experiences and their effect 
on alliance value creation, a deductive, hypothesis-testing approach is adopted. This 
chapter firstly provides an overview of the research philosophy adopted in Section 3.1, 
before the research design is introduced in Section 3.2. Following this, the data 
collection and analysis is described in Section 3.3. The chapter then provides an 
overview of the variables and measures used in the following empirical chapters in 
Section 3.4.  
 
3.1 Research philosophy 





 assumptions underpinning this thesis. These assumptions help to 
refine how I, as a researcher, position myself within the field and how this fits within 
the existing paradigm in research on strategic alliances.  
This thesis is based on a critical rationalist perspective. Critical rationalism 
agrees with the logical positivist stance that knowledge is objective, yet it also 
maintains that it can never be absolute. As argued by Popper (1962), a key proponent 
of critical rationalism, “the way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our 
scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by 
tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled 
by criticism; that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. 
They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified” (Popper, 
1962: vii). Thus, as a researcher it is difficult to claim that there is no other alternative 
theory which can possibly describe an empirical finding more accurately than the 
specific one used. Consequently, while a particular theory may hold for decades, 
subsequent evidence may result in the revision, extension or refutation of existing 
theory (e.g. the famous black swan example). Therefore, truth can only be 
approached, however, never be entirely reached. Popper summarized this in his moral 
                                                     
4
 Ontology refers to the “philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality” (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe , & Jackson, 2008: 61). 
5
 Epistemologies refer to the “general set of assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the 
nature of world” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 61). 
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credo: “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to 
the truth” (Popper, 1994: xii). 
The development of scientific knowledge according to critical rationalism 
therefore depends on a constant process of conjectures and refutations. In other words, 
the key basic assumption of critical rationalism is that knowledge is refutable. This 
has important implications for the generation of scientific knowledge. For science to 
effectively develop new knowledge, it is necessary to develop testable hypotheses 
which allow for the falsification of existing knowledge in a so-called “falsifying 
hypothesis” (Popper, 2009: 66).  
Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1970) have further elaborated this approach by 
showing that  falsification of hypotheses occurs within ‘paradigms’ (Kuhn) or 
‘research programs’ (Lakatos). Paradigms are defined by Kuhn as “universally 
recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and 
solutions for a community of researchers” (Kuhn, 1962: viii). Similarly, Lakatos’ 
concept of research programs refers to the acceptable standards within the community 
of scientific researchers. Through these two concepts both have advanced the idea of 
falsification by further specifying the theoretical context in which research occurs. 
Kuhn has propagated that within a paradigm of a research area, so called ‘normal 
research’ is carried out. This means that within the research area, fundamental beliefs 
and theoretical assumptions are not challenged. Essentially, the paradigm enables 
researchers to ‘solve puzzles’ with the goal to improve the fit towards reality. Thus, in 
order to explain empirical phenomena the researcher makes use of recognized 
heuristics within the ‘research program’ (Lakatos, 1970). Yet the inability to solve a 
particular puzzle does not immediately result in the falsification of the paradigm. 
Instead, such ‘anomalies’ initially question the ability of the researcher and the 
methodological process before the ‘hard core’ (Lakatos, 1970), the key set of 
theoretical assumptions of a research area are scrutinized. 
As a researcher I rely on the ‘hard core’ (Lakatos, 1970) within the paradigm 
of alliance research. One core assumption is that investors are capable to rationally 
evaluate the impact of an alliance announcement onto the stock market value of a 
focal firm. This assumption is largely accepted within the scientific community as 
evidence from scientific publications indicates (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009) and thus forms 
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part of the paradigm of alliance research. Whereas Popper believes those assumptions 
may be falsified, Kuhn in turn argues that falsification is not sufficient. It would 
require a scientific revolution. A scientific revolution in turn would require the 
community of researchers to abandon such core assumptions regarding alliances in 
order to adapt a new paradigm or research program. Kuhn believes that in a scientific 
revolution the key assumptions may be replaced, or the recognition of the actual 
research problem may differ and thus scientific may be non-cumulative. Within the 
paradigm, however, my contribution as a researcher is that I try to falsify hypotheses 
regarding what Lakatos (1970) calls the ‘protective belt’ of the ‘research program’ but 
not the ‘hard core’. This helps to further develop research within the accepted 
scientific community.  
In essence, both Kuhn and Lakatos further modify Popper’s falsification by 
providing a necessary context for the process of hypotheses falsification. This process 
is influenced by political factors within the scientific area. Under consideration of 
such influences and in line with critical rationalism and logical positivism, I follow a 
deductive, hypothesis-testing approach. In particular, I aim to falsify existing theory of 
alliance experience. It is the refutation of those hypotheses through which I aim to 













3.2 Research design 
The research design of this study, firstly, builds on a pilot study in order to 
gain better insights into the industry and secondly an empirical database study. The 
pilot study consisted of interviews with industry and strategic alliance experts.  
 
FIGURE 3.1: Research design overview 
 
 
3.2.1 Pilot study with alliance executives (interviews) 
Interviews with alliance executives had been conducted as a pilot study in 
order to provide further clarity into strategic alliances, specifically in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Therefore, in October 2012, the largest global 100 
biopharmaceutical companies by revenue in 2011 were identified from the 
Recombinant Capital (RECAP) database and other industry reports. Subsequently, 
leading alliance management executives, such as (senior) vice-presidents of alliances, 
or R&D executives who had managed alliances at these companies in the past were 
initially identified through the RECAP database, which has an extensive list of 
alliance executives in the biopharmaceutical industry. Additionally, annual reports, 
company websites, were consulted for alliance executive names. From these sources, 
the highest ranked executive in the company with an alliance management 
1. Pilot 
study 
• Interviews with leading biopharmaceutical alliance executives (Oct-Dec 2012) 
•Objectives: Gain insight into (1) industry specifics and (2) alliance/relational 
experience 
•Main results: Alliances (1) are important for firms in the biopharmaceutical 




•Analysis of firm-level general alliance experience and dyad-level relational 
experiences on alliance value creation 
•Objectives: Identify how different dimensions of alliance/relational experience 
impact alliance value creation 
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background or position was identified and contact details obtained. Executives were 
then sent a letter by post introducing the research project asking for their availability 
to participate in either a personal or telephone interview to discuss the role of strategic 
alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry and their organization specifically. If no 
response had been obtained after three weeks, a follow-up phone call was made. 
Several contacted firms replied but were unable to participate in an interview due to 
confidentiality agreements regarding their alliances, resulting in initial interviews with 
10 firms. Interviews were then scheduled via telephone for the period between 
October and December 2012. Additionally, interviews with smaller biotech firms were 
scheduled during the ‘CPhI’ in Madrid (October 2012) and the ‘Biofit’ trade-fair in 
Lille, France, (December 2012), two of the leading European biopharmaceutical trade-
fairs for R&D and alliance executives. In combination with the phone interviews, this 
resulted in 20 interviews. The interviewed companies consist of both large 
pharmaceutical and small biotechnology organizations. Their headquarters are 
primarily in Europe, with a smaller proportion of interviewed companies based in the 
US and Japan. All of the interviewed executives had been directly involved with the 
management of strategic alliances in the past. The interviews were semi-structured 
and provided the opportunity to discuss role of alliances in the biopharmaceutical 
industry with a special on the role of alliances for the respective organization. Based 
on this, the importance of alliance experience in the management of strategic alliances 
for the firm was discussed.  
The key insights from the interviews were: Firstly, executives stressed the 
importance of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry. Alliance 
executives emphasized that both R&D collaborations and licensing deals are 
important in the industry, whereas manufacturing and marketing alliances are deemed 
not as critical to success. Moreover, some executives indicated that alliance 
performance depends on various factors. While some alliances have measurable 
outputs associated with them, others involve intangible outputs such as learning. 
Additionally, most executives indicated that the termination of alliances is not 
necessarily a signal for failure. Despite having their own alliance performance 
assessment criteria, most executives seemed to agree that stock market indicators are 
an important measure for their alliance management as well, particularly for smaller 
firms which are more reliant on early-stage financing.  
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Secondly, interviews allowed me to specify the research questions more 
precisely. A few executives emphasized that experience is important for managing 
strategic alliances. During the interviews it was noted, however, that firms leverage on 
their alliance experiences differently. Several executives for instance were more 
capable of recalling both positive and negative experiences with previous alliances. 
Additionally, some alliance executives’ seemed to imply that contingencies are 
important to derive benefits from alliance experience. For instance, some executives 
mentioned that it is easier to learn from an alliance when performance is extreme, 
thus, either very successful or unsuccessful. 
Overall, the main insights from these interviews were that firstly, R&D 
alliances are critical in the biopharmaceutical industry. Secondly, alliance 
performance is difficult to measure, while the stock market does provide a reasonable 
measure. Thirdly, differences in how executives were able to recall previous alliance 
experiences and the contingencies for benefiting from previous experiences raised 
important questions I intended to explain further in a more generalizable database 
study. 
 
3.2.2 Three deductive empirical chapters 
Based on insights from these interviews, the second step of the research design 
is to test whether alliance experience is relevant and whether there might be 
contingencies which influence how firms benefit from alliance experience. Prior 
research in the field of strategic alliance experience has been conducted using a wide 
range of different methodologies by using either inductive, theory generating or 
deductive, hypothesis-testing approaches (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). Additionally, some research has identified data on alliance 
experience from interviews and surveys (e.g. Heimeriks, 2010; Zollo et al., 2002), 
while other studies have relied on using databases (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Gulati et al., 2009). In this thesis, I decided to test the effect of contingencies of 
alliance experience on value creation in a deductive, database study as this provided a 
direct extension to existing studies which have investigated alliance experience.  
The empirical chapters consist of a series of event studies in each one of them. 
For each event study, independently pooled cross-sectional data is used. More 
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specifically, as the level of analysis in an event study is the alliance itself, this means 
that cross-sectional data is sampled over the duration of the sample period. This is in 
sharp contrast to panel data which tracks a cross-section of firms’ alliances over time. 
However, here cross-sectional data is ‘pooled’ over multiple years. Using pooled 
cross-section data is standard practice in event study research (e.g. Balakrishnan & 
Koza, 1993). 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
3.3.1 Data sources 
The MEDTRACK database is used to identify strategic alliance. This database 
offered by Life Science Analytics, offers a very comprehensive account of 
biopharmaceutical drug development activity on both public and private companies. A 
particular emphasis in the database is on strategic alliances. MEDTRACK 
accumulates data on alliances from press releases, annual reports, newspapers, and 
company sources. It has frequently been used in previous alliance studies (e.g. Diestre 
& Rajagopalan, 2012; Diestre, Rajagopalan, & Dutta, 2015; Fernald, Pennings, & 
Claassen, 2014). For each announcement, MEDTRACK provides in many cases the 
original press release as well as other relevant information regarding the alliance such 
as an event history. For this thesis, the alliance announcement press releases are of 
particular interest. Due to the importance of the precise announcement date for event 
studies, particular emphasis is placed on the press release date. Therefore, press 
releases and confounding announcement dates are also checked in Lexis-Nexis. 
Besides the critical data on strategic alliances, other data sources are consulted 
for other variables. Stock market data for the dependent variable in the work is 
derived from the University of Chicago’s Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP). This data is then used in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
Eventus tool to calculate the alliance value creation effect. Data for control and 
moderating variables are extracted from the WRDS Compustat tool, the WRDS 
I/B/E/S database, from annual reports (10-K and 20-F) and proxy statements 
(DEF14A) filed on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar website. 
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3.3.2 Sample 
This study uses a sample of non-equity strategic R&D alliances in the global 
biopharmaceutical industry [SIC codes: 2834 (Pharmaceutical preparations) and 2836 
(Biological products)] from 2003 to 2012. This ten-year sampling window is selected 
to account for recent alliances, while still permitting the collection of firm-level data 
for control variables. The recency of the data is particularly desired as the importance 
of strategic alliances has been increasing over time, as mentioned in the CEO survey 
above. Joint ventures are excluded from the analysis as they differ significantly in 
terms of ownership and control of assets, making them difficult to compare to 
contractual strategic alliances (e.g. Das et al., 1998). Furthermore, this sample relates 
to all the non-equity strategic alliance and licensing agreements entered by firms in 
the R&D stage or the commercialization stages of development. Such alliances are 
common in the biopharmaceutical industry as firms increasingly share the rising 
development costs (Hagedoorn, 2002) and have been emphasized by alliance 
executives as the key alliance type in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
As explained above, the level of analysis in event studies is usually the 
announcement itself, not the announcing firm. MEDTRACK identifies 8872 strategic 
alliance announcements for this time period. These deals are then matched to the 
CRSP files in order to identify whether one of the firms involved in the strategic 
alliance is listed on either one of the following stock exchanges at the announcement 
date: NYSE, NYSE Amex, NASDAQ, and Arca exchanges. This results in 1294 
alliance deals. Following that, further alliances are excluded if confounding events 
occurred around the announcement date which might influence the analysis. More 
specifically, Lexis Nexis and MEDTRACK are checked whether announcing firms 
also announce earnings, dividends, M&As, strategic alliances and annual general 
meeting announcements surrounding the alliance announcement (+/- 5 days). This 
results in a further exclusion of 425 cases, resulting in a sample size of 869 alliance 
announcements. As Medtrack provides alliance information on other related industries 
all non-biopharmaceutical firms are excluded from the analysis. This results in 741 
alliance announcements. 
Final sample sizes differ across the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 however. In 
Chapter 4, this thesis uses a subsample of alliances where the two partners had 
collaborated in a previous alliance before, thus have relational experience. This results 
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in the identification of 184 strategic alliance announcements. Due to missing values in 
control variables, the final sample consists of 161 announcements. Chapter 5 consists 
of the full sample of 741 alliance announcements. Excluding cases with missing 
values results in a final sample of 611 strategic alliances. For Chapter 6, the focus is 
on general alliance rhythms (GAR) but also on the partner-specific alliance rhythms 
(PAR). Therefore, both the full sample and the subsample are used. 
External validity is ensured by comparing key measures of general alliance 
experience, total assets and employees. Due to data limitations, this comparison is 
conducted between the population of all listed firms engaging in strategic alliances 
and the final sample sizes for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Resulting from this, no statistical 
difference can be identified for these key measures.  
 
3.3.3 The Biopharmaceutical industry 
Existing research on strategic alliances has extensively focused on the 
biopharmaceutical industry (e.g. Deeds & Hill, 1996; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; 
Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Pangarkar, 2003; Powell et al., 1996; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; 
Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Yang et 
al., 2015). This is because of the importance of strategic alliances to the industry’s 
total revenues (Rothaermel, 2001), and the resulting high number of alliance 
announcements (Hagedoorn, 2002; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Before I provide 
more details on the importance of strategic alliances to the industry, I provide a 
general overview of the biopharmaceutical industry. 
 
3.3.3.1 General overview of the industry 
The biopharmaceutical industry is comprised of pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms which develop new medicines and vaccines to prevent and treat diseases and 
improve lives of patients, according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) (IFPMA, 2014). The industry itself is 
global with multiple companies dispersed around the world. Global market size in 
terms of revenues in the industry have reached over US$800 billion in 2013 which 
represents growth rates of around 4% over the period 2009-2013 and forecasts until 
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2018 predict that the CAGR will reach around 5% (Marketline, 2014). The key market 
still remains North America with over 40% of all revenues generated there. 
Nevertheless, reports indicate that the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest growing 
market with growth rates of around 7% (Marketline, 2014). As a result of the rapid 
growth, the Asian-Pacific market has already surpassed the European market size 
during the last decade. 
One of the key features of the biopharmaceutical industry is the high research 
intensity. Evidence from the National Science Foundation in the US indicates that 
20% of all R&D expenses in the US are funded by biopharmaceutical companies, 
making it the most research-intensive industry in the US and also globally (IFPMA, 
2014). Globally, around US$137 billion annually are spent on R&D by 
biopharmaceutical companies (IFPMA, 2014). The output of these efforts has led to 
more than 500 new drug approvals by the Food and Drug Administration in the US 
since 2000, according to the trade association Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) (PhRMA, 2013). 
This has substantial socio-economic impacts. According to data for the US, 
PhRMA estimates that more than 810,000 people are employed in the US 
pharmaceutical industry with around 3.4 million jobs across the economy being 
created due to efforts by biopharmaceutical organizations. Based on data by the Office 
of National Statistics in the UK, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (ABPI) finds that the economic value created (as measured by the Gross 
Value Added) is the highest among all manufacturing industries per employee in the 
UK (ABPI, 2015)  
One key measure for the impact onto society is the life expectancy. According 
to the ABPI, the life expectancy of new born babies in the UK is now almost doubled 
in comparison to figures in 1900. Also, numbers from the British Heart Foundation 
indicate that deaths from cardiovascular diseases have declined by about 40% over the 
period 1998 to 2008. Additionally, deaths arising due to HIV/Aids have dropped by 
85% from 1995 to 2011 due to introductions of new antiretroviral therapies. 
Furthermore, data by the World Health Organization and the IFPMA indicate that 
since the 20
th
 century 19 classes of Antibiotics have been developed which have led to 
cures of multiple thousand types of infections and saving potentially over 200 million 
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lives since then. In developing countries, the impact of the biopharmaceutical industry 
is also substantial. For instance, it is estimated that over 1 million African children’s 
life has been prevented due to medicines being developed against malaria. 
 
3.3.3.2 Importance of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry 
The contribution of strategic alliances to the growth in the biopharmaceutical 
industry is substantial. According to Medtrack data on R&D alliance
6
, the number of 
newly formed strategic alliances has continuously increased [CAGR: +18% (1995-
2005)]. A recent trend over the last decade, however, finds a decrease in the number 
of newly formed strategic alliances [CAGR: -6% (2005-2012)]. More interestingly, 
this trend has been counteracted by a substantial increase in the median deal value 
over the same time period [CAGR: +10% (2005-2012)]. This indicates that the 
relevance of the (smaller number of) newly formed alliances to the industry has 
actually grown over time. 
One of the key reasons for such dramatic increases in the significance of 
strategic alliance to the biopharmaceutical industry has been due to the dramatic 
changes to the industry structure since the 1980’s. The industry has traditionally been 
focused on the chemical development of drugs. Traditionally, the industry consisted of 
large pharmaceutical corporations which experimented with the drug development 
primarily by themselves. This process was oftentimes based on serendipity and 
resulted in one-off successes. However, the industry was shaken up when the principle 
of DNA recombination was first developed by scientists at the University of 
California San Francisco who would later go on to found the now-publicly listed 
company Genentech. This discovery has enabled researchers to investigate living cells 
and test whether so-called ‘lead compounds’ can affect the target molecule in such 
cells. As a result, a new form of companies has challenged the way traditional 
pharmaceutical companies have developed drugs. Nowadays, the industry is 
comprised of two types of organization: On the one hand, the large pharmaceutical 
companies, leveraging on their expertise of large-scale chemical development and on 
the other, the small biotechnology firms, in turn leveraging on the more innovative 
biologic compounds for their drug development. While these seem distinct, their 
                                                     
6
 This includes all R&D alliances following Medtrack’s definition. 
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capabilities such as the management and the resources needed for the later stage are 
similar. 
The unique composition of financially strong pharmaceutical firms and the 
small innovative biotechnology firms in combination with the expensive drug 
development has led to intense pressures for both types of firms to engage in strategic 
alliances (Rothaermel, 2001). Firstly, the risks associated with the development of 
drugs are high given the immense development costs. Most importantly, the outcome 
is uncertain as the success rate for drug compounds taken into human clinical trials is 
only 20% (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003). It is an inherently uncertain industry 
as a quote of the former Novartis CEO, Dr Daniel Vasella indicates: “We can never 
read the future. You can put in place all the elements that you believe are essential: 
The people, the money, the technical resources, the skills, the continuous training, 
alliances with academia and with other partners…but there is no guarantee for 
success. You are constantly dealing with uncertainty. But having said that, you need to 
have people who are willing to bet their life that what they are doing is right. That’s 
when you have programs that move forward and succeed, but then you also have more 
programs that move forward and don’t succeed. It’s a business with more failures than 
successes. It’s just the fact and we have to accept it” (Vasella, 2004). 
Secondly, costs for the development of drugs are high. Capitalized costs for 
developing a drug from research through clinical trials to approval have grown from 
US$100 Million in the 1970’s to over US$800 million in the 2000’s (Grabowski, 
2011).  
Thirdly, the benefits for incurring such high costs are often marginal as sales 
levels for individual drugs have declined over the years. While drugs in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s have often delivered a major breakthrough to a medical indication and 
became blockbuster drugs (sales over US$ one billion), improvements to existing 
drugs are often only marginal nowadays (Grabowski, 2011). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that only 30% of all product approvals break-even, with the rest incurring 
loses (Grabowski, 2011).  
Fourthly, regulatory pressures intended to enhance competition have led to the 
shortening of market exclusivity for drugs and the increased legislative power to 
generics and biosimilar producers. Moreover, increased value-based pricing systems 
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do not make any reference to the actual development costs but only to the added 
patient benefits of a specific new drug. This has led to increased substitute and buyer 
power in the industry, respectively (Marketline, 2014). 
As mentioned above, the industry has nevertheless continued to grow and 
despite the abovementioned challenges, outlooks are also positive. The reason behind 
this is that firms have reacted to these pressures. Firstly, companies have consolidated 
by engaging in horizontal M&As, as evidenced by recent examples of large 
pharmaceutical M&As this decade. While these have helped to reduce costs and 
minimize risks, M&As have not addressed the underlying issues of the pharmaceutical 
industry which is a lack of innovation at a cost-efficient price (Gassmann, Reepmeyer, 
& Zedtwitz, 2008).  Therefore, several companies have focused on their core markets, 
vertically disintegrated and instead partnered with multiple alliance partners. Such 
strategic alliances have enabled biopharmaceutical firms to focus on their key 
capabilities in core markets while complementing these with capabilities of external 
partners. Most often the small biopharmaceutical company provides the innovative 
capabilities, while the large pharmaceutical company provides the commercial 
abilities.  
In summary, due to the abovementioned pressures of uncertainty, dynamism 
and the various capabilities needed in order to stay competitive, companies oftentimes 
engage in strategic alliances. In order to diversify their risk over multiple alliances 
(Grabowski, 2011), companies manage large portfolios of strategic alliances at the 
same time (Hoffmann, 2005). These alliances can range from non-equity to equity 
alliances and can improve firm performance while at the same time maintaining 
strategic flexibility (Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). 
  
3.3.4 Statistical analysis and OLS regression 
The statistical analysis is conducted using the STATA software package. An 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used throughout all three empirical 
chapters. In order to use OLS regression and for results to be robust, several 
assumptions concerning the dependent variable need to be fulfilled. The assumptions 
refer to the linearity between independent and dependent variables, independence of 
errors, normality of error distributions and homoscedasticity of the error terms. These 
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are tested and no violations for the assumptions could be identified. Furthermore, 
robust standard errors (Huber-White Sandwich Estimators) are used in OLS 
regressions throughout the thesis with the clustering option by firm (e.g. Wang & 
Zajac, 2007) in order to reduce any potential biases and more specifically to reduce 
any potentially disturbing issues concerning with interdependence of announcements 
by the same firm. Multi-collinearity is checked through mean-centring as proposed by 
(Aiken & West, 1991) and tested through variance inflation factors. Additionally, as 
suggested by Echambadi and Hess (2007), subsamples as used for robustness checks 
are also used to check for changes of coefficients and standard errors. 
 
3.4 Variables and measures 
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
An event study methodology is used to calculate the dependent variable 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). Event study methodology is frequently used to 
assess investor reactions to announcements which were previously unanticipated 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Investors constantly re-evaluate the firm value of companies due 
to changes in the firm’s projected discounted cash flows. Therefore, investors 
primarily react to announcements which can range from macroeconomic, political, 
competitor to focal firm announcements. Under the assumption that the stock market 
is at least semi-efficient (Fama, 1970), investors react to publicly available 
announcements to adjust their projected discounted cash flow and, hence, the value of 
the company (Fama et al., 1969). If carefully conducted and confounding events are 
excluded, these abnormal changes can then directly be attributed to the announcement 
being made. Event studies are therefore a frequently used method in the field of 
strategic management (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Laamanen, Brauer, & Junna, 2014; 
Liu, Arthurs, Nam, & Mousa, 2014; Liu & Ravichandran, 2015; Sears & Hoetker, 
2013). They have also frequently been used as a stock-market based measure for 
alliance performance or value creation (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Balakrishnan & 
Koza, 1993; Das et al., 1998; Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002; Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991; Liu & Ravichandran, 2015; Merchant & Schendel, 2000; Yang et 
al., 2015).   
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Based on the assumption that the stock market is at least semi-efficient and is 
able to predict the value of an alliance upon the announcement, it offers a measure 
with high validity. By comparing the derived market-based measure to subjective 
managerial assessments of long-term alliance performance, studies have found a high 
correlation between such measures; hence, concluding that the stock market based 
measure is efficient (Heimeriks et al., 2015; Kale et al., 2002; Koh & Venkatraman, 
1991).  
In order to estimate the incremental value creation of each alliance for the 
respective announcing firm in the sample, the ‘normal’ stock market behaviour for the 
stock (the estimation period) needs to be estimated. The estimation period is subject to 
influence from confounding events surrounding the alliance announcement. Thus, the 
end date of the estimation period should not be too close to the announcement itself, 
however, also not too long before it as it should pick up the ‘normal’ returns for the 
focal firm in order to be able to calculate the ‘abnormal returns’. It is common practice 
to have an estimation period of over 200 days, with the start date around 250 days 
ahead of the focal alliance and the end date between 50 to 10 days before the alliance 
(MacKinlay, 1997). In this study an estimation period of 250 days up to 10 days 
before the alliance is used which is comparable to other alliance studies (Gulati et al., 
2009). 
In order to calculate the abnormal return, the individual return of the focal firm 
i needs to be regressed on the market returns in the estimation period. The CRSP 
equally-weighted index is chosen which is common in existing research (e.g. Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005; Park, 2004)
7
. From both the firm and market returns in 
the estimation period, the parameter estimates 𝜶𝒊 and 𝜷𝒊 are calculated to measure the 







In this, 𝒓𝒊𝒕  represents the returns for firm i on day t, 𝒓𝒎𝒕 is the daily return on the 
CSRP equally weighted index, 𝜶𝒊 and 𝜷𝒊 are firm-specific measures for the model and 
                                                     
7
 All models are also run with the CRSP value-weighted index and results do not change. 
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𝜺𝒊𝒕 is distributed normally. As it is standard practice in the field, the returns generated 
from the above model are then used in multiple event windows surrounding the 
alliance announcement (MacKinlay, 1997). Both short and long event windows are 
used in alliance research. For this thesis the main event window of -1 days before the 
announcement to the event, day 0, is used. This event window takes into account that 
the alliance announcement may be leaked to the market the day before the official 
announcement and sophisticated investors and analysts may already be informed. 
Hence, the announcement may already be reflected in the firm’s stock price one day 
before, while still having the main effect on the announcement day itself. The event 
window (-1,0) is therefore one of the most frequently used event windows in strategic 
alliance research (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; McConnell & 
Nantell, 1985; Reuer & Koza, 2000; Yang et al., 2015). 
The main advantage of the stock-market based measure CAR is that it may 
pick up the effect of an announcement without being influenced by confounding 
events. This is particularly advantageous over other measures of value creation or 
performance in the field of strategic alliances such as innovation (De Man & Duysters, 
2005), managerial assessments (Zollo et al., 2002). Such measures are heavily 
influenced by such factors and their empirical effect onto value creation may be 
biased. However, there is the danger of misinterpreting short event windows as 
investors may require more time to understand such rare announcements (Oler, 
Harrison, & Allen, 2008). Therefore, various event windows
8
 which are still short but 
longer than the (-1,0) window are chosen to increase the robustness of results. While 
choosing long event windows would decrease the issue of investor understanding, 
they are also not without disadvantages. Essentially long-event windows are subject to 
be negatively influenced by various confounding events such as other firm 
announcements (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Due to the dynamism and the 
frequency of announcements in the pharmaceutical industry, this might seriously 
influence the results. In the pharmaceutical industry in particular alliances are one of 
the most common forms of announcement and multiple such events may be made in 
short succession (Hagedoorn, 2002). Hence, investors are likely not to require 
extensive time to value an alliance announcement and be expected to be 
                                                     
8
  I use multiple different event windows ranging from -10 to +10 days as robustness checks which is 
standard practice in existing literature  
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knowledgeable of alliance announcements. Additionally, the multitude of different 
announcements in the industry makes short event windows even more appropriate. 
After selecting the event window, the parameter estimates for the calculation of the 





, where ?̂?𝒊𝒕 represents the expected returns for firm i in the respective event window, 
and ?̂?𝒊 ?̂?𝒊 represent the model estimates. The next step is then to calculate the 
abnormal return for the firm on a specific day. The expected return on that specific 
day for the firm ?̂?𝒊𝒕 is then subtracted from the actually realized return 𝒓𝒊𝒕.The error 






The abnormal return reflects the increase or decrease in a firm’s stock which is 
unanticipated in comparison to those witnessed during the estimation period; i.e. the 
so-called ‘normal’ returns. The abnormal returns for each trading day are then 








𝒕 reflect the event window for which the cumulative abnormal returns are generated. 
As described above, in this thesis 𝒕 ranges from -1 to 0. The CAR is multiplied by 100 





3.4.2 Control variables 
This section provides an overview of the control variables which are used 
throughout all three empirical chapters of this thesis. To facilitate readability of the 
later chapters and to avoid repetition, control variables used throughout are only 
introduced here, whereas the independent variables used for the respective hypothesis 
testing are introduced in the respective chapter’s methodology sections. Table 3.1 
provides an overview of the measures for each independent and control variables and 
the empirical chapters in which each variable occurs. The control variables are: 
Alliance year. A dummy variable for the year in which the announcement is 
made is created. Year 2003 represents the base year and is not included in the OLS 
regression. Creating dummy variables for announcement years is common practice in 
event studies for strategic alliance. (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009). 
Non-listed alliance partner. The diversity of the organizational governance of 
the alliance partners in the focal alliance is included as another control (e.g. Deeds & 
Hill, 1996). This is a dummy variable with ‘0’ indicating an alliance between the 
public focal firm with another stock-listed public partner and ‘1’ indicating an alliance 
between the public focal firm and a non-listed private firm, research institute or 
university. The ownership and the diversity of alliance partners has been shown to 
significantly impact alliance performance (e.g. Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010). As non-
listed partners are smaller than listed partners, this measure also takes into account the 
relative size between alliance partners which has been found to be relevant in 
explaining alliance value creation (e.g. Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Lavie, 2007). In 
general, small partners tend to appropriate more value than the larger partner.  
Slack Resources. A measure for the slack resources is also included as a 
control variable. Multiple, highly correlated  measures of slack resources exist 
(Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner Jr, 2004). This study follows multiple studies in 
the field of strategic management which have measured organizational slack as the 
solvency of firms (Bourgeois, 1981; Greve, 2003; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  Gulati 
et al. (2009) have found that it is a particularly important variable in predicting the 
impact of relational experience on alliance value creation. The slack resources of the 
focal firm are measured as the cash divided by the long-term debt, both enumerated in 
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the year preceding the alliance announcement. Due to the skewness in the variable, the 
natural logarithm is taken. 
Firm Uncertainty. Additionally, literature has identified Firm uncertainty to 
be relevant in terms of alliance formation decisions. Beckman, Haunschild, and 
Phillips (2004) in their measurement of uncertainty as a function of the focal firm’s 
standardized monthly volatility are followed: 
 
Firm uncertainty = 
SD (Firm's monthly closing price, YeariFirmj)
Mean (Firm's monthly closing price, YeariFirmj)
 (5) 
The volatility of firm j in year i, the announcement year, is firstly standardized. 
By dividing the standard deviation of the stock by the average firm’s monthly stock 
market closing price, this method enables the interpretation of the standard deviation 
across firms with different stock prices. 
Absorptive capacity. I follow existing literature and measure absorptive 
capacity by using the R&D intensity of the focal firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The 
R&D intensity measure captures the potential capacity of the firm to absorb 
knowledge. It is the most frequently used measure for absorptive capacity in strategic 
management (e.g. Ben-Menahem, Kwee, Volberda, & Van Den Bosch, 2013; 
Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006) and is 
also particularly prone to be used in the context of strategic alliances (Mowery et al., 
1996; Schildt, Keil, & Maula, 2012). It is a particularly important measure in the 
biopharmaceutical industry as firms rely on research and development (Hagedoorn, 
2002). This does, however, vary across firms as some firms focus on less R&D 
intensive areas, such as generic products. Additionally, R&D intensity has been found 
to be important in explaining the impact of alliances on alliance performance (e.g. 
Gulati et al., 2009). The R&D intensity is measured as the R&D expenses divided by 
the net sales of the focal company in the year preceding the alliance announcement. 
R&D alliance type. Some R&D alliances may also consist of licensing in 
addition to the collaboration in the R&D field. Experience effects however are 
significantly different for R&D collaborations and licensing deals (Anand & Khanna, 
2000a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). In order to account for such differences, I follow 
Medtrack’s coding to control whether R&D alliances are only based on collaboration 
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and do not have a licensing component of a biopharmaceutical compound or product. 
Therefore, a dummy variable is created with the value of ‘0’ if the firms have a 
licensing component in their alliance agreement and ‘1’ if the alliance is solely based 
on R&D collaboration. 
International alliance. Research has frequently distinguished between 
domestic and international alliances. International alliance have higher failure rates 
because they are more difficult to manage (Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas, 1997). 
Geographical and cultural distance may make it more challenging to generate trust, for 
instance (Parkhe, 1998). Geographical distance also decreases the likelihood of 
forming alliances, which may however be influenced when collaborating with partners 
(Reuer & Lahiri, 2014). Following Sampson (2005), I therefore created a dummy 
variable to control for this impact. The dummy variable receives a ‘0’ if both alliance 
partners headquarter is located in the same country, or a ‘1’ if the headquarters are 
located in different countries, hence making it an international alliance. 
Relational experience. Relational experience is measured as a continuous 
variable as it is standard in existing literature (e.g.Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). It is based on the number of previous alliances 
with the same alliance partner prior to the announcement of the focal alliance. This 
measure is updated for each focal alliance in the sample. Studies have found that 
previous alliances with the same partner as a measure for relational experience may 
either positively or negatively influence alliance performance (e.g. Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). 
General alliance experience (log). General alliance experience (GAE) refers 
to all previous alliances managed by a firm. Some studies have used all prior strategic 
alliances irrespective of alliance type  (Sampson, 2005). However, other studies have 
found that there are significant differences in management requirements between 
alliance types (e.g. Das & Teng, 2000a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). In this study, I 
follow Anand and Khanna (2000a) who measured GAE by all previous alliances of a 
specific type an organization has accumulated up to the focal alliance. For example, 
for a focal alliance classed as a contractual R&D alliance, all previous contractual 
R&D alliances are measured. Sampson (2005), however, has found that both measures 
provide similar results. The number of relational experiences is deleted from GAE in 
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order to ensure the independence of the two variables. Due to the high level of 
skewness in the variable, I take the natural logarithm of GAE. Also other studies have 
used the natural logarithm as a measure for GAE (e.g. Al-Laham, Amburgey, & Bates, 
2008; Reuer & Zollo, 2005).  
Even though several studies have used firm size to investigate the effect of 
alliance announcements on CAR, these size effects have largely been insignificant 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). 
Moreover, I find that the correlation between GAE and Firm size (as measured by 
total assets or employees in the year of the alliance announcement) exceeds 0.85 
which might lead to spurious results. Therefore, these are not included as control 
variables in the models presented in the empirical chapters. However, key effects are 
also tested using firm size and effects hold. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the 
various measures and the data sources for the variables.  
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TABLE 3.1: Measures table (Thesis) 
Variable name Measures Data source Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Alliance year(s) 
0/1 Binary variable for each year in which the 
alliance was announced 
Medtrack Control Control Control 
Non-listed alliance 
partner 
0/1 Binary variable. 1, if partner firm is a non-
public partner (private firm, research institute or 
university), 0 if partner firm is a listed public firm 
Compustat Control Control Control 
Slack resources 
Natural logarithm cash divided by long-term debt 
in the year preceding the alliance announcement 












R&D expenses divided by net sales in the year 
preceding the alliance announcement 





0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is classified as a 
contractual R&D alliance, 0 if it is classified as 
comprising a licensing agreement 
Medtrack Control Control Control 
International 
alliance 
0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is between two 
partners which have their HQs in different 
countries. 0, if HQs are in the same country 
Compustat Control Control Control 
Relational 
experience 
Number of previous partnerships between focal 







Natural logarithm of total number of alliances of 
either R&D alliance or licensing agreements the 








0/1 Binary variable. 1, if focal firm executive 
mentions previous relational experience quality, 






Number of financial analysts making earnings 
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CHAPTER 4: THE QUALITY DIMENSION OF RELATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES: A SIGNALLING APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
One key issue for alliance researchers has been the performance and value 
creation impact of repeated partnerships with the same alliance partner (e.g. Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Goerzen, 2007; Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et 
al., 2002). Most studies identify that repeated partnerships result in positive 
performance and value creating effects, and attribute these to trust and inter-
organizational routine generation, which ultimately facilitate the knowledge exchange 
between alliance partners (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002). 
Results of those studies have further led researchers to associate repeated partnerships 
as proxies for the development of relational capabilities between alliance partners 
(Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015; Zollo et al., 2002). However, other evidence indicates 
that repeatedly partnering with the same alliance partner may generate negative 
performance effects (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Reasons for this 
have primarily been attributed to network inertia, a process caused by inter-personal, 
inter-organizational and network linkages which incentivize firms to continuously 
enter into repeated partnerships with the same partner despite potentially more 
appropriate new alliance partners (Goerzen, 2007; Kim et al., 2006). Based on these 
two opposing objectives for entering repeated partnerships, research has investigated 
the conditions under which repeated partnerships may actually generate positive value 
and thus lead to development of relational capabilities. Specifically, alliance, firm, 
partner, or environmental characteristics influence whether a repeated partnership is 
actually value-creating (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 
2002). So far, to the best of my knowledge, most studies, however, focus on the 
quantity of previous partnerships while not recognizing that there are heterogeneities 
in the previous alliance experiences themselves. OL literature, however, identifies that 
significant heterogeneities in the value of various experiences themselves exist (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993; Sitkin, 1992). For instance, both more 
positive and negative experiences, thus extreme experiences, may more effectively 
contribute to the value of experiences (e.g. Kim, Kim, & Miner, 2009; March, Sproull, 
& Tamuz, 1991). Thus, the context of in which experiences are accumulated matters 
to generating value from them (e.g. Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011). In the context of 
alliances, the variety of different value creation outcomes and the fact that benefits 
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derived from relational experiences are largely intangible (Gulati, 1995a) indicates 
that the development of relational capabilities is not necessarily subject to the quantity 
of previous partnerships, but instead the “quality of collaborations” (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005: 343).  
Investigating the quality of repeated partnership experiences may provide 
further insights to distinguish between repeated partnerships formed due to the 
development of on the one hand ‘high quality’ relational capabilities or on the other 
hand ‘inferior quality’ network inertia. Knowing the objective for entering such 
repeated partnerships is especially critical for investors. While alliance partners 
themselves may be aware whether their repeated partnership represents an effective, 
high quality partnership, outside investors may be unaware of the underlying quality 
of them due to intangibility of the previous alliance outcome. In order to adjust their 
firm valuation based on the alliance announcement, knowing whether relational 
capabilities between partners have actually developed is essential for investors as 
these facilitate the knowledge exchange between partners and thereby also likely 
alliance performance (Schilke & Goerzen, 2010).  
Therefore, the announcement of repeated partnerships is likely to be a situation 
in which asymmetry in information about the quality of the partnership relationship 
exists. Information asymmetry and quality heterogeneity has been referred to as the 
adverse selection problem in the economics literature
9
. In the context of repeated 
partnerships, investors are therefore likely to discount the value of each repeated 
alliance because they risk that the alliance may be subject to network inertia or 
inferior quality in general. As the stock market reaction to an alliance announcement 
can be critical to alliance partners, such asymmetry is not favourable to either partner. 
Based on the information asymmetry, signalling theory has developed and proposes 
that firms which have effectively developed relational capabilities are in turn likely to 
signal this to investors, while firms which have not, are likely not to emphasize this to 
investors. As signalling theory regards firm executives as important signallers in firm 
                                                     
9
 Developed by Akerlof (1970), the adverse selection problem refers to a situation in which information 
asymmetry between two parties concerning the quality of a product exists. Also known as the ‘market 
for lemons’ in the second-hand car market, Akerlof (1970) finds evidence that buyers who cannot 
effectively evaluate the quality of cars are discounting the value they attribute to those. Therefore, 
sellers of high quality cars are unlikely to offer their cars unless they can make buyers believe that their 
product is of ‘high quality’. In absence of such credible guarantees or signals, this is therefore 
considered a situation of market failure. 
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announcements (Westphal & Zajac, 1998), I therefore argue that firms, whose 
executives send a credible signal of having developed relational capabilities between 
alliance partners to investors, receive higher positive alliance value creation effects. 
As such signals have significant effects on investors (Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen, & 
Shannon, 2014; Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973), more positive alliance value 
from a new collaboration with that same partner can be expected. 
Signalling literature also finds that the strength of signals varies significantly 
across signaller and receivers as they are largely subject to influence from contingency 
factors (Bergh et al., 2014). Building on this, three moderating relationships 
mitigating or exacerbating the effect of signals are proposed in this chapter. Firstly, I 
expect that executive signaller reputation exacerbates the strength of the signal as 
these are more ‘credible signallers’. Secondly, I expect that the sophistication of 
investors is likely to mitigate the effects of the signal as such investors are already 
aware of the signal. Similarly, I expect that financial analysts as intermediaries 
between announcing firms and investors are likely to mitigate the strength of the 
signal on investor valuations as they are likely to be better informed, not requiring the 
signal and therefore most likely pass the information on to investors by the time the 
signal is sent. This chapter therefore endeavours to answer the following research 
question:  
How does the signalling of relational experiences impact the valuation of a 
subsequent alliance? What impact do signaller, intermediary and receiver 







In order to answer these research questions, this chapter draws on signalling 
theory as introduced by the economics literature (Spence, 1973). I intend to use 
signalling theory as a means to investigate the quality of repeated partnerships based 
on firms’ signals to draw inferences regarding the relational capability development as 
only firms which have managed high quality partnerships with the same partner are 
likely to signal this to investors. This takes into account the difficulty of externally 
evaluating the quality of repeated alliances as these require insights into various 
intangible alliance outputs, such as organizational learning and therefore assessing 
alliance performance is difficult for external stakeholders (Lunnan & Haugland, 
2008). As credible signals, this chapter draws on the use of executive quotes in 
alliance press release announcements which emphasize the quality of the previous 
partnership with the same partner. This follows existing research in the fields of 
management and accounting which regard executives commenting on the quality of 
earnings announcements as effective signals as they represent knowledgeable and at 
the same time credible authorities (e.g. Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2002; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
This chapter thereby contributes to existing literature in various ways. Most 
importantly, it introduces a quality dimension of relational experiences to the alliance 
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literature. This is particularly relevant as prior studies investigating the quantity of 
relational experiences have indicated significant heterogeneity in value creation 
effects. Also, this chapter contributes by combining literature of alliance formation 
reasons for either relational capabilities or network inertial reasons. It thereby 
provides a means to differentiate between the two concepts arising from repeated 
partnerships. Both areas have been investigated separately with almost all studies 
exclusively focusing on either relational capabilities (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 
2009; Zollo et al., 2002) or network inertia outcomes of repeated partnerships 
(Goerzen, 2007; Kim et al., 2006). Only few studies have tried to distinguish between 
positive and negative reasons for firms to enter repeated partnerships (Beckman et al., 
2004; Gulati & Westphal, 1999). This study contributes to the existing ones by 
providing a signalling perspective from alliance firms to investors. 
The theoretical development of this chapter has two main components. Firstly, 
existing literature on the formation objectives for repeated relationships as either 
resulting from relational capabilities or network inertia is discussed. This builds the 
foundation for outlining the relevance of a signalling approach in this context. 
Secondly, signalling theory is specifically applied to the context of repeated 
partnerships. This results in hypotheses development how the signalling of relational 
capabilities positively impacts alliance value creation. Afterwards, relevant signaller 
(executive reputation), financial intermediaries- (financial analysts), and receiver-
specific (institutional investors) moderating factors, which influence the signal-value 
creation relationship, are developed. The hypotheses are tested in the subsample of 
repeated partnerships between two alliance partners. General support for the main 
hypothesis is found, whereas only mixed results for the moderating variables can be 
identified. Subsequently, the implications of the results and the limitations are 





4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 The ambiguous effect of repeated partnerships on alliance value creation 
Partner selection is a critical issue for organizations entering strategic alliances 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hitt et al., 2000; Rothaermel & 
Boeker, 2008; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). The paramount decision for organizations 
to make is whether to partner with a known partner (Gulati, 1995a), or to engage with 
a new partner (Goerzen, 2007). Essentially, this reflects a dilemma between 
exploitation (repeated partnership) and exploration (new partner) that managers face 
in many other contexts of strategy as well (March, 1991). Existing literature identifies 
that the perceived uncertainty in the environment influences firms’ decision to enter 
new alliances (Beckman et al., 2004). Additionally, the inter-personal or inter-
organizational network may influence the decision to repeatedly partner with the same 
firm (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Kim et al., 2006). 
While studies regarding the objectives to enter a repeated partnership are rare, 
a large number of studies have investigated the effect of such relational experiences, 
partner-specific alliance experiences, repeated partnerships or repeated ties on 
performance or value creation (e.g. Goerzen, 2007; Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). The majority of these 
studies have argued for a positive effect and derived this effect from three primary 
reasons (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 2009; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). 
Firstly, based on transaction cost theories, repeated partnerships reduce monitoring of 
and negotiation costs with the alliance partner (Zaheer et al., 1998). Secondly, 
repeatedly partnering develops trust among partners which further facilitates 
knowledge exchange, leading to more favourable alliance outcomes (Gulati, 1995a). 
Thirdly, it produces inter-organizational routines, such as steering committees and 
other structural coordination mechanisms which make the partnership more effective 
(Zollo et al., 2002).  
However, an increasing number of studies identifies negative effects of 
repeated partnerships (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Such results are 
primarily attributed to reasons unrelated to the respective alliance itself but instead 
related to inter-personal, inter-organizational or network connections between partner 
organizations and/or their managers (Kim et al., 2006). As such, alliance partners may 
become used to partner with one another, which in turn may prohibit their ability to 
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engage in alliances with potentially new and valuable partners (Goerzen, 2007; Kim et 
al., 2006). In the next two subsections, these differing reasons are discussed in more 
detail. Reasons why repeated partnerships may result in positive value creation, thus 
relational capabilities, are provided first before discussing reasons why they may also 
result in negative value creation, thus network inertia. 
 
4.2.1.1 Relational capability as a result of repeated partnerships 
Relational capabilities refer to a dyad-level capability for more effectively 
managing an alliance with a specific partner (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998). They facilitate 
the ability to trust the partner, thereby avoiding opportunism, while also facilitating 
the ability to exchange knowledge among partners. Empirical evidence indicates that 
the outcomes of repeated partnerships are oftentimes positive (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009). 
More specifically, partners have been shown to increase the level of trust after 
repeatedly partnering (Gulati, 1995a) or improve their knowledge exchange through 
development of partnering routines (Zollo et al., 2002). As a consequence, partners 
tend to be more likely to form additional repeated alliances in the future (Gulati, 
1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and significantly benefit from these (e.g. Gulati et 
al., 2009; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Therefore, repeated partnerships 
are regarded as a proxy for relational capabilities (Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). The 
underlying reasons why repeated partnerships lead to favourable outcomes are 
explained in detail in Chapter 2 but are summarized here again.  
When organizations partner with one another in any business relationship, 
transaction costs may arise (Williamson, 1975). In the alliance context, these costs 
emerge from preparing the contract and engaging in negotiations and monitoring to 
prevent the opportunistic behaviour of the alliance partner (e.g. Das, 2006; Zaheer et 
al., 1998). The familiarity with the partner may, however, reduce such transaction 
costs due to various reasons. For instance, search costs for partners, arising from due 
diligence efforts, are reduced as the firm already knows about the partner’s suitability 
(Dyer & Chu, 2003). Through repeated alliances, partners can more easily trust that 
the other partner will not act opportunistically (Gulati, 1995a). Existing literature also 
finds that such mutual trust through repeated collaborations may result in partners 
sharing information more openly (Gulati, 1995a; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), while 
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also decreasing the likelihood for conflicts (Simonin, 1997). Furthermore, such inter-
organizational trust may lead to a development of interpersonal trust among the 
managers of the partnering organizations which has been shown to further improve the 
effectiveness of strategic alliances (Abrams et al., 2003; Zaheer et al., 1998).  
The development of trust, however, takes significant effort by the partnering 
organizations (Das & Teng, 2001). Therefore, firms may need to invest further 
resources into developing repeated partnerships into relational capabilities. 
Consequently, alliance partners may emphasize their commitment to the alliance by 
investing in so-called relation-specific assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Such assets can, 
for instance, be related to production relocation closer to the alliance partner (e.g. 
Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). This may indicate a significant commitment to the 
partnership, as even when the alliance is terminated, these assets may not be useful in 
alliances with other partners. Therefore, the trust may be further enhanced through 
such investments (Gulati, 1995a). Moreover, such assets may also include the 
development of inter-organizational routines, such as steering committees, to engage 
in a continuous information exchange between alliance partners (Zollo et al., 2002). 
The improved interaction may make the knowledge exchange more efficient and 
effective (Schilke & Goerzen, 2010; Zollo et al., 2002).  As a result of increased trust 
and the generation of relation-specific assets or routines, it is not surprising that many 
studies have found positive performance effects of repeated partnerships (e.g. Gulati 
et al., 2009; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). 
 
4.2.1.2 Network inertia as a result of repeated partnerships 
In contrast to the abovementioned literature, which finds that repeated 
partnerships are an indication of relational capabilities due to the trust and routines 
generated, there is also evidence against this. Some evidence indicates that firms are 
simply more likely to form additional alliances with the same partner when they have 
partnered before (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Consequently, this does 
not mean that the underlying processes of relational capabilities, such as trust or 
effective inter-organizational routines have actually been developed. Despite efforts 
by organizations to make a rational cost-benefit analysis whether to engage in another 
repeated partnership, many organizations enter into such partnerships for non-
performance-enhancing reasons (Kim et al., 2006; Li & Rowley, 2002). Kim et al. 
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(2006) summarize these by terming them: ‘Network inertia’, which is a similar 
concept to ‘structural inertia’ (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Network inertia refers to a 
constraint for organizations to change their alliance partners as they continuously 
engage with them. Due to such inertial pressures, firms avoid choosing or even 
looking for a new partner because of simplicity or other inter-organizational or 
network reasons (Kim et al., 2006). The following two subsections look more 
specifically at the reasons why such network inertia may develop. 
 Inter-personal/organizational dyadic ties as reasons for network inertia 
Inter-organizational or inter-personal factors may incentivize firms to enter 
repeated alliances (Kim et al., 2006). As such, the same reasons developed for firms to 
benefit from repeated partnerships, namely trust and routines may actually also 
incentivize firms to enter repeated partnerships for non-positive reasons. Inter-
personal ties between alliance executives are often the key to success for an alliance as 
they enable effective knowledge exchange (Abrams et al., 2003; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
However, if the alliance is dysfunctional, such inter-personal ties may mitigate the 
ability to change the alliance partner. As a classic agency problem, this may be 
because executives value their inter-personal relationships higher than the inter-
organizational relationship and effectively the firm. Zollo et al. (2002), for instance, 
find that executives are personally more satisfied with repeated partnerships. 
However, this personal satisfaction does not necessarily translate into higher financial 
performance as evidenced by other studies (Goerzen, 2007). However, as identified by 
Gulati and Westphal (1999), such inter-personal linkages increase alliance formation. 
Consequently, this may provide an indication that the inter-personal relationship of 
executives may be the underlying incentive for many firms to engage in repeated 
partnerships.  
Additionally, inter-organizational routines may represent constraints why firms 
repeatedly engage in strategic alliances with the same partner. Such routines, for 
instance, the bureaucratic and technological alliance structures are oftentimes created 
through repeated partnerships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zollo et al., 2002). While these 
generate important benefits by reducing transaction and coordination costs, these 
routines also create significant commitment to the specific alliance partner as they 
involve relation-specific assets. As the name suggests, these assets are relation-
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specific, consequently become less useful in a partnership with a new alliance partner 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). As firms are oftentimes not following the principle of ‘sunk 
costs’, they are likely to let such earlier investments into routines influence their 
strategic decisions for the future (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Firms may therefore 
internally limit the choice for new partners apart from existing ones (Gulati, 1999). In 
summary, the inter-personal and inter-organizational trust in addition to the extent to 
which organizations regard their alliance-specific investments as non-sunk costs may 
impact the decision to engage in repeated partnerships (Kim et al., 2006).  
 Inter-organizational network position reasons for network inertia 
While the above has focused on factors involving the dyadic relationship 
between the alliance partners that may prevent alliance partners from choosing new 
partners, the position of the firm within its alliance network may also influence the 
decision to engage in repeated partnerships. Among those reasons are dependence 
between the focal firm and the alliance partner and the status of the alliance partner in 
the network.  
Alliance partner dependency can refer to different resources. Firstly, firms may 
be dependent on their alliance partner when the partner offers contacts across the 
entire network which may provide benefits to the focal firm in various ways (Kim et 
al., 2006). In such circumstances, firms may be more likely to continuously engage in 
repeated partnerships (Gulati, 1998; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Dependence may 
also relate to other resources accessed in the partnership. In case partner resources fill 
a firm’s ‘structural holes’ by connecting them to other potential partners in the 
network, they are more valuable to keep and therefore companies more likely to 
engage in repeated partnerships (Burt, 1992; Kim et al., 2006). Additionally, status 
may be a reason for firms to engage in strategic alliances (Gulati, 1998). Partnering 
with a high-status firm can be an endorsement of its capabilities and has been shown 
to increase firms’ ability to attract further funding (Stuart, 2000). If one of the 
partnering firms has a reputation or status which is lower than the other partnering 
firm, then one firm has a strong incentive to continuously engage in alliances with the 
other firm (Kim et al., 2006). Essentially, all the above factors may in combination 
affect firm’s decision to engage in repeated alliances with the same partner 
(Hagedoorn, 2006). 
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4.2.1.3 Comparison of alliance formation based on relational capabilities versus 
network inertia 
In essence, as can be seen from Table 4.1, the similarity between processes 
reflecting either relational capabilities or network inertia is striking. Inter-personal, 
inter-organizational connections or status of the alliance partner may be either positive 
or negative. Objectively assessing whether such connections or processes exist is 
therefore unlikely to facilitate our understanding whether a partnership can be 
considered of consisting of positive relational capability processes, as they may in turn 
also reflect negative network inertial processes. This indicates that investigating 
whether such processes actually exist within partnerships or between alliance partners 
is not as helpful. Instead, investigating the quality of such processes is key for 
evaluating whether relational capabilities or network inertia exist between alliance 
partners. 
 
TABLE 4.1: Formation objectives for repeated partnerships 
Relational 
Capabilities 
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4.2.2 Investor uncertainty regarding repeated alliance objectives 
From the above, it seems apparent that investigating whether repeated 
partnerships may be formed due to the development of either relational capabilities or 
network inertia is challenging for external stakeholders. Making matters even more 
difficult is that outcomes of previous alliances are largely intangible and the success 
depends on alliance managers’ evaluations themselves (Zollo et al., 2002). Objective 
indicators such as the length of the partnership are not helpful either as they may 
indicate the creation of either relational capabilities or network inertia (Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Kim et al., 2006). Such uncertainty for evaluations is common 
if resources or outcomes are largely intangible (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). Therefore, 
investors evaluating whether a repeated partnership indicates a relational capability or 
network inertia face uncertainty and information asymmetry. Despite these 
uncertainties, investors have a strong incentive for identifying the reasons for alliance 
formations as varying value creation impacts indicate. 
Ultimately, it is the executives of the partnering organizations who are aware 
of the underlying formation reasons and the effectiveness of the existing partnership 
so far, while investors have difficulty to identify those. This leads to information 
asymmetry between the partnering firms and investors. Such information asymmetry 
not only creates problems for investors aiming to invest in firms due to the uncertainty 
but also to firms themselves as investors are likely to discount all security prices for 
the risk they incur that the repeated alliance may possibly be formed due to network 
inertia (Easley & O'Hara, 2004; Wang, 1993). Alternatively, investors may decide to 
forego any investments in such assets which they perceive as too risky (Domowitz, 
Glen, & Madhavan, 1997). As this may negatively influence stock prices, announcing 
firms have incentives to decrease the asymmetry in information. Firms that can 
credibly indicate that their repeated alliance is not subject to such network inertia but 
relational capabilities are likely to signal this in order to positively influence investors. 
This chapter therefore uses signalling theory in order to provide an improved 
understanding which repeated alliances investors regard as valuable, thus consisting of 
relational capabilities, and which ones are regarded as negative, thus possibly being 
subject to network inertia instead. The following subsection applies signalling theory 
to the context of repeated partnerships. 
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4.2.3 Signalling theory applied to the context of repeated partnerships and their 
effect on alliance value creation 
As introduced in Chapter 2, signalling theory is primarily concerned with firms 
aiming to reduce information asymmetry between themselves and investors. The 
literature has identified that the signalling process consists of five stages as they occur 
in a sequential process: The information problem, observation of signal, signal costs, 
Pareto optimization, and signal confirmation (Bergh et al., 2014; Spence, 1973). The 
following is structured around these key dimensions of signalling theory and applies 
them to the context of how firms can signal that their respective repeated partnership 
consists of a relational capability and not network inertia. 
This chapter identifies executive quotes in alliance announcement press 
releases as a means for signalling superior partnership quality to investors. I propose 
that such quotes decrease the information asymmetry between on the one hand firms 
announcing an alliance and on the other hand, investors valuing the alliance 
announcement. As such, these quotes may signal the superior quality of the previous 
partnership with the same partner. Such signals are credible because executives have a 
cost involved with sending such signals as their reputation is at stake. Consequently, 
according to signalling theory, only firms that have developed relational capabilities 
and intend to build on those in the subsequent partnership will signal the quality of 
repeated partnerships to investors whereas firms that have developed network inertia 
or are not utilizing relational capabilities previously are more likely not to emphasize 
this to investors. The following subsections develop the theoretical argument using the 
distinct stages identified by signalling theory (Bergh et al., 2014). The theoretical 







4.2.3.1 Information problem between alliance partners announcing repeated 
partnerships and investors 
In order for signals to have any relevance, there needs to be an ‘information 
problem’, a situation where the signaller and the receiver have different levels of 
information, also called information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Signallers in this 
case believe a signal will have an effect on how the receiver reacts to it and thereby 
reduce the information problem (Spence, 1973). In the context of repeated 
partnerships, there is an information problem for investors at the announcement of a 
repeated alliance regarding the formation reasons. As explained in detail above, 
whether firms form repeated partnerships for positive or negative reasons is unclear. 
Evaluating the ultimate reason, however, is critical for investors to estimate the 
incremental value the repeated alliance generates for the firm. More specifically, 
investors need to evaluate whether a repeated alliance is entered because firms have 
developed processes such as trust or inter-organizational routines in their previous 
partnership (Gulati, 1995a; Schilke & Goerzen, 2010; Zollo et al., 2002). The 
alternative for the repeated alliance formation may be that firms have developed 
tendencies to repeatedly collaborate due to network inertia (Kim et al., 2006). 
Investors may search for insights from previous partnerships. However, due to the 
complexity of alliance partnerships and the intangible performance outcomes of 
previous partnerships, there is significant ambiguity whether a previous partnership 
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found that, for instance, the length of the alliance or premature termination does not 
indicate the performance level of the alliance as firms may have reached their alliance 
objectives prematurely (Sadowski & Duysters, 2008). 
Consequently, there is significant heterogeneity in the value investors ascribe 
to repeated partnerships. While several studies (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Sleptsov et al., 
2013; Zaheer et al., 2010) find that investors react positively to repeated partnership 
announcements, others find that investors value repeated partnerships negatively (Lee, 
2013; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Yang et al., 2015). Research finds that in such 
high ambiguity contexts, investors look for signals which help them to more fully 
understand why firms might be entering repeated partnerships as they cannot be aware 
of all private and public information that is available to the executives involved 
(Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). Therefore, the various empirical effects upon 
announcement might indicate that investors’ reaction is triggered by underlying 
experience-related signals from the announcing firm to value such repeated alliance 
announcements (e.g. Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant & Schendel, 2000).  
 
4.2.3.2 Signal observability 
 Press releases as signals 
Signalling in the context of alliances is based on two types of signals in 
particular. Firstly, the alliance partnership itself may send a signal to investors (e.g. 
Ozmel et al., 2013; Park & Mezias, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999). For instance, forming 
alliances with prominent alliance partners may send a signal of legitimacy to investors 
(Ozmel et al., 2013; Stuart et al., 1999). Secondly, the underlying firm-specific 
characteristics of the announcing firm also send a signal to investors (e.g. Anand & 
Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009). For instance, firms’ experience in managing 
strategic alliances signals a firm-level alliance or dyad-level relational capability to 
more successfully manage (repeated) alliances to investors (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Gulati et al., 2009). 
Both types of alliance signals can be observed by investors as they involve the 
public disclosure of alliances through press releases (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009). Such 
press releases are distributed through publicly available databases such as ‘Business 
Wire’ or ‘PR Newswire’, which have a high reach in the investor community (Henry, 
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2008; Perkins & Hendry, 2005). They may also effectively influence how the media 
reports on the announcement, thereby increasing the effect of press releases (Carter, 
2006; Paul, 2001). Therefore, press releases have been used in prior literature as 
effective signals to the market (e.g. Carter, 2006; Francis et al., 2002; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1998). Investors essentially use such real-time development press releases to 
adapt their firm valuation. Thus, signals are not only observable but investors even 
actively observe those signals to adapt their investment strategy (Henry, 2008).  
Stock-listed firms in the USA have a ‘duty to disclose’ any ‘material’10 event 
for their organization (Palmiter, 2008). A frequent test for such materiality is whether 
such actions would have significant effects on the stock price. As indicated by 
previous empirical studies, most strategic alliance announcements actually have a 
significant impact on share prices with averages between 1 and 3% around the 
announcement date (e.g. Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). 
According to SEC regulations, companies need to announce any such alliances in a 
press release and file an 8-K statement with the SEC subsequently. Additionally, also 
the press release is regulated to some extent by the SEC. The main press release 
requirement is writing in an ‘unambiguous’, ‘timely’ way, with a ‘duty of honesty’ for 
announcing firms and executives (Palmiter, 2008; Wasserman, 2003). This prevents 
companies from making false or misleading statements; however, it leaves companies 
free to voluntarily disclose as much information about strategic alliances as they feel 
appropriate as long as all investors receive the official press release at the same time. 
Consequently, there is significant heterogeneity in the length and information 
provided in press releases (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). 
As investors actively seek the detection of signals, some firms deliberately 
signal certain information to investors who spend considerable effort to interpret such 
press releases (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011; Kimbrough & Wang, 2013). Research 
indicates that investors are influenced by the way press releases are written (Henry, 
2006, 2008), whether they contain certain keywords (Hussainey, Schleicher, & 
Walker, 2003; Smith & Taffler, 2000) or the structure of press release (Guillamon-
Saorin, Osma, & Jones, 2012). One key illustration is the US Federal Reserve Bank 
                                                     
10
 Material has been defined as “a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in making a securities-related decision” unless “investors already 
know or can infer the omitted information from other disclosure” (Palmiter, 2008: 85) 
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and its announcements concerning monetary policy. Investors in these announcements 
actively observe statements by the Central Bank and look for any hints concerning 
monetary policy such as sentences which contain ‘patience’ etc. (Gurkaynak, Sack, & 
Swanson, 2004). 
In line with this, research has identified that firms put significant efforts into 
properly communicating corporate agreements to investors (Sirower & Lipin, 2003). 
Wayne Moore, a former partner and managing director at one of the world’s leading 
deal advisors Goldman Sachs, has argued: “It is critical that the announcement of a 
transaction be well received […]. As a result, the time, effort, and care that goes into 
announcing a deal has increased significantly. And the content—the description of the 
strategic rationale and the quantification of the synergies and future earnings effects—
has as well.” (Moore, Rimland, Ritch, & Rouner, 1998: 12). 
 Executives as signallers 
As investor/external relations departments oftentimes write press releases 
themselves, press releases can at times be generic. Moreover, as press releases may be 
part of the disclosure requirements, the release itself may not differentiate the 
announcing company. Research finds, however, that a means for companies to 
differentiate themselves in press releases is through the use of executive quotes 
(Blankespoor & de Haan, 2014; Sleurs, Jacobs, & Van Waes, 2003). Executives 
represent key signallers of the organization (e.g. Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Zhang & 
Wiersema, 2009) and in the context of alliance formation (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati & Westphal, 1999). They have been found to signal 
effectively to investors through their quotes in statements, as introduced in the 
subsection above (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Sleurs et al., 2003). In line with this, 
accounting research finds that investors may be influenced by executives’ qualitative 
comments in earning press releases (Francis et al., 2002; Hoskin, Hughes, & Ricks, 
1986). More specifically, research identifies that the amount of press releases detailing 
executives’ opinions about earnings has significantly increased over time and can 
explain why investors value such announcements more significantly (Francis et al., 
2002). Such comments about earnings may further explain the importance and 
acceptance of such announcements among investors (Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2012; 
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Francis et al., 2002). As such, executive statements may be critical to delivering a key 
message of an announcement (Sleurs et al., 2003).  
 
4.2.3.3 Signalling costs 
In order for the receiver to evaluate the signal as credible, the signal itself must 
be costly for the signaller to make or alternatively sending a false signal must be 
leading to penalty costs (Bergh et al., 2014; Kang, 2008). Most importantly, according 
to SEC guidelines misleading or wrong information in press releases incur substantial 
direct penalty costs (e.g. Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994) as firms and 
announcing executives have a ‘duty of honesty’ (Palmiter, 2008). Signalling costs are 
not necessarily incurred by the firm but may also be indirectly incurred by the 
executive who sends the signal (Connelly et al., 2011). One of the key reasons, why 
above studies have found that executives are effective signallers for investors, is 
because executives have high signalling costs due to their indirect costs associated 
with their reputation.  
Executive reputation as such can be conceptualized as the subjective judgment 
of overall executives performance by stakeholders (Bednar, Love, & Kraatz, 2014) 
and therefore may serve as a proxy for executive ability (Milbourn, 2003; Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988). Therefore, if executives perform below expectations, they are likely 
to pay reputational costs (Milbourn, 2003). Such costs matter to executives because 
they also act in their own self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and incurring such 
costs may essentially harm their career development as their reputation serves as a 
means for further career enhancement (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). Consequently, 
executives’ reputational costs can include job losses (Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006), 
and long-term career difficulty of finding a subsequent job (Cannella Jr, Fraser, & 
Lee, 1995). As they are interested in improving their bargaining position and their 
career prospects, they have a strong incentive to maintain such a positive reputation 
(Hirshleifer, 1993). 
Therefore, research indicates that executives tend to act fairly honest towards 
stakeholders as a negative reputation would spread to existing/potential alliance 
partners as well as to existing/potential investors. Kang (2008), for instance, finds that 
reputational costs may even spill-over to companies. Therefore, firms and their boards 
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have strong incentives to keep executives statements under control. In the context of 
strategic alliances, executives have a key role due to their personal relationship with 
the alliance partner’s executives (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), thus 
emphasizing the scrutiny they are under regarding any alliance decision or statements. 
As investors evaluate executives actions and statements on a continuous basis (Bednar 
et al., 2014), executives tend to be rather conservative in the statements they make 
(Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992). 
 
4.2.3.4 Separating equilibrium 
The combination of the signal and the signalling costs leads to a ‘Pareto 
optimizing solution’ in which the receiver is able to effectively estimate the signalling 
costs to the signaller and hence, is able to put a value on the signal (Bergh et al., 
2014). In the case of executives signalling the quality of a repeated alliance, a 
separating equilibrium is created whereby only executives managing an effective 
alliance partnership with relational capabilities are likely to provide a positive 
statement regarding the quality of the previous partnerships with the same alliance 
partner. Executives, which manage an ineffective partnership, subject to network 
inertia, or have managed an unsuccessful alliance with the same alliance partner in the 
past, will regard their reputational costs as too high and therefore not make such 
statements. Investors subsequently ascribe a value to the statement considering the 
signalling costs of each firm which will then lead to a separating ‘Pareto optimal 
solution’. This means that given the respective signalling costs, there is no other more 
optimal feasible solution for either party. Hence, I hypothesize that investors view 
executive statements on the experience of previous alliance relationships with the 
same alliance partner as effective signals for determining whether a repeated 
partnership is an effective, high quality partnership.  
Hypothesis 1: Press releases comprising an evaluation of the quality of the previous 
strategic alliance have a more positive impact on investor valuation of repeated 
strategic alliances than press releases not comprising a quality evaluation. 
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4.2.3.5 Comparison of relational experiences signal and repeated partnerships 
Existing studies have almost exclusively focused on quantity-based experience 
measures as an indication that relational capabilities have been generated. These, 
however, have found both positive (Gulati et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2010) and non-
positive or even negative (Lee, 2013; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Yang et al., 2015) 
value creation effects with significant unexplained heterogeneity. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the quantity-based measure reflects both repeated alliances which entail 
relational capabilities or network inertia. I therefore propose that not only does a 
quality-based relational experience signal as introduced in Hypothesis 1 have positive 
value creation effects but also that it is likely to provide a more positive value creation 
effect than quantity-based measures of relational experiences. In order to confirm the 
value of the signal, I therefore hypothesize that the signal is more effective in 
predicting value generated from repeated alliances than non-signalled measures.  
Thus, 
Hypothesis 2: Press releases comprising an evaluation of the quality of the previous 
strategic alliance on alliance value creation have a more positive value creation 
effect than quantity-based relational experience measures. 
 
While the above provides a foundation for why executives’ signals impact the 
perception of receivers (investors), existing research finds that the strength of signals 
is dependent on various other factors related to signaller, receiver or environmental 
characteristics (Connelly et al., 2011). Therefore, the following subsections 
investigate how the abovementioned relationship is moderated by the reputation of the 
signaller (Executive reputation), the sophistication of the receiver (Institutional 
investors) and an intermediary between signallers and receivers (Financial analysts).  
 
4.2.4 Moderating impact of executive reputation  
As argued above, the costs and credibility of a signal are important 
components which influence the Pareto optimal solution between signaller and 
receiver (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). As also 
described above, executives’ reputational costs are an important reason why 
executives signals can be perceived as credible (Bednar et al., 2014). However, not all 
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executives face the same costs as their reputations are inherently different. Executives 
who have a higher reputation essentially also “have more to lose” (Balvers, 
McDonald, & Miller, 1988: 613). Reputation can be distinguished along various 
dimensions. One key dimension is the structural dimensions. CEOs are the ‘face’ of 
the company and their decisions clearly influence market value (e.g. Quigley & 
Hambrick, 2015). A recent survey by Weber Shandwick and KRC Research (2011) of 
more than 1,700 executives worldwide indicates that almost half the company 
reputation is attributed to the CEO’s reputation, essentially making the CEO’s 
reputation a significant factor in the firm’s market value. This so-called ‘CEO effect’ 
means that CEOs have the power to dramatically impact firm’s value. Thus, CEOs 
with high reputation levels in turn also face higher reputational costs thus increasing 
the signal strength. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of previous partnership executive signals on alliance 
value creation is positively moderated by executive reputation. 
 
4.2.5 Moderating impact of financial analysts 
Financial analysts are individuals usually hired by large investment companies. 
Such analysts cover firms for which they expect trading commission in the security or 
alternatively financing and consulting revenue from the covered firm (Hong, Lim, & 
Stein, 2000; Irvine, 2003). Financial analysts tend to be knowledgeable about the 
companies they cover and they usually have a team of junior analysts that follow the 
company even more closely. Their task is to provide forecasts on future earnings and 
issue recommendations on buy, hold, or sell to investors. As analysts are also in direct 
contact with the firm’s managers, their expertise about the firm tends to exceed the 
knowledge of other investors. As they pass their knowledge and judgement on to 
investors, they essentially become information intermediaries with a high degree of 
legitimacy, both from investors as well as from company managers (Zhang & 
Wiersema, 2009; Zuckerman, 1999). Therefore, their buying recommendations have a 
significant impact on investment decisions.  
In their role as intermediaries, analysts can reduce the information problem 
between buyers and sellers as they pay particular attention to strategic actions in so-
called analyst calls which help in the interpretation of firms’ actions. Analysts may 
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then effectively communicate this to their clients (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995), 
essentially improving the effectiveness of markets by making them more liquid and 
reducing the information problem (Roulstone, 2003). Ruling out preferential treatment 
of analysts over other investors, firms are still likely to keep analysts well-informed 
over the course of the alliances. In line with this, research has shown that signalling by 
companies is usually less effective for firms which are covered by a large number of 
financial analysts (e.g. Ozcan & Overby, 2008). Due to analysts being well-informed, 
they may also more effectively evaluate the potential outcome of previous strategic 
actions and know the underlying reasons for firm’s actions (Bednar et al., 2014). Their 
knowledge of the firms they cover, and their often informal connections with the 
executives involved with the alliance makes financial analysts more likely to be aware 
of the underlying reasons for any alliance formation.  
In the context of repeated partnerships, financial analysts may therefore have 
two key advantages over individual investors. Firstly, they may be more 
knowledgeable of outcomes of previous partnerships between the same alliance 
partners and may have informed investors of these over the course of the partnership. 
This may help analysts to evaluate whether the repeated partnership is likely formed 
due to relational capabilities or network inertia. Secondly, their informal conversations 
and the knowledge of the firms may provide analysts with the underlying reasons for 
the repeated alliance formation and, hence, may know the likelihood of it being due to 
relational capabilities or network inertia. 
Hence, investors of companies which are extensively covered by financial 
analysts have a higher chance of receiving earlier cues as to whether previous 
partnerships have been a success or not, and whether the repeated partnership is 
entered due to either relational capabilities or network inertia. Thus, such information 
may have already reached investors by the time of the repeated alliance announcement 
(or even before). Hence, the value of the signal is therefore less valuable to such 
investors. Thus, I expect that as more analysts follow the firm, the impact of the signal 
will have a lower impact on the stock price. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of previous partnership executive signals on alliance 
value creation is negatively moderated by financial analyst coverage. 
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4.2.6 Moderating impact of institutional investors  
Receiver characteristics may also impact the strength of a signal (Connelly et 
al., 2011). As explained above, the basic assumption of signalling theory is that there 
is an information problem between signallers and receivers. In turn, the extent to 
which there is an actual information problem can influence the strengths of the signal 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Therefore, more informed investors are likely not to be 
influenced by signals as much. As one of the largest groups of receivers among firm 
investors, institutional investors are large organizations such as pension or mutual 
funds which usually hold substantial amounts of shares (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, & 
Krinsky, 2000). Due to their significant investments, such investors are professional 
and sophisticated in their investment strategy, thus, well-informed of current 
developments at firms they have invested in (e.g. Bushee, 1998). Similar to analysts, 
institutional investors are oftentimes better informed than smaller private investors as 
organizations may take extra efforts to keep them informed such as special conference 
calls (Bushee, Matsumoto, & Miller, 2003). Therefore, institutional investors are 
likely to be more capable to interpret the quality of the previous partnership with the 
same alliance partner than private investors. Hence, the information problem is not as 
significant between firms announcing repeated partnerships and institutional investors. 
In turn, the magnitude of the signal sent by the executive is likely to be less valuable 
for institutional investors. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of previous partnership executive signals on alliance 







4.3 Variables and measures 
4.3.1 Independent variables first introduced in Chapter 4 
Relational experience signal. To determine whether firms send a relational 
experience signal to investors, a content analysis of alliance announcement press 
releases is conducted (e.g. Francis et al., 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Alliance 
press releases are first gathered from Medtrack and then coded by the researcher and 
subsequently by another coder. The coding scheme involved two key steps. Firstly, 
press releases are studied whether the statement contains a reference to previous 
partnerships between the two announcing firms either in the main body of the text or 
in a quote. An example is the following: “This collaboration is the second between 
the companies. In December 2002, Sunesis and Biogen Idec entered into a separate 
collaboration to discover therapeutics for the treatment of inflammatory and 
autoimmune diseases”. 
Secondly, press releases are scanned and coded whether executives of the focal 
firm make a statement directly referencing to the quality of the previous partnership 
and the experience with the partner in collaborating or the outcomes of the previous 
partnership. A binary variable is used and receives a ‘1’ if the executive makes a 
statement regarding the quality and ‘0’ otherwise. Please see two examples below for 
the quality assessment. There was inter-coder agreement rate on over 95% of all cases. 
The remaining cases were discussed and an opinion found. Such a coding procedure 
has been used in the management field in the context of executive explanations and 
justifications for corporate governance mechanisms such as long-term incentive plans 
in proxy statements (Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995) or in the 
accounting field in the context of earnings comments by executive (Francis et al., 
2002). For this chapter, 31% of all statements included a reference to a previous 
partnership and a direct statement from a firm executive about the quality of a 
repeated partnership. 
“The importance of this agreement to our company is at least twofold: it 
manifests the excellent collaboration already in place with Solvay, as evidenced by 
the current Phase II clinical trials with Cetrotelix. In addition, it is yet another 
proof of the research competence and commitment of our internal drug discovery unit 
(Dr. Juergen Vogel, Executive Vice President Global R&D and COO at Aeterna). 
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“For the first time in any pharmaceutical company's history, we have the 
ability to capture and evaluate atherosclerotic plaque from thousands of patients. Our 
first year of collaboration with FoxHollow has given us novel insights into 
cardiovascular disease, and we’re very pleased to enlarge our relationship today 
to continue this focus on cardiovascular disease while including other important 
disease areas as well. The expanded collaboration will also enable FoxHollow to use 
human plaque analysis to enhance the capabilities of its NightHawk intravascular 
plaque imaging system, and accelerate its anti-restenosis drug therapy program” (Peter 
S. Kim, Ph.D., president of Merck Research Laboratories). 
Executive reputation. Executive reputation is challenging to measure as it 
reflects a perception of different stakeholder groups. Therefore, I rely on two 
measures for this. Firstly, I draw on research which indicates that higher positioned 
executives might be more reputable. Structural power gives more senior executives a 
higher reputation as they are the head of the company and ‘have more to lose’ 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). Recent research indicates that CEOs have substantial 
power over organizations and can therefore influence performance significantly 
(Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). Therefore, I measure executive reputation through a 
binary variable which receives the value ‘1’ if the signal is sent by the CEO or ‘0’ if it 
had been sent by another executive-level officer. Additionally, I measure executive 
reputation through an analysis of the newspaper coverage the announcing executive 
had received 3 years prior to the announcement and since 1990. Similar to Francis, 
Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang (2008), I use Lexis Nexis to check The Wall Street 
Journal, Financial Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today, as 
well as the PR Newswire and the Business Wire for the number of articles in which 
executives are mentioned.  
Analyst coverage. Previous studies (e.g. Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; 
Ozcan & Overby, 2008) are followed by measuring the impact of analyst coverage by 
the count measure of all analysts explicitly following the focal firm. The I/B/E/S 
database is used to identify the unique number of analysts making earnings forecasts 
in the year of the alliance announcement in order to indicate the number of 
intermediaries between executives as signallers and investors as receivers of the 
signal.  
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Institutional investors. The sophistication of institutional investors is 
measured as the percentage of investors which own more than 5% of the outstanding 
shares. Under SEC regulations, any investment manager, fund or other person must 
file a schedule 13D form if they own more than 5% of a US-based equity. Information 
regarding the percentage of the stocks outstanding held by such investors is directly 
gathered from the announcing firm’s DEF 14A proxy statement filed for the financial 





Measures for control variables are described in detail in Chapter 3. In order to 
improve readability, an overview of all the measures used in this chapter is provided 
in the Table 4.2 below. 
TABLE 4.2: Measures table (Chapter 4) 
Variable name Measures Data source Chapter 4 
Alliance year(s) 0/1 Binary variable for each year in which the 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if partner firm is a non-
public partner (private firm, research institute or 
university), 0 if partner firm is a listed public firm 
Compustat Control 
Slack resources Natural logarithm of cash divided by long-term 
debt in the year preceding the alliance 
announcement 
Compustat Control 
Firm uncertainty Volatility in monthly stock prices in the year of 




R&D expenses divided by net sales in the year 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is classified as a 
contractual R&D alliance, 0 if it is classified as 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is between two 
partners which have their HQs in different 




Number of previous partnerships between focal 




Natural logarithm of total number of alliances of 
either R&D alliance or licensing agreements the 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if focal firm executive 
mentions previous relational experience quality, 
0, if otherwise.  
Medtrack Independent 
Analyst coverage Number of financial analysts making earnings 






0/1 Binary variable. 1 if focal firm’s announcing 





Percentage of focal firm’s total equity held by 










TABLE 4.3: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Chapter 4) 
Mean Std. 13
1 CAR 3.06 9.81 1
2 Absorptive capacity 1.18 2.10 0.29 *** 1
3 Firm uncertainty 0.16 0.13 0.27 *** 0.35 *** 1
4 Slack resources 0.14 1.96 0.01 0.06 0.14 * 1
5 Non-listed alliance partner 0.30 0.46 -0.04 0.02 0.17 ** -0.01 1
6 R&D alliance 0.52 0.50 0.11 0.17 ** -0.07 -0.12 0.09 1
7 International alliance 0.54 0.50 -0.06 -0.17 ** -0.10 0.17 ** -0.12 -0.13 * 1
8 Relational experience 1.83 1.42 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 * -0.05 -0.02 1
9 GAE (log) 4.00 1.27 -0.33 *** -0.34 *** -0.47 *** -0.29 *** 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.16 ** 1
10 Relational experience signal 0.31 0.46 0.23 *** 0.20 ** 0.09 -0.02 0.14 * 0.13 * 0.05 -0.06 -0.22 *** 1
11 Executive reputation 0.23 0.42 0.16 ** 0.15 ** 0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.08 -0.25 *** 0.27 *** 1
12 Financial analysts 11.45 10.79 -0.11 -0.08 -0.13 * 0.11 * -0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.00 1
13 Institutional investors 21.81 19.37 0.18 ** 0.19 ** 0.25 *** 0.04 -0.14 * -0.14 * 0.03 0.11 -0.53 *** 0.11 0.24 *** -0.02 1
N=161
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
121 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
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4.4 Analyses and results 
4.4.1 Analyses 
Descriptive statistics of the mean and the standard deviation (S.D.) are detailed 
in Table 4.3. This sample consists of partnerships comprising of at least one previous 
alliance before the focal alliance announcement. This results in 161 alliances. For 
CAR, the mean abnormal return of 3.06% is somewhat higher than for previous 
studies, which primarily investigated equity joint venture announcements (Gulati et 
al., 2009; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). There are various explanations for this. 
Firstly, as Anand and Khanna (2000a) indicate the mean abnormal return for 
contractual alliances is higher than for equity alliances. Secondly, Zollo et al. (2002) 
find that the value of repeated experiences is higher in non-equity alliances as trust 
(generated through repeated experiences) and control (generated through equity) are 
substitutes. Thirdly, Gulati et al. (2009) find that relational experiences in general are 
more valuable than general experiences. As this sample only consists of partnerships 
comprising at least one previous repeated experience between the two partners, it can 
therefore be expected that the mean CAR is higher than in previous studies. For a 
detailed overview of event study results including CAR tables please refer to 
Appendices 4.1-4.2. 
Table 4.3 also shows the bivariate correlation results. Notable is the negative 
correlation between GAE(log) and Institutional investors (-0.53, p<0.001), indicating 
that as the number of GAE increases, the proportion of institutional investors 
decreases. This can be explained by the fact that small firms in the biopharmaceutical 
industry tend to require substantial financing and therefore have a large proportion of 
institutional investors with significant shareholdings. Executive reputation is highly 
correlated with the Relational experience signal (0.27, p<0.001). This indicates and 
may provide some support that more reputable executives send signals to investors in 
order to increase the strength of the signal. Additionally, it is notable that Firm 
uncertainty is negatively correlated with GAE(log) (-0.47, p<0.001). This can largely 
be explained by industry factors as well. Firms inexperienced in alliances are likely to 
have significant uncertainty surrounding their product development success as 
partnering with firms in the industry is associated with reputation and status (Stuart et 
al., 1999). In turn, this means that firms with more alliance experience are likely to 
have less uncertainty surrounding product development. 
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Besides the bivariate correlations and due to the inclusion of interaction 
variables in the empirical models, multi-collinearity is also checked by investigating 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs). Both mean and individual values are below the 
critical threshold value of 10 (e.g. Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, & Nizam, 1998). 
In Table 4.4, the OLS regression results for estimating alliance performance 
based on CAR are presented. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes all the 
control variables. Model 2 introduces the Relational experience signal sent by focal 
firms’ executives in order to test Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 comparing the effect of 
the quality-based Relational experience signal with the quantity-based Relational 
experience measure is also tested using this model. The moderating effect of 
Executive reputation as proposed in Hypothesis 3 is tested in Model 3. Model 4 then 
tests the moderating effect of Financial analysts (Hypothesis 4), while Model 5 tests 








TABLE 4.4: OLS regression results (Chapter 4) 
 
 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable
Control variables
Alliance years (dummies) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Absorptive capacity 0.884 0.801 0.778 0.804 0.828
(.86) (.79) (.78) (.77) (.8)
Firm uncertainty 10.051 11.873 * 12.519 * 12.091 * 11.759
(7.15) (6.91) (7.06) (6.83) (7.14)
Slack resources -0.462 -0.381 -0.426 -0.474 -0.430
(.4) (.38) (.43) (.4) (.38)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.596 -2.391 -2.146 -2.033 -2.457
(1.48) (1.54) (1.45) (1.4) (1.53)
R&D alliance 1.758 1.470 1.487 1.350 1.276
(1.45) (1.34) (1.3) (1.28) (1.53)
International alliance 0.136 -0.294 -0.333 -0.121 -0.254
(1.49) (1.36) (1.39) (1.36) (1.36)
Relational experience 0.087 0.030 0.060 -0.066 0.107
(.68) (.68) (.66) (.7) (.7)
GAE (log) -1.990 ** -1.556 ** -1.432 ** -1.487 ** -1.821 **
(.79) (.72) (.67) (.7) (.72)
Explanatory variables
Relational experience signal 4.139 ** 3.434 4.495 ** 4.171 **
(1.79) (2.16) (1.85) (1.76)
Executive reputation 1.058
(1.43)








Relational experience signal x Instititutional investors 0.002
(.08)
Constant 9.872 * 7.632 7.151 8.356 8.798 *
(5.62) (5.8) (5.74) (5.78) (5.19)
N 161 161 161 161 161
F-Statistic 1.66 * 2.19 ** 2.28 *** 2.54 *** 2.2 ***
R-Square 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.24
Root MSE 9.21 9.07 9.11 8.97 9.12
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01











MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
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4.4.2 Results 
In this section, results of the hypothesis testing are presented. In terms of 
overall fit of the empirical models, the r-squares of the models are compared to 
existing literature and are found to be higher than in previous studies using stock 
market measures for alliance value creation (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002). 
R-squares tend to be rather low due to the amount of other factors influencing stock 
market performance. As stated by Gulati et al. (2009: 1226): “the objective of the 
analysis in these cases is to evaluate the contribution of partnering experience to value 
creation rather than to explain the overall variance in abnormal market returns 
following alliance announcements”. 
Due to the robust OLS option (Huber-White sandwich estimator with firm 
clustering), adjusted r-square values are not identifiable for comparing the explanatory 
power of the models. Alternatively, Root Mean Squared Error (Root MSE) provides 
an accuracy measure for model comparisons. The lower the Root MSE, the more 
accurate the model is. Model 1 as the controls model provides the least explanation to 
CAR, whereas the explanatory power of the other models increases. The most 
accurate Model 4 is model including the Financial analysts interaction term. While 
the other two interactions provide more explanatory power than the base model, 
Models 2 and 4 seem to be best fitting. However, the difference to the moderating 
models fit is marginal. 
In order to test Hypothesis 1 that the signal of previous repeated alliance 
quality is positively related to investor reaction, it is tested in Model 2 (“Relational 
experience signal”). The results reported in Model 2 provide support for Hypothesis 1 
with the coefficient estimate on the Relational experience signal variable being 
positive and significant (β
Relational experience signal
: 4.13, p-value: 0.02). All other things 
being equal, this means that a firm with an executive sending a signal about the 
previous partnerships quality receives around a 4% higher stock market return than 
firms which do not. This is in line with prior research that signals sent by executives 
in corporate disclosures such as press releases are received and valued by investors 
(Francis et al., 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Thus, they represent important means 
to signal quality to the market. Results therefore seem to suggest that a separating 
equilibrium between on the one side firms with relational capabilities and on the other 
side firms with non-relational capabilities exists. 
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Results reported in Model 2 also provide means to test Hypothesis 2 that the 
effect of the Relational experience signal is higher than for the quantity of Relational 





(F1, 68: 3.91, p-value: 0.05). This indicates 
that there is a significant difference between a quantity and quality based indicator of 
relational experiences in predicting alliance value creation. 
The moderating effects are tested in Models 3, 4, and 5. Results reported in 
Model 3 provide no support for Hypothesis 3, that Executive reputation as measured 
by the executive position positively moderate the effect of the Relational experience 
signal onto CAR, with the coefficient estimate being positive but insignificant for 
executive position (β
Relational experience signal x Exec. reputation
: 1.16, p-value:0.7). Hypothesis 
3 is therefore rejected. A supplementary analysis whether other reputational factors 
impact the signal strength is subsequently conducted. The news coverage for 
executives is also a frequently used measure for reputation (e.g. Francis et al., 2008). 
However, due to smaller sample size as they cover only the ‘signalled’ 
announcements, these suffer from multi-collinearity issues and are therefore not 
reported. 
The results reported in Model 4 provide support for Hypothesis 4, that the 
number of Financial analysts negatively moderate the effect of the Relational 
experience signal onto CAR, with the coefficient estimate being negative and 
significant (β
Relational experience signal x Financial analysts: -0.30, p-value: 0.06). Please see an 
interaction graph in Figure 4.3. As expected, results indicate that as the number of 
analysts following the firm making the alliance announcement increases, the effect of 





FIGURE 4.3: Two-way interaction graph relational experience signal and analyst 
coverage 
 
The results reported in Model 5 provide no support for Hypothesis 5, that the 
proportion of Institutional investors negatively moderates the effect of the Relational 
experience signal onto CAR, with the coefficient estimate being positive but 
insignificant (β
Relational experience signal x Institutional investors
: 0.001, p-value: 0.9). The control 
variables are tested in Model 1. In line with existing research which has frequently 
found a large amount of insignificant control variables (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; 
Gulati et al., 2009), this chapter also finds that several control variables are 
insignificant. Only two control variables are significant across most models, however. 
Firstly, this chapter finds that Firm uncertainty has positive effects on CAR. This 
result on first sight may seem surprising given that investors do not like uncertainty as 
it is more difficult to value a company’s strategic actions. However, uncertainty by 
itself is not an unfavourable condition. In particular, investors may positively react to 
announcements, particularly in conditions of uncertainty (Zhang, 2006). As alliances 
in general are positive news for investors, the positive effect of firm uncertainty on 
such announcements is therefore not surprising (Chan et al., 1997). Secondly, this 
chapter also finds that General Alliance Experience (GAE) has a negative impact on 
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alliance value creation. This is also in line with existing literature which finds 
declining effects on alliance performance (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 
2005). The underlying reasons for this are discussed more extensively in Chapter 5.  
 
4.4.3 Robustness checks 
Four different robustness checks are conducted. Firstly, robustness is ensured 
by testing whether any underlying partnership characteristics influence whether a 
signal is actually sent. In essence, there might be a sample selection problem in that 
other characteristics beyond the ones tested above may influence whether firms 
actually send a relational experience signal. As this may result in endogeneity issues, a 
two-step procedure as suggested by Heckman (1979) is followed to take this into 
account. As a first step, this meant that a probit model is run with Relational 
experience signal as the dependent variable and partnership characteristics as 
independent variables. Several characteristics were identified from existing literature, 
namely (1) Relationship length (Continuous variable: number of years since the first 
announced partnership between the two organizations), (2) Last relationship 
(Continuous variable: Number of years since the last announced partnership between 
the two organizations), (3) Alliance type (Binary variable: 1 if focal announcement 
refers to a R&D collaboration, 0 if the focal announcement refers to a licensing deal), 
and (4) Different alliance type (Binary variable: 1 if previous announced alliance 
between the two partners was a different alliance type to the focal alliance, 0 if it was 
the same alliance type). Existing literature suggests that the length between 
partnerships over time may be either beneficial or not as long gaps decrease the 
strength of a new partnerships between the partnering organizations (Gulati, 1995b) 
but may also indicate increased trust (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). 
Additionally, the alliance type is a critical determinant of alliance success (Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2006) and for benefiting from alliance or relational experience more 
specifically (Zollo et al., 2002). Relational experience may be more relevant in 
contexts in which partner teams more actively collaborate in this case R&D alliances 
over licensing agreements. Changes in the type of alliance may also indicate important 
changes in the alliance objectives and thus the possibility to take utilize on the 
development of previously generated relational experiences. Therefore, I decide to 
include these four variables as explanatory variables for executives sending a quote or 
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message to the market with the objective to generate the inverse Mills ratio from this 
model. Results suggest that two of these factors are indeed significant in influencing 
whether a relational experience signal is sent. Firstly, the relationship length 
negatively impacts whether such a signal is sent (-0.054, p-value: 0.09). This suggests 
that firms may possibly be more likely to be subject to network inertia at this stage. 
Secondly, the alliance type also influences whether a quality signal of relational 
experiences is sent to the market. More specifically, when announcing more 
collaborative deal types, these are more likely to be signalled to the market (0.416, p-
value: 0.05).  
Overall, this robustness check suggests that also partnership-specific aspects 
influence whether a signal to investors concerning the quality of the previous 
partnerships is sent. As a second step, the generated inverted Mills ratio is then added 
as another control variable in the above models (please see Table 4.5). Important 
findings from this additional robustness check are that, firstly, the inverse Mills ratio 
control variable is insignificant, which implies that endogeneity may not be a concern. 
Secondly, the sign of Relational experience signal is still positive 
(β
Relational experience signal
: 3.87, p-value: 0.03) and significant, thus supporting the main 
argument for a quality-based measure of relational experience. Moreover, the effect of 
the Financial analyst coverage also holds when controlling for the inverse Mills ratio. 
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TABLE 4.5: OLS regression with inverted Mills ratio 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2
Control variables
Alliance years (dummies) n.s. n.s.
Absorptive capacity 0.796 0.803
(.79) (.77)
Firm uncertainty 11.970 * 12.202 *
(6.99) (6.93)
Slack resources -0.379 -0.475
(.39) (.41)
Non-listed alliance partner -2.555 -2.177
(1.63) (1.48)
R&D alliance 0.952 0.883
(1.23) (1.18)
International alliance -0.436 -0.248
(1.39) (1.39)
Relational experience 0.098 -0.007
(.65) (.67)
GAE (log) -1.532 ** -1.467 **
(.71) (.7)
Inverted Mills ratio (λ) -1.948 -1.728
(2.34) (2.37)
Explanatory variables









F-Statistic 2.17 ** 2.42 ***
R-Square 0.25 0.27







Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White sandwich estimators and firm clustering are in 
parentheses
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Secondly, I check if despite collinearity issues (>0.85) including firm size as a 
control variable changes the significance of the main results identified in this chapter. 
I find that the effect of the Relational experience signal and the moderating effect of 
Analyst coverage are both significant also when including firm size. Thirdly, I check 
if a subset of the data drives the effect. Therefore, I randomly delete 10% of the 
observations and check if the results hold (Lee, 2013). Confirmation for this is found. 
Fourthly, I use a different event window as suggested by existing literature to improve 
robustness of the results (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). I choose 
event window (-1, +1) in order to leave more time for investors to interpret the 
alliance announcement. This event window provides support to the main hypothesis of 
a quality-based measure of relational experience (see Appendix 4.3). The effects of 
the analyst coverage interaction become insignificant in this window, however, as 
their main effect is likely to be strongest when the news of the repeated alliance 
announcement triggers through to the market and not after the announcement day 
itself. Additionally, results of the CAR tables (Appendices 4.1 and 4.2) indicate that 
investors react positively on the announcement day itself with average CARs of 
+2.47% and also albeit smaller on the pre-announcement day (+0.59%). This provides 
support to both the argument of a quality-based relational experience measure and the 
importance of analysts to investors in immediately communicating to investors. On 
the contrary, as expected, results do not hold for an event windows not comprising the 
event day (e.g. -10,-2 or +2, +10). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter aims to answer the research questions how the signalling of 
relational experiences affects alliance value creation. In addition, it endeavours to find 
whether the effect of such signals is influenced by signaller, intermediary or receiver 
characteristics. This chapter thereby advances research on repeated partnerships and 
their effect on value creation (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Goerzen, 2007; Gulati et al., 
2009; Kale et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002). Existing research has used performance or 
value creation implications of repeated partnerships as an indication or proxy whether 
relational capabilities had been generated. Research has, however, found significant 
unexplained heterogeneity in effects of relational experiences implying that the use of 
the quantity of previous relational experiences may actually not reflect the quality of 
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the partnership, thus the development of relational capabilities. This chapter therefore 
distinguishes alliances with the same partner between signalled and non-signalled 
repeated partnerships to identify whether these may significantly explain the value 
creation heterogeneity. By using signalling theory, this chapter reveals that the 
distinction between signalled and non-signalled alliances is a critical one and can 
explain parts of the heterogeneity observed in previous studies. Findings also reveal 
that the strength of the signal is contingent upon intermediaries transmitting the signal 
to receivers, while signaller or receiver characteristics do not influence the strength of 
the signal. More specifically, the effect of relational experience signals depends on 
financial analysts who mitigate the direct effects of the signal as they are likely to 
keep their clients informed about the quality of the partnership before a signal by the 
announcing firm has been sent.  
Findings indicate that the signalling of relational experiences has a positive 
impact on value creation. This confirms expectations that firms which signal their 
repeated partnerships may indicate superior quality of the previous one. While some 
firms provide a short press release focusing on the newly announced repeated alliance, 
other firms provide additional information about the previous partnership. When 
executives provide such information, this may signal confidence and quality in the 
partnership to investors. Accordingly, organizations which do not signal their repeated 
alliances may not be able to credibly covey their alliance objective is for relational 
capabilities. On the contrary, companies may have developed network inertia with no 
positive results from previous partnerships reported by executives.  
Moreover, this chapter finds evidence that a quality-based measure of 
relational experiences provides a better indication for the value created from alliances 
than only the quantity of previous relational experiences. This finding explicitly builds 
on existing studies that the number of previous partnerships may be a weak indicator 
of relational experiences. Therefore, previous studies have challenged the use of 
repeated partnerships as a measure for relational capabilities (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Gulati et al. (2009: 1228), for instance, propose that 
such measures should “(…) allow researchers to assess realized experience rather than 
limit investigation to potential experience or learning opportunities.” In line with this, 
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005: 343) propose that “(…) alliance experience variables 
should also reflect the quality of collaborations (…).” This finding builds on the above 
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and finds an indication that the signalled and perceived quality of collaborations may 
influence the value creation thereof. 
The chapter’s hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of signaller 
characteristics, signaller-receiver intermediaries and receiver characteristics receive 
only some support. Findings concerning executive reputation in moderating the 
signalling effect are not supported. Insignificant findings for executive reputation may 
indicate that signalling costs for executives are already at a significant level for all 
executives and there are no significant differences whether executives have a low or 
high executive position. While such executives have technically more to lose in terms 
of reputation, executives with a lower position also have more to gain in terms of their 
career advancements, thus making them also inclined to prevent reputation losses. The 
insignificance of the findings for executive reputation, therefore may also be part of a  
the difficulty in measuring of executive reputation as has been indicated by previous 
literature (Milbourn, 2003). 
Findings for signal-receiver intermediaries confirm expectations that financial 
analysts decrease the impact of such signals to the market. According to expectations, 
such analysts have significant power in informing their investor clients (e.g. Brennan 
& Subrahmanyam, 1995). Thus, analysts may mitigate the effect of signals to the 
market effectively. It seems surprising that the receiver characteristics, in this case, the 
sophistication of the institutional investors are found to be insignificant. Two possible 
reasons for this can be identified. Firstly, institutional investors react differently to 
news announcements. Their trading activity is less frequent than private investors and 
they essentially use different trading strategies. As such, they may be subject to 
various clauses in their fund offering, potentially requiring fund managers to divest for 
non-market related factors (e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). This implies 
that they may not react significantly around the announcement date itself. Secondly, 
the insignificance might be a methodological issue. This chapter uses the percentage 
of shares held by institutional investors above the outstanding disclosure threshold. 
However, many institutional investors might own less than this reporting threshold. 
Therefore, a measure using all institutional investors might provide significant results 
as hypothesized. 
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This chapter provides contributions to existing literature both theoretically and 
empirically. Firstly, this chapter provides a means to distinguish between repeated 
partnerships formed for different reasons. It therefore explicitly builds on studies 
which have identified significant performance heterogeneity in repeated partnerships. 
While some studies find that firms benefit from repeated partnerships (Gulati et al., 
2009; Sleptsov et al., 2013; Zaheer et al., 2010; Zollo et al., 2002), others find 
negative effects (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Lee, 2013; Wassmer & 
Dussauge, 2012; Yang et al., 2015). This chapter may clarify some of the differences 
among these for repeated partnerships from an external investor perspective. 
Secondly, this chapter combines an investigation into the reasons for repeated 
alliance formation with an examination of the outcome of repeated partnerships. 
Previous studies have mentioned and theorized based on these alliance formation 
reasons (e.g. Goerzen, 2007; Gulati, 1995a). However, the explicit reasons for alliance 
formation and their impact on alliance performance has hardly been investigated 
before, with the exceptions of Beckman et al. (2004) and Gulati and Westphal (1999). 
This study thereby answers calls for more research investigating the quality of 
previous partnerships instead of only the quantity (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo 
et al., 2002). 
Thirdly, this chapter is one of the first studies to investigate repeated 
partnerships with the same alliance partner which uses signalling theory. It is a 
valuable theory which can help to uncover circumstances when significant 
information asymmetry between parties exists and its use in many areas of strategic 
management has been increasing (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011). In the 
context of strategic alliances, signalling theory has been applied before (e.g. Ozmel et 
al., 2013; Park & Mezias, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999), however, not in the context of 
repeated partnerships. As signalling theory is particularly imperative when 
information asymmetry is present, the context of repeated partnerships provides a 
relevant addition to signalling theory and signalling theory to the context of repeated 
partnerships. 
Fourthly, the investigation of the moderating variables has implications on the 
understanding of prior studies which have investigated the alliance value creation 
through CAR (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009). While previous studies 
 108 
have primarily investigated firm- and partnership-specific moderating factors which 
impact the alliance announcement effect on CAR (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant & Schendel, 2000), this study finds that financial 
intermediaries also have an important effect in moderating the impact. Such financial 
analysts have the power to significantly reduce the information asymmetry between 
announcing firms and financial investors.  
 
4.6 Limitations and directions for future research 
While this chapter provides contributions to the strategic alliance literature, it 
has also has limitations which may provide directions for future research. Firstly, it 
needs to be emphasized that this chapter is only one first step to investigate the impact 
of previous partnership quality over the quantity. By using the signal of the previous 
partnership, it essentially refers to a quality measure as perceived by investors. Thus, 
drawing conclusions regarding the actual development of relational capabilities or 
network inertia may essentially be an investor evaluation. Whilst this study has 
attempted to identify factors which encourage firms to send such signals and finds that 
the alliance type and the relationship length may have an impact on the decision to 
send such signals, future studies may wish to investigate further factors that may 
impact firm’s signal. While signalling theory predicts that if signals are costly and the 
signal itself represents a quality assessment, future studies may also investigate the 
quality of previous partnerships with respect to the development of relational 
capabilities or network inertia in more detail.  
This chapter investigates the quality of repeated partnerships through 
signalling theory only in one industry. In order to improve generalizability and to rule 
out industry-specific differences, future studies may wish to investigate whether 
results also hold in other industry settings. Moreover, this chapter uses a stock-market 
measure for alliance value creation. While evidence indicates that it may be correlated 
with other more subjective measures of alliance performance (e.g. Heimeriks et al., 
2015; Kale et al., 2002), this study does not explicitly test for such long-term effects. 
As mentioned above, however, assessing the performance of a repeated partnership is 
challenging due to varying and oftentimes irrational alliance formation reasons. 
Nevertheless, future studies may still wish to examine whether the results identified in 
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this chapter also lead to better long-term alliance performance. While this may be very 
difficult in large-scale empirical studies, a possibility may be a number of longitudinal 
case studies which investigate specific partnerships and the formation reasons in order 
to further uncover the value creation heterogeneity of repeated alliances.
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL AND 
RELATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND THE IMPACT ON ALLIANCE VALUE 
CREATION 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to further contribute to existing empirical literature which has 
identified heterogeneity in the effect of relational experiences on value creation 
measures, Chapter 4 has investigated whether the signalling of relational experiences 
increases value creation. Some support has been found that investors’ value signalled 
previous relational experiences, indicating that the signalled quality of relational 
experiences may reflect the investor-perceived relational capability of the repeated 
partnership. While this may have helped the understanding of relational experiences, 
there is still significant heterogeneity in the effect of relational experience onto value 
creation. In order to build on these findings, this chapter shifts from the sole 
consideration of dyad-level repeated partnerships to an investigation of the 
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FIGURE 5.1: Empirical chapter overview (Chapter 5) 
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Described in Chapters 2 and 4, repeated partnerships as an antecedent to 
relational capabilities are situated on the dyad-level (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998). This is 
in contrast to the general ability of the firm to  manage strategic alliances, irrespective 
of the partner (Kale & Singh, 2007). There are significant differences in the way firms 
manage alliances and their respective performance outcomes. Some firms, such as Eli 
Lilly for instance, are renowned for their ability to manage strategic alliances 
effectively (Sims et al., 2001). Due to the generation of processes which are 
introduced firm-wide, alliance capabilities seem to also exist on the firm-level. A key 
antecedent to developing such firm-level alliance capabilities is through accumulating 
experiences with strategic alliances: General Alliance Experience (GAE). Primarily 
based on OL literature, existing research finds that firms can improve their alliance 
performance over time through ‘learning by doing’ (Argote et al., 1990). In the 
alliance context, research has investigated the effect of GAE on various performance 
measures and has shown that accumulating GAE may improve alliance performance 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Kale et al., 2002), particularly for inexperienced firms 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Park & Kim, 1997; Sampson, 2005). However, as firms 
accumulate more alliance experience, empirical evidence indicates that firms may 
become overconfident in managing those (Heimeriks, 2010) and performance declines 
at high levels of GAE (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Such a 
process of overconfidence is triggered by heuristics and superstitious learning which 
means that firms are likely to misattribute the cause and effect relationship between 
their alliance management and performance (Heimeriks, 2010; Zollo, 2009). Initial 
alliance successes may cause firms to over-ascribe their ability to manage alliances 
based on firm-level alliance processes leading to performance declines at high extents 
of firm-level alliance capabilities (Heimeriks, 2010). Empirical results provide strong 
support for this theory of overconfidence at high levels of GAE (Heimeriks, 2010; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). 
While research suggests that GAE may lead to overconfidence, it is still 
unexplored whether this may elucidate why such significant heterogeneity in the 
effect of dyad-level relational experiences on alliance value creation exists. 
Surprisingly, existing literature has so far considered firm-level GAE and dyad-level 
relational experience only independently. While they are situated on different levels, 
existing research has found that both types of experiences are still highly interrelated 
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as they both aim to improve the traditionally low alliance performance and affect the 
same alliance managers (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 2009; 
Zollo et al., 2002). Furthermore, theory on overconfidence suggests that in 
conjunction with any overconfidence in an organizational activity goes a simultaneous 
neglect or decline in other related processes, a so-called “competency trap” (Levitt & 
March, 1988: 322) or “core rigidity” (Leonard‐Barton, 1992: 118). More specifically, 
resources may be allocated to the overconfident processes, in this case firm-level 
alliance processes, while insufficient resources may be allocated to other processes, in 
this case dyad-level relational processes, leading to an underdevelopment of the latter. 
Existing conceptual research indicates that both types of alliance experience may in 
fact be interrelated (Schreiner & Heimeriks, 2010; Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). 
However, empirical evidence investigating whether overconfidence in firm-level GAE 
leads to a decreased value creation of dyad-level relational experience is to the best of 
my knowledge missing.  
In support of the proposed interrelationship between firm-level alliance 
experience and dyad-level relational experience, recent literature in related corporate 
development fields such as M&A or licensing finds that experiences which are 
interrelated may ‘spill-over’ from one activity level to another and thus may either 
positively or negatively impact one another (Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Eggers, 2012; 
Mulotte et al., 2013; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). For instance, developing strong in-
licensing experience may negatively impact a firm’s internal research and 
development efforts as firms resource allocations to own activities decreases (e.g. 
Mulotte et al., 2013). Alternatively, a firm’s international M&A activity may impact 
its internal activities in the domestic markets (e.g. Bertrand & Capron, 2015).  
While existing research finds that overconfidence may occur under such 
conditions, a general understanding of the factors which may mitigate or exacerbate is 
still lacking. As overconfidence by itself is a process which is triggered by uncertainty 
as managers and firms rely on using heuristics under such circumstances (e.g. 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997), I propose that the spill-over effect between relational 
experiences and GAE is exacerbated under conditions of firm uncertainty. 
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Moreover, existing research on alliances identifies that the effect of GAE on 
alliance performance is influenced by the underlying alliance management 
mechanisms, comprising of both integrating and institutionalizing mechanisms as first 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Kale et al., 2002). Such 
processes which advance alliance management consist of storing, codifying and 
disseminating alliance knowledge (Kale & Singh, 2007). While there is some 
evidence that such processes directly improve the management of GAE (Heimeriks & 
Duysters, 2007; Heimeriks et al., 2007), they also tend to lead to increased 
overconfidence when used in conjunction with high levels of GAE (Heimeriks, 2010). 
Therefore, it remains puzzling whether such alliance management mechanisms can 
mitigate or potentially exacerbate the negative effects of GAE at high levels and 
consequently how this may affect the relational experiences alliance value creation 
impact. Therefore, this chapter also investigates how such alliance management 
mechanisms may affect the interrelationship between GAE and relational experiences. 
Consequently, the research questions for this chapter are:  
 
How does the extent of firm-level general alliance experience (GAE) influence the 
value creation effects of dyad-level relational experiences? How do firm-level 
uncertainty and alliance management mechanisms influence the interrelationship 
between the two levels of experience? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter builds on previous research 
which has investigated the interrelationship of experiences across corporate 
development activities (e.g. Mulotte et al., 2013; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). This chapter 
thereby draws on two different levels of theories. Firstly, firm-level theories of OL 
and the RBV are used to argue that firms become overconfident in their firm-level 
alliance practices at high levels of GAE. Secondly, alliance partner-level theories such 
as inter-organizational trust are used to argue that such overconfidence affects the 
ability of dyad-level relational experience to positively impact alliance value creation 
as firms resource commitments to the partnership are likely to decrease.  
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The theoretical framework is in comparison to Chapter 4 tested on the full 
sample and not only the subsample of repeated partnerships. Before testing the 
interdependent effects of GAE and relational experiences, the independent effect of 
them on alliance value creation is tested in two baseline hypotheses. Results for the 
latter confirm results derived in Chapter 4 that the signalling of repeated partnerships 
has positive effects on alliance value creation. This also confirms parts of existing 
research which finds that the independent effect of relational experiences on alliance 
value creation is positive (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002). Secondly, results 
suggest that the effect of GAE on alliance value creation declines rapidly, confirming 
the expectation that organizations become overconfident in applying past alliance 
management lessons (Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Thirdly, the 
interrelationship is tested and strong support is found that the effect of dyad-level 
relational experiences on value creation is significantly reduced at high extents of 
firm-level GAE. Moreover, this chapter finds evidence that the interrelationship is 
moderated by firm characteristics. More specifically, according to expectations, firms’ 
idiosyncratic levels of uncertainty enhance the negative spill-over effect of high levels 
of GAE onto relational experiences. This follows expectations that uncertainty may 
further lead organizations to rely on heuristics, such as overconfidence (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Additionally, I find some evidence that alliance management 
mechanisms influence the proposed interrelationship between GAE and relational 
experiences. In line with expectations, such mechanisms may exacerbate the spill-over 
effect. However, results further indicate that such management mechanisms influence 
the effect onto the effect of relational experiences on value creation independent of 
GAE.  
This chapter is a logical next step to studies which have identified 
overconfidence at high levels of firm-level alliance experiences (e.g. Heimeriks, 
2010). Therefore, it also answers calls for more empirical insights into the relationship 
between firm-level alliance and dyad-level relational capabilities (Wang & 
Rajagopalan, 2015). To the best of my knowledge, this represents the first empirical 
study linking the independent fields of firm-level alliance experience and dyad-level 
relational experience. By doing so, it also contributes to studies primarily 
investigating the inter-relationship between the processes directly affected by 
accumulating either GAE, such as organizational learning, and dyad-level relational 
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experiences, such as trust development. In light of this, Dekker and Abbeele (2010: 
1247), for instance, have called for studies to “examine how organizational learning 
processes are associated with the development of trust between exchange partners”. 
The findings of this chapter also explicitly contribute to existing alliance 
literature investigating the reasons for heterogeneity in value creation effects of 
relational experiences. These studies have already investigated firm- (Gulati et al., 
2009), relationship- (Zollo et al., 2002), and environmental-level moderators 
(Goerzen, 2007). Low explanatory power and other recent studies have found that the 
effect of relational experiences still depends on many unobserved factors (Vanneste et 
al., 2014). As a result, this chapter contributes by finding evidence that the extent of 
firm-level GAE is an additional moderating factor which impacts the effect of 
relational experience on alliance value creation. This might further explain why there 
is such heterogeneity in studies finding both positive (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Reuer & 
Zollo, 2005; Sleptsov et al., 2013; Zaheer et al., 2010; Zollo et al., 2002), non-positive 
or even negative (e.g. Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Lee, 2013; 
Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009; Yang et al., 2015) value creation effects of 
relational experience.  
Supportive results for such an interrelated effect further extend research on 
corporate development capability spill-over effects (Mulotte et al., 2013; Zollo & 
Reuer, 2010). While existing studies have tested such spill-over effects across 
corporate development activities such as amongst others from M&A to alliance (Zollo 
& Reuer, 2010) or licensing to firms’ internal efforts (Mulotte et al., 2013), this 
chapter on strategic alliance experiences finds evidence that there might be spill-overs 
even within one activity. Additionally, results of this chapter provide evidence for new 
moderating factors which may influence spill-over effects. While Zollo and Reuer 
(2010) and Mulotte et al. (2013) have found that the relatedness of the respective spill-
over activities themselves influence the effect of it, this study finds that firm-specific 
factors, such as structural management processes or the level of uncertainty may 




This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly a review of the literature on firm-
level alliance experiences before hypothesizing effects on alliance value creation is 
conducted. Secondly, the independent effect of relational experiences on alliance 
value creation is tested. Thirdly, the interrelated effect of GAE onto relational 
experiences is hypothesized. Fourthly, the moderating effects of firm-level uncertainty 
and alliance management mechanisms onto the spill-over effect are hypothesized. 
Afterwards, the methodology for this chapter is introduced before the results are 
presented. The chapter then provides a discussion of these results before presenting 

















5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
This subsection is structured as follows. In order to test for the 
interdependency of firm-level GAE onto the value creation impact of dyad-level 
relational experiences, the independent effects are introduced and tested 
independently. Figure 5.2 below provides an overview of the theoretical framework 
and the hypotheses tested. Firstly, I theorize that GAE has negative non-linear value 
creation effects, indicating overconfidence and inertia in firm-level alliance 
management processes. Secondly, based on the results of Chapter 4, a hypothesis is 
developed that relational experiences improve alliance value creation. After 
hypothesizing for the independent effects, the main hypotheses on the spill-over 
between high extents of firm-level GAE onto the effect of dyad-level relational 
experience on value creation are developed. Subsequently, the moderating effects of 
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FIGURE 5.2: Theoretical framework (Chapter 5) 
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5.2.1 Firm-level general alliance experience (GAE) and the effect on alliance 
value creation 
This section theorizes how firms can improve their alliance value creation 
from managing strategic alliances, irrespective of a repeated partnership with the same 
partner. This section is structured to stress the positive value creation effects of GAE 
first before discussing why high levels may not be value-creating for organizations. 
General alliance experience (GAE) (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005) refers to all previous alliances or to alliances of a specific alliance  
type a firm has managed in its lifetime (Anand & Khanna, 2000a) or over a specific 
period (Sampson, 2005). It is important to emphasize that the benefits of GAE refer to 
how organizations learn about the management of strategic alliances in general 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000a). GAE is therefore clearly distinct from the learning from 
strategic alliances in fields such as internalizing specific product development 
processes other organizational activities from an alliance partner (e.g. Hamel, 1991; 
Khanna et al., 1998). 
The theoretical arguments for an effect of GAE on alliance value creation are 
generally drawn from the OL literature. The empirical evidence on the effect of GAE 
onto value creation indicates that alliance experiences are important for learning how 
to manage the alliance management lifecycle as firm’s move down the learning curve 
and become more effective (Anand & Khanna, 2000a). GAE also provides an input to 
codify experiences into alliance management routines (Heimeriks et al., 2015; Kale & 
Singh, 2007). Additional theories have also included signalling theory which has 
indicated that GAE sends a signal of improved status or reputation to external 
stakeholders (Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000). However, as the amount of GAE 
increases, the overconfidence in these processes increases as well (Heimeriks, 2010; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Therefore, research finds that GAE leads to non-linear 
effects on alliance performance (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 




5.2.1.1 Positive effects of firm-level general alliance experience (GAE) onto alliance 
value creation 
The underlying reasons why low levels of GAE improve alliance value 
creation can primarily be derived from OL literature. GAE provides organizations 
with knowledge on how to improve the alliance lifecycle management (Argote, 2012; 
Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988). The alliance lifecycle consists of 
multiple processes related to the pre-formation (for example, partner search and 
contract negotiation) and post-formation phase (for example, the alliance itself and the 
termination). Within each stage of the alliance lifecycle, organizations run the risk of 
being exploited by the partner (Das, 2006). Hence, learning how to recognize and 
prevent partner organizations to act opportunistically is key to alliance success 
(Schreiner et al., 2009). 
Each stage in the alliance lifecycle can be managed independently and firms 
are able to draw inferences from previous alliances and learn lessons about the 
management of each stage. On an organizational level, such lessons may then be 
encoded into alliance management routines (Heimeriks, 2010; Heimeriks et al., 2015; 
Levitt & March, 1988). Organizations with such well-known alliance management 
frameworks, for instance Eli Lilly and Hewlett Packard, are often recognised as 
‘alliance champions’ due to their superior ability to manage alliances (e.g. De Man, 
2001; Schreiner et al., 2009). In order to effectively develop capabilities, prior 
experience matters significantly (Zollo & Winter, 2002). This is because learning 
curve literature argues that organizations become more effective in the management of 
the respective capability as their experience increases (e.g. Argote et al., 1990). It also 
helps firms to choose the right partners and to be proactive in managing conflicts 
(Mohr & Spekman, 1994). GAE is therefore a crucial firm-level alliance capability 
development mechanism (Kale & Singh, 2007; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Schreiner 
et al., 2009). Empirical evidence confirms the existence of such alliance capabilities as 
firms with GAE have been shown to outperform competitors in terms of their alliance 
value creation both in the short- (Anand & Khanna, 2000a) and in the long-term (Kale 
et al., 2002).  
Contrary to learning curve theories, other research finds that such positive 
effects of GAE can only be achieved at low levels. More specifically, research 
identifies that low levels of GAE already significantly improve alliance value creation 
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(Sampson, 2005). Therefore, it is the existence of experience which is necessary for 
performance improvements. The importance of simply having partnered before is due 
to two reasons. Firstly, this is in line with OL literature which proposes that the 
marginal effect of additional experiences is not necessarily positive (Argote, 2012; 
Darr et al., 1995; de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993). Firms are 
capable to internalize knowledge about alliance management practices quickly and 
codify their experiences into routines. Empirical evidence supports this argument 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005). Secondly, according to signalling 
theory the mere existence of alliance experience can be valuable for improving the 
reputation of the organization. Due to the opportunism risk in alliances, previous 
partnerships send a signal of trustworthiness which is in contrast to firms which have 
no previous alliance experiences (Das & Teng, 2001). Particularly, for small firms, 
which engage in alliances with large firms, such partnerships therefore often act as 
‘endorsements’ and may improve subsequent alliance performance substantially 
(Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000). Hence, investors value firms with low levels of 
GAE more positively (Das et al., 1998).  
 
5.2.1.2 Negative effects of firm-level general alliance experience (GAE) onto 
alliance value creation 
If it is only the existence of GAE that matters to improving alliance value 
creation, what happens at higher extents of GAE? OL literature provides 
complementary reasons. Firstly, contrary to classic learning curve examples which 
predict decreasing unit costs as a result of cumulative output, OL literature finds that 
experiences may not be cumulative and additive (Argote, 2012). Instead, knowledge 
may depreciate in its value over time through knowledge decay  (de Holan & Phillips, 
2004). In the context of alliances, the most recent experiences are most relevant 
(Gulati, 1995b; Sampson, 2005). However, these findings may only explain why 
higher extents of GAE are not beneficial. Instead, GAE may even have detrimental 
effects on alliance value creation. Existing evidence suggests that organizations may 
erroneously draw the wrong lessons from their past experiences to current issues in 
so-called superstitious learning (Heimeriks, 2010; Levitt & March, 1988). The 
initially positive effect of gaining GAE may lead to a positive feedback loop (Hoang 
& Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005). More specifically, by entering into alliances, 
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investors and analysts may provide positive feedback as it sends a signal of legitimacy 
to the market (Das et al., 1998). Additionally, the success rates of the initial alliance 
projects derived from exponential learning may indicate to firms that their alliance 
processes are effective (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005).  
However, this feedback loop may not be positive for alliance value creation. 
Due to abovementioned reasons, initial gains from alliances can be derived from both 
intensive learning processes and external factors such as reputation increases. Such 
initial successes may be due to latter ‘arbitrary’ factors (Levitt & March, 1988). As 
described above, for instance, firms value creation from alliances at low levels of 
GAE may also be due to the increased reputation and the ‘endorsement’ of the firm 
(Stuart, 2000), hence, entirely irrespective of a firm’s actual ability to manage its 
alliances. As such, firms’ alliance capability may be underdeveloped but firms’ 
believe that their own alliance management has led to these early successes. Hence, a 
firm’s success and the positive feedback loop reinforce alliance management routines 
which are developed early onwards.  
The multitude of different aspects which may have led to performance 
increases is a prime example of superstitious learning. Superstitious learning is a bias 
in OL which refers to the misattribution of cause and effect (Levitt & March, 1988). 
As firms perceive they understand the causes for success, they become overconfident. 
This is due to the underlying organizational belief that failure is due to chance, 
whereas firms ascribe successes to their own ability (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Essentially, this results in a “competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988: 322) which is 
the reinforcement of an initial capability that is not applicable any longer. 
Understanding the cause and effect relationship of strategic actions is difficult as 
causal ambiguity is prevalent (Carley & Lin, 1997; King & Zeithaml, 2001; Powell, 
Lovallo, & Caringal, 2006). Particularly, in “situations in which subjective evaluations 
of success are insensitive to the actions taken” (Levitt & March, 1988: 326), such 
superstitious learning is prone to happen (Levitt & March, 1988). It therefore results 
in overconfidence as the applicability is no longer questioned, the existing capability 
levels may be relied upon and only slightly adapted (Levitt & March, 1988). This has 
led Heimeriks (2010) to adapt the name “competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988: 
322) to “overconfidence trap” (Heimeriks, 2010: 59). 
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Superstitious learning is enhanced in rare strategic decisions as the cause and 
effect relationship becomes even more ambiguous and the outcome more difficult to 
objectively assess (Zollo, 2009). Zollo (2009) finds evidence for such superstitious 
learning and resulting overconfidence by managers in the ‘rare’ activity of M&A. In 
the context of firm-level alliance management, empirical evidence also supports the 
notion of superstitious learning and the resulting overconfidence. Heimeriks (2010) 
finds that firms with high levels of GAE tend to be overconfident in applying their 
alliance management lessons learnt from previous experiences. Firms then 
continuously exploit them while neglecting the exploration of new alternative ways of 
managing alliances. As organizations become overconfident in managing their 
strategic alliances based on alliance lifecycle management processes, innovations in 
the alliance processes may easily be overseen as organizations do not look for 
alternatives of them (Levinthal & March, 1993). For instance, advances in the alliance 
management processes may be overlooked as past experience has been accumulated 
with a different process which the organization wants to exploit now. Levinthal and 
March (1993) in their seminal article on the ‘Myopia of Learning’ have termed such 
learning processes as “self-destructive” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 103). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in their seminal article in the field of 
psychology identify another reason for the process of overconfidence to emerge in 
complex systems such as alliances. More specifically, they find that overconfidence is 
due to an anchoring and adjustment problem arising from the uncertainty faced. In 
comparing the choice for conjunctive events versus disjunctive events, they find that 
‘conjunctive events’ may have a lower overall probability of success than ‘disjunctive 
events’11. However, as the probability for each independent event occurring may be 
higher for conjunctive events (in the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) example: 90% for 
conjunctive events versus 10% for disjunctive events), there is evidence for an 
anchoring bias whereby such higher base levels for independent events lead to 
overconfidence in the attribution of success likelihood. Confirmation for such an 
anchoring bias has been found in existing literature (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). This 
has direct applications to alliance management which consists of the sequential 
                                                     
11
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) use an example of marbles in which subjects can bet on either 
conjunctive events [drawing red marble seven times in succession with replacement and 90% red and 
10% white (overall probability: 48%)] and disjunctive events [drawing red marble at least once in seven 
tries with replacement and 10% red and 90% white (overall probability: 52%)]. 
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management of the alliance lifecycle, thus a ‘conjunctive event’. Each stage of the 
alliance lifecycle may have a relatively high likelihood of success when considered in 
isolation. The partner selection and termination stage, for instance, are relatively easy 
to manage, replicable and can easily be codified whereas the actual partner 
management stage is difficult to manage and thus codification of that stage in the 
alliance lifecycle is not beneficial (Heimeriks et al., 2015) Moreover, the process of 
alliance management is inherently sequential and dependent on the effective 
management of each stage (Kale & Singh, 2009). While managers may think in terms 
of the isolated success probability of each management stage, the overall alliance 
value creation depends on the management of the entire alliance lifecycle. Thus, while 
the average probability of success depending on the separate stages may still be 
relatively high, the likelihood of overall alliance success is likely to be lower. Such a 
bias for the overestimation in managing complex systems may therefore essentially 
reflect overconfidence in firm’s general alliance processes.   
In summary, such overconfidence and the persistent exploitation of existing 
alliance management processes is detrimental to alliance value creation as essentially 
all alliances are different in their requirements for control and trust (De Man, 2014). 
Therefore, firms would need to treat alliances differently and avoid overconfident 
comparisons to previous alliances managed in the past. Empirical research confirms 
the existence of overconfidence at high levels of GAE (Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). As the level of GAE increases, alliance performance decreases. 
This relates to project performance (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), new product 
development (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), innovative performance (Sampson, 2005), 
value creation measures (Das et al., 1998; Gulati et al., 2009), as well as financial and 
accounting measures (Zollo & Reuer, 2010). Hence, I hypothesize that the effect of 
GAE on alliance value creation are negative at high levels of GAE. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between general alliance experience and alliance 




5.2.2 Dyad-level relational experiences and the effect on alliance value creation 
The theoretical reasoning why relational experiences and the signal thereof 
lead to positive effects on alliance value creation is described extensively in Chapter 
4. Results support these arguments in favour of a quality-based experience measure. 
However, this chapter comprises not only the subsample of repeated partnerships 
which is used in Chapter 4. Instead, a sample of both repeated and non-repeated 
alliances is used in order to include a broader variety of different alliances. Thus, in 
order to develop the argument for the interrelated effect, the effect of relational 
experiences onto alliance value creation is tested again on the full sample in this 
chapter. As a summary to the theoretical reasoning of Chapter 4, executive’s 
signalling of relational experiences to the stock market indicates a higher quality of 
the repeated partnership as it is more positively evaluated by investors. Signalling the 
quality of the previous partnerships may indicate that the relationship between the 
respective partners has been functional, trustful, and that partner-specific routines 
between the alliance partners may have been generated. Existing literature finds that 
these factors effectively contribute to the success of relational experiences (Gulati, 
1995a; Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002). In essence, the signal may indicate that 
relational capabilities may exist between partners. The Relational experience signal 
has therefore provided further clarity into the relationship between relational 
capabilities and value creation.  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of relational experiences on alliance value creation is 
positive. 
 
5.2.3 The impact of firm-level general alliance experiences on dyad-level 
relational experiences 
As also argued in the latter part of the theory development for Hypothesis 1 
and confirmed by empirical evidence, the independent effect of alliance experience on 
value creation can also be negative. This is in contrast to relational experiences for 
which the effects may even increase as firms partner more frequently (Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Thus, despite explanations provided in Chapter 4, negative 
value creation effects for relational experience effects are still surprising (Goerzen, 
2007) and many unobserved moderators still exist which may explain such results 
(Vanneste et al., 2014). Recent research in the field of firm-level alliance and M&A 
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capability literature has identified that one type of experience may either positively or 
negatively influence the other through so-called spill-over effects (e.g. Bertrand & 
Capron, 2015; Mulotte et al., 2013; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). As experiences need to be 
related but still distinctly different in order for such spill-overs to occur (Zollo & 
Reuer, 2010), this section aims to provide further clarity into the interrelatedness of 
the underlying processes. Moreover, it aims to uncover how the negative effects of 
firm-level alliance experience may have spill-over effects onto dyad-level relational 
experience and explain why negative effects of relational experience on alliance value 
creation have been identified in previous studies. 
Essentially, firms’ managing strategic alliances are leveraging on the firm-
level GAE to further develop their ability to manage strategic alliances, independent 
of the partner, while also aiming to develop relational capabilities between them and 
the specific partnering firm (De Man, 2014; Sims et al., 2001). In order to benefit 
from relational experiences, the creation and maintenance of trust between the 
partnering organizations by reducing transaction and monitoring costs is essential 
(Gulati, 1995a; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). However, these processes 
involve significant resource commitments for firms (Butler Jr, 1991; Doz, 1996). 
Hence, the concept of benefiting from relational experiences is particularly prone to 
be subject to influence from the resources allocated to its processes (Gulati et al., 
2009). 
As firms are constrained in their allocation of resources however, the argument 
for the interrelationship between the two is that the amount of resources allocated to 
relational experience processes is negatively impacted by the resources allocated to 
general alliance processes. As argued in Hypothesis 1 above, firms become 
overconfident in their alliance lifecycle management processes as they accumulate 
GAE (Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). However, how does this 
overconfidence at high levels of GAE relate to resources allocated to relational 
experiences and subsequently its effect on alliance value creation? Can the negative 
impact of firm-level alliance experience spill over onto the effect of relational 
experience on value creation?  
In order to answer these questions, this chapter uses a two-folded perspective 
from a (1) firm and (2) alliance partner level. Firstly, I propose that through the 
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accumulation of GAE superstitious learning and overconfidence are created, which in 
turn has negative impacts on the resources allocated to processes developed from 
relational experiences. Secondly, such a reduction in the allocation of resources to 
relational capabilities subsequently has a detrimental effect on the development and 
maintenance of relational capabilities as the alliance partner notices the lack of 
commitment to building relational capabilities due to the partnering organizations’ 
overconfidence. Using these arguments, I hypothesize that the otherwise positive 
effect of relational experiences on alliance value creation is reduced at high levels of 
GAE. 
 
5.2.3.1 GAE and relational experience interrelationship explained from a firm-level 
perspective 
Firms nowadays manage substantial portfolios of alliances and experiences 
from alliances managed in the past (Hoffmann, 2005). As described above, firms 
develop alliance processes on the firm-level in order to improve the alliance lifecycle. 
This occurs far more frequently through the accumulation of GAE than the practice of 
building a trusting relationship and developing relation-specific operating routines 
through relational experiences. Existing studies indicate that firms manage around 
forty to fifty alliances before managing any repeated alliance with the same partner 
(e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Managing alliances with a 
variety of different partners requires firms to develop processes to prevent 
opportunism. Such processes are developed on the firm-level and may include 
guidebooks and structures which prescribe alliance managers on details of the alliance 
partnership – ‘How to engage with the alliance partner?’ ‘Which aspects to share 
etc.?’ This likely creates a focus on firm-level alliance management processes. As 
emphasized in the literature review, GAE influences a firm-level alliance capability, 
whereas relational experiences influences a dyad-level relational capability (e.g. Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). As organizations are limited in their resources, important trade-offs 
regarding the capability development need to be made. Thus, firms need to decide 
“which among the many promising but uncertain investments should be undertaken” 
(Winter, 2003: 993). One key criterion for capability investments is based on the 
usage of the underlying processes with more resources allocated to more frequently 
used ones (Winter, 2003), which in the case of high GAE are likely to be firm-level 
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alliance processes. In order to benefit from relational experiences, however, resource 
commitments to its processes are necessary as boundary spanners are needed, partner-
specific routines need to be implemented and most importantly, trust needs to be 
developed (Zaheer et al., 1998). Especially, for trust to develop and to be maintained 
effectively, commitment is essential (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
In line with this, existing research has termed high levels of firm-level GAE a 
“core rigidity” (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005: 334). Developed by Leonard‐Barton 
(1992), the main idea behind the concept is that the overly frequent use of a strategic 
activity leads to a likewise decline in the usage and effectiveness of another related 
activity as firms stop experimenting and continuously rely on one process (Leonard‐
Barton, 1992). Hence, one overly used process essentially ‘crowds out’ another related 
one. Leonard‐Barton (1992) uses the example of Chaparral Steel’s core competence of 
the ‘casting’ of steel, which made it difficult to apply other knowledge on 
electromagnetic fields in a new project which was less frequently used in production. 
Essentially, this leads to more resources committed to one process while the other one 
is essentially crowded out in the resource allocation process.  
Moreover, as developed in Hypothesis 1, firms may become overconfident in 
their management of firm-level alliance processes arising from high levels of 
experience due to the anchoring bias and superstitious learning which not only inhibits 
routine adaptations (Levinthal & March, 1993) and makes firms inert to changes 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984) but also leads to a  far-reaching “overconfidence trap” 
(Heimeriks, 2010: 59). Such a trap develops as a result of superstitious learning and 
the perceived ability to manage strategic alliances. Subsequently, organizations “(…) 
increase the frequency with which those procedures result in successful outcomes and 
thereby increase their use” (Levitt & March, 1988: 322). This goes in hand with an 
increase in managers who “commit resources (…) without pausing to consider 
additional information” (Mahajan, 1992: 329). Hence, such overconfidence in 
complex systems as derived from anchoring and superstitious learning may result in a 
vicious circle in the usage of activities which are not beneficial to the firm but are 
instead increasingly and continuously used. More importantly, this also provides an 
indication that the increased overconfidence leads to a more frequent use which in 
turn leads to more resources allocated to firm-level alliance processes (Winter, 2003). 
In the context of M&A, evidence indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to invest 
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significantly in ‘value-destroying’ M&A, for instance (Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 
2008). 
In the alliance context, there is empirical evidence that organizations invest 
significant amounts of resources into developing and maintaining their firm-level 
alliance management processes as they use them more frequently (Heimeriks, 2010). 
This leads to firms becoming overconfident in them (Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). In the similar context of in-licensing, evidence for competency 
and overconfidence traps and superstitious learning have also been identified. Mulotte 
et al. (2013) find evidence that firms become overconfident once they have in-licensed 
products and feel these are continuously applicable also to own activities, hence 
increasing overconfidence. This translates into lower performance of subsequently 
managed independent activities indicating a neglect of resource allocations to such 
processes (Mulotte et al., 2013).  
In summary, there are two reasons why firms are likely to focus on firm-level 
alliance processes while neglecting the dyad-level relational processes. Firstly, 
processes which are used more frequently (Leonard‐Barton, 1992; Winter, 2003) and 
have a high chance of independent success due to anchoring biases (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) are likely to receive more resource investments. As previous studies 
indicate, firms manage significantly more alliances with a variety of different alliance 
partners than repeated partnerships. As both firm-level alliance capabilities and dyad-
level relational capabilities are part of an overarching alliance management capability 
and are essentially managed by the same group of alliance managers, this likely 
affects the resource allocation process in favour of firm-level alliance capabilities. 
Secondly, derived from OL literature, such “frequently used procedures” (Levitt & 
March, 1988: 322), and the declining effects of firm-level alliance experience indicate 
that firms become overconfident in their management of firm-level alliance 
capabilities (Heimeriks, 2010). Through early successes with alliance management 
and the general ambiguity of cause and effect in assessing alliance performance, firms 
are likely to fall into the ‘overconfidence trap’ (Heimeriks, 2010). The perceived 
ability to manage alliances through firm-level alliance capabilities disguises that it 
essentially ‘crowds out’ necessary resource allocations to value-creating relational 
processes.  
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5.2.3.2 GAE and relational experience interrelationship explained from an alliance 
partner-level perspective 
The previous section has argued that the interrelationship between the two 
types of experience and the underlying processes can be explained from firm-level 
factors. Existing literature however recognizes that alliance success is also largely 
dependent on the alliance partner and its commitment to the alliance (Das & Rahman, 
2002; Das & Teng, 1998; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Parkhe, 1993). As argued above, 
overconfidence in firm-level alliance processes leads to a lack of resources allocated 
to the underlying dyad-level relational processes. This has a significant influence on 
alliance partners as they are concerned that their alliance partner may behave 
opportunistically towards them (Parkhe, 1993). Therefore, alliance partners are aware 
of the other alliance partners resource commitments (Parkhe, 1993). Thus, if one 
partner reduces the commitment to the alliance by investing less resources to it, this is 
likely to be recognized by the alliance partner and reciprocal action in the form of 
resource reductions on the partners side may be taken (Parkhe, 1993). As emphasized 
by Thompson (1967: 35), it is the “exchange of commitments” of both alliance 
partners which is essential to alliance success and important for the stability of such 
partnerships. Essentially, such lack of commitment is one of the most frequently cited 
reasons for alliance failure (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Park & Ungson, 2001) as it is 
essential for building trust on a dyadic alliance level (Butler Jr, 1991). 
There are situations in which the reliance on the alliance partner is 
disproportionate, for instance, when small entrepreneurial organizations partner with a 
large organization. This might suggest that the small organization would continue to 
commit to the partnership because it is reliant on the success. However, research 
suggests that in order to benefit from alliances, commitment needs to be relatively 
even from both alliance partners. Thus, even if one alliance partner invests 
disproportionally into the alliance, this will unlikely have positive effects on alliance 
performance (Das & Teng, 2000a). Consequently, alliance partners are less likely to 
invest disproportionally more resources into the partnership and essentially the 
development and maintenance of relational processes.  
In summary, the alliance partner and the reciprocity of commitment to the 
alliance builds on firm-level arguments as described above that may explain why high 
extents of firm-level alliance experience may have negative spill-over effects on the 
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effect of dyad-level relational experiences on alliance value creation. Due to the 
overconfidence in firm-level alliance experience, this likely leads to organizations 
putting too much emphasis on benefiting from firm-level alliance processes. This 
results in favourable resource allocations to firm-level alliance processes while dyad-
level relational processes are crowded out. Subsequently, this results in the partnering 
organization perceiving the focal organization’s trustworthiness as inferior due to its 
lack of commitment (Jones & George, 1998). Thus, when the partnering organization 
notices that the focal firm does not effectively commit to a partnership, the trust and 
thereby the benefits of a relational capability among both partnering organizations will 
likely suffer, leading to lower value creation effects of relational experiences. 
 
5.2.3.3 GAE and relational experience interrelationship and the impact on alliance 
value creation 
The previous two sections have provided arguments for the interrelationship 
from both a firm- and an alliance partner-level. Dyad-level relational experiences have 
been found to be valuable, rare, in-imitable, and only substitutable through equity 
agreements  (Das & Teng, 2001). They have even been shown to increase in their 
importance over time (Gulati & Sytch, 2008). However, negative performance effects 
can still be identified (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) which cannot be 
explained by firm-, environmental-, and relationship-level moderating variables 
(Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002) as many unobserved moderating variables still 
exist (Vanneste et al., 2014). Therefore, the interrelated effect of firm- and dyad-level 
relational experiences can possibly provide an improved understanding of their effect 
on value creation as called for by existing research (e.g. Schreiner & Heimeriks, 2010; 
Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015).   
The theoretical framework hypothesizes that the effect of relational 
experiences may have lower effects on alliance value creation at high levels of GAE 
due to overconfidence in firm-level alliance management processes. Consequently, 
this leads to fewer resources allocated to partner-specific processes needed to benefit 
from the development and maintenance of relational processes such as trust. The 
alliance partner perspective therefore complements the firm-level perspective and 
argues that due to the focus in resources invested in firm-level alliance processes, 
alliance partners are likely to reduce their efforts on developing dyad-level relational 
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capabilities and trust even further. I therefore hypothesize that investors perceive firms 
with high levels of GAE not to be able to benefit from relational experiences. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of relational experiences onto alliance value 
creation is reduced at high levels of general alliance experience. 
 
5.2.4 Moderating impact of firm-level uncertainty on the interrelationship 
between GAE and relational experiences 
The firm-level uncertainty surrounding the firms engaging in alliances is a 
critical determinant to alliance value creation (Gulati et al., 2009). Prior relational 
experiences between the two partners may provide an ‘anchor’ to both firm managers 
as well as investors that the partnership is more likely to succeed and are thus higher 
valued by investors under such circumstances (Gulati et al., 2009). However, research 
on overconfidence indicates that its appearance is also dependent on various 
environmental factors. One critical factor identified is the level of uncertainty as the 
process of overconfidence involves executives to “underestimate the associated 
uncertainty” (Mahajan, 1992: 329). As introduced above, the anchoring and 
adjustment bias arises directly from uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As 
further evidence by Busenitz and Barney (1997) indicates such heuristics and biases 
are even more likely to occur under uncertainty itself as “in such settings, more 
comprehensive and cautious decision-making is not possible and biases and heuristics 
may provide an effective way to approximate the appropriate decisions” (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997: 9-10). Moreover, uncertainty directly exacerbates the overconfidence 
bias generated (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). As relational experience has positive 
effects onto value creation for firms exposed to high levels of uncertainty (Gulati et 
al., 2009), I expect that this effect is significantly decreased when firms are 
overconfident in their general alliance processes. Under such circumstances, both 
incentives and resources to dyad-level relational processes are likely to be ‘crowded 
out’. Therefore, I hypothesize that under conditions of firm-level uncertainty, the spill-




Hypothesis 4: The interrelationship between high levels of GAE and relational 
experiences is moderated through firm-level uncertainty such that, the reduction of 
the relational experience effect onto alliance value creation at high levels of GAE is 
more negative when firms are faced with high levels of uncertainty. 
 
5.2.5 Moderating impact of alliance management mechanisms on the 
interrelationship between GAE and relational experiences 
GAE has often been regarded as one of the key sources for improving alliance 
performance (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Building on 
capability development and OL research (e.g. Crossan et al., 1999; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002), existing studies find that GAE and 
alliance management mechanisms are tightly interlinked in influencing alliance 
performance (e.g. Kale & Singh, 2007). Such integrating or institutionalizing 
processes effectively develop a shared understanding of the previous experiences 
among organizational members and disseminate it throughout the organization by 
means of codification (Zollo & Winter, 2002). In the alliance context such 
mechanisms can range from knowledge integration, such as alliance training 
programmes or communities of practice to institutionalizing mechanisms which may 
include codified practices and structural alliance functions (Heimeriks et al., 2007; 
Kale et al., 2002). Existing research finds support that firms can improve alliance 
value creation through such alliance management mechanisms in order to integrate 
and institutionalize the knowledge generated (Draulans et al., 2003; Kale et al., 2001; 
Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 2007). 
Other evidence, however, indicates alliance management mechanisms are not 
always beneficial for firms (Heimeriks et al., 2007). As argued above, firms tend to 
become overconfident in their alliance management when they accumulate alliance 
experience as they learn superstitiously. Research suggests that this effect is most 
severe when firms also institutionalize their alliance practices (Heimeriks, 2010). This 
is because institutionalization routinizes their alliance practices even further, 
therefore, likely making firms even more overconfident, inert and consequently less 
likely to adapt their alliance practices when necessary (Heimeriks, 2010). Similarly, 
recent research finds that such institutionalizing through codification of alliance 
practices is particularly detrimental to alliance performance when managing the 
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alliance itself, whereas it may have positive effects for the selection and termination 
stage (Heimeriks et al., 2015). This is because flexibility is reduced as a consequence 
of codification and might therefore be costly to capability development (Heimeriks et 
al., 2015; Winter, 2003). Das and Teng (1998: 498) argue that one of the key reasons 
why firms enter into alliances is because of their “contractual flexibility”. This 
indicates that alliance management mechanisms may not be beneficial when managing 
alliances in general due to the lack of flexibility and ad-hoc management.   
Flexibility and ad-hoc management are even more essential components for 
managing repeated partnerships and effectively developing a relational capability 
between partners. Building the necessary trust among partners requires commitment 
(Thompson, 1967). As a lack of flexibility may impact organizations’ commitment to 
alliances (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Das & Teng, 1998; Young-Ybarra & 
Wiersema, 1999), institutionalized alliance management mechanisms may in turn 
impact a firms’ ability to benefit from its relational experiences. For instance, alliance 
executives may not be allowed to make critical decisions with the respective alliance 
executive at the partnering organization as guidelines may impact the decision-making 
flexibility due to hierarchies or guidelines. Non-institutionalized processes on the 
contrary may enable alliance managers to make more flexible decisions. As both inter-
organizational and inter-personal trust are important for effective alliances (Gulati, 
1995a), such alliance management mechanisms may be even more detrimental to the 
overconfidence generated through the inflexibility and an even stronger on firm-level 
processes. Therefore, it can be expected that the overconfidence at high levels of GAE 
is further exacerbated when firms also have alliance management mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 5: The interrelationship between high levels of GAE and relational 
experiences is moderated through alliance management mechanisms such that, the 
reduction of the positive effect of relational experiences on alliance value creation 
at high levels of GAE is more negative when the announcing firm has alliance 






5.3 Variables and measures 
5.3.1 Independent variables first introduced in Chapter 5 
Relational experience is measured through the same variable Relational 
experience signal as in Chapter 4 where it is also described in more detail. For two 
reasons, this chapter uses an additional continuous measure of relational experiences, 
for the moderating variables, however. Firstly, the investigation of the firm-level 
uncertainty and alliance management mechanisms moderating effects is conducted 
using a three-way interaction variable. As for the latter, two out of three variables 
would include binary variables, thus increasing the difficulty in interpretation. 
Secondly, a continuous Relational experience variable may not only provide an 
improved means to investigate the moderating effects but also increase robustness. 
The measurement of Relational experiences and General alliance experience is 
explained in Chapter 3. 
Alliance management mechanisms are measured through a binary variable 
identified in a content analysis of proxy statements and annual reports of the focal 
firm. The objective was to identify a variable which captures the perceived alliance 
management mechanisms by investors. While certain aspects such as the alliance 
function may facilitate the alliance management, these may not be known to investors 
necessarily. Based on existing research which has found that structural elements as 
well as processes are important components of alliance management mechanisms (e.g. 
Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2002), a measure comprising the focal firm’s 
executives responsible for strategic alliances (Executive VP Strategic Alliances) or 
Business/Corporate Development (Executive VP Business or Corporate Development) 
in the year of the alliance announcement were identified. The use of alliance 
executives as a measure of structural learning mechanisms is common (Harbison & 
Pekar, 1998; Heimeriks et al., 2007). The variable receives the value 1 if firm 
executives are signalled to the market in the alliance announcement year. This 
measure may also essentially signal the underlying functional aspects such as the 
alliance function, executive and integrating and institutionalizing processes 
(Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2002). Previous studies on alliance management 
mechanisms have primarily drawn data from interviews or surveys. This study 
however explicitly takes into account that investors may more directly react to 
publicly available information as part of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama et al., 
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1969). This measure therefore represents perceived alliance management mechanisms 
of the firm. 
In order to test for the interrelationship between GAE and partner experiences, 
a two-way interaction model between Relational experiences and GAE (log) is 
introduced. For the moderating effect of firm-level uncertainty and alliance 
management mechanisms onto the relationship between GAE and relational 
experience, three-way interaction variables are used (Aiken & West, 1991). Such 
three-way interaction variables have been used or suggested for future use in prior 
management literature (Barthélemy, 2008; Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997; 
Hagedoorn, 2006; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Stam & Elfring, 2008). 
In order to test for the three-way interaction, all potential two-way interactions of the 
respective variables (i.e. log GAE, Relational experience and Firm-level 
uncertainty/Alliance management mechanisms) are also included in the respective 
models. To reduce potentially disturbing multi-collinearity, all two- and three-way 
interaction variables in this chapter are subject to mean centring of the separate 
variables comprising the interaction variable (Aiken & West, 1991), while further 
multi-collinearity tests such as the use of subsamples are also conducted. In order to 
test Hypotheses 4 and 5 further post-hoc tests of slope difference tests are used 














Measures for control variables are described in detail in Chapter 3. In order to 
improve readability, an overview of all the measures used in this chapter is provided 
in the Table 5.1 below. 
 
TABLE 5.1: Measures table (Chapter 5) 
Variable name Measures Data source Chapter 5 
Alliance year(s) 0/1 Binary variable for each year in which the 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if partner firm is a non-
public partner (private firm, research institute or 
university), 0 if partner firm is a listed public firm 
Compustat Control 
Slack resources Natural logarithm of cash divided by long-term 
debt in the year preceding the alliance 
announcement 
Compustat Control 
Firm uncertainty Volatility in monthly stock prices in the year of 





R&D expenses divided by net sales in the year 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is classified as a 
contractual R&D alliance, 0 if it is classified as 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is between two 
partners which have their HQs in different 




Number of previous partnerships between focal 




Natural logarithm of total number of alliances of 
either R&D alliance or licensing agreements the 





0/1 Binary variable. 1, if focal firm executive 
mentions previous relational experience quality, 






0/1 Binary variable. 1, if focal firm has an 
executive level board with alliance responsibility. 










5.4 Analyses and results 
5.4.1 Analyses 
As this chapter is comprised of not only the subsample of repeated 
partnerships introduced in Chapter 4, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
are presented again. Table 5.2 describes the descriptive statistics consisting of the 
mean, standard deviation (Std.) and the bivariate correlations. The sample size for this 
chapter is based on 611 alliance announcements. Similar to Chapter 4, the mean CAR 
is positive. It is less positive than Chapter 4’s but in range with existing studies (e.g. 
Anand & Khanna, 2000a). It is lower because this sample not only consists of 
repeated partnerships but also of alliances with no repeated partnerships, which have 
been found to have less positive effects on alliance value creation (e.g. Gulati et al., 
2009). An overview of the CAR on the various event days and event windows can be 
found in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2. Notable is the correlation between GAE(log) and 
Firm uncertainty (-0.43, p<0.001). Small firms tend to be exposed to more volatility 
while having accumulated less GAE. On the contrary firms with substantially high 
levels of GAE tend to be exposed to less uncertainty due to their maturity. Therefore, 
the relatively high negative correlation can be explained. Additionally, the high 
positive correlation (0.47, p<0.001) between GAE(log) and Alliance management 
mechanisms can be explained that such mechanisms are often the result of high levels 
of GAE. Therefore, with rising levels of GAE, firms tend to have both (Heimeriks et 
al., 2007). Consequently, the explanation for the high negative correlation between 
Alliance management mechanisms and Firm uncertainty (-0.26, p<0.001) follows the 
explanation above for the high negative correlation between GAE (log) and Firm 
uncertainty. Besides the bivariate correlations and due to the inclusion of interaction 
variables in the empirical models, multi-collinearity is also checked by investigating 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs). Both mean and individual values are below the 
critical threshold value of 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998). An alternative test as suggested 
by Echambadi and Hess (2007) is also carried out to rule out issues of multi-
collinearity. Therefore, a subset of the data is tested and coefficients remain stable. As 




In Table 5.3, the OLS regression results for estimating alliance value creation 
based on CAR are presented. Model 1 is the baseline model which tests Hypothesis 1 
and the effect of GAE (log) on CAR. Model 2 introduces the Relational experience 
signal variable and thereby tests the effect on CAR in Hypothesis 2. While this is 
comparable to Chapter 4, this chapter tests the entire sample. The main hypothesis on 
the interrelationship between GAE and relational experience is then tested in Model 3 
and 4 (Hypothesis 3). Models 5 and 6 then test how the interrelationship between 
GAE and Relational experiences is influenced by Firm-level uncertainty (Hypothesis 


















1 CAR 1.65 7.05 1
2 Absorptive capacity 2.60 12.92 0.06 1
3 Firm uncertainty 0.17 0.14 0.09 ** 0.08 ** 1
4 Slack resources 0.29 1.96 0.11 *** 0.09 ** 0.10 *** 1
5 Non-listed alliance partner 0.51 0.50 -0.14 *** -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 1
6 R&D alliance 0.53 0.50 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 1
7 International alliance 0.56 0.50 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 ** -0.08 * 1
8 Relational experience 0.48 1.09 0.10 ** -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.22 *** -0.02 -0.02 1
9 GAE (log) 3.81 1.38 -0.18 *** -0.21 *** -0.43 *** -0.37 *** 0.09 ** -0.05 0.10 ** 0.11 *** 1
10 Relational experience signal 0.08 0.27 0.20 *** -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.34 *** -0.05 1
11 Alliance management mechanisms 0.48 0.50 -0.08 * -0.10 *** -0.26 *** -0.13 *** 0.04 0.04 0.07 * 0.05 0.47 *** 0.00 1
N=611
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
7 8 9 101 2 3 4 5 6
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TABLE 5.3: OLS regression results (Chapter 5) 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent 
variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
Control variables
Alliance year 2004 -0.533 -1.083 -1.060 -0.629 -0.985 -0.914
(1.26) (1.31) (1.36) (1.27) (1.3) (1.31)
Alliance year 2005 -0.335 -0.709 -0.727 -0.585 -0.881 -0.868
(1.46) (1.45) (1.43) (1.46) (1.48) (1.43)
Alliance year 2006 -1.668 -1.892 * -1.792 * -1.494 -1.868 * -1.671
(1.04) (1.04) (1.06) (1.03) (1.11) (1.06)
Alliance year 2007 0.074 0.173 -0.033 0.065 -0.451 -0.240
(1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.23) (1.31) (1.16)
Alliance year 2008 0.475 0.587 0.338 0.601 0.179 0.638
(1.85) (1.82) (1.61) (1.85) (1.76) (1.79)
Alliance year 2009 -1.609 -1.752 -1.916 -1.617 -2.203 ** -1.903 *
(1.24) (1.2) (1.17) (1.19) (1.17) (1.18)
Alliance year 2010 -0.163 -0.190 -0.598 -0.355 -0.614 -0.830
(1.26) (1.21) (1.25) (1.24) (1.26) (1.33)
Alliance year 2011 -0.357 -0.690 -0.630 -0.404 -0.978 -0.594
(1.03) (.99) (.99) (1.02) (1.11) (1.02)
Alliance year 2012 -0.972 -0.852 -1.063 -0.926 -1.374 -0.938
(1.11) (1.11) (1.04) (1.07) (1.1) (1.05)
Absorptive capacity 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.018 * 0.017 * 0.018 *
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Firm uncertainty 1.595 1.883 1.503 1.476 1.472 1.122
(1.99) (1.97) (1.84) (1.92) (2.33) (1.8)
Slack resources 0.156 0.180 0.175 0.175 0.140 0.197
(.18) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.370 ** -1.468 ** -1.315 ** -1.281 ** -1.419 ** -1.318 **
(.62) (.61) (.57) (.6) (.6) (.58)
R&D alliance 0.323 0.205 0.197 0.342 0.356 0.242
(.62) (.57) (.54) (.6) (.56) (.55)
International alliance 0.598 0.524 0.486 0.602 0.650 0.651
(.62) (.59) (.58) (.6) (.59) (.58)
Relational experience 0.607 * 0.171 0.206 1.104 *** 0.601 1.369 ***
(.32) (.27) (.27) (.42) (.42) (.44)
GAE (log) -0.747 ** -0.646 ** -0.471 ** -0.865 *** -0.943 *** -1.383 ***
(.3) (.26) (.22) (.31) (.35) (.43)
Explanatory variables
Relational experience signal 4.900 ** 4.205 ***
(2.06) (1.48)
GAE (log)x Relational experience signal -2.965
(1.93)
GAE (log) x Relational experience -0.857 ** -0.686 -1.662 ***
(.34) (.47) (.52)
Relational experience x FLU 7.707 *
(4.19)
GAE (log) x FLU -4.345
(2.88)
GAE (log) x Relational experience x FLU -7.960 *
(4.58)
Alliance management mechanisms (AMM) -0.093
(.68)
Relational experience x AMM -1.342
(.89)
GAE (log) x AMM 0.912 *
(.46)
GAE (log) x Relational experience x AMM 1.826 ***
(.67)
Constant 2.251 * 2.125 * 2.157 * 2.328 ** 2.453 ** 2.375 **
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.19) (1.13) (1.16)
N 611 611 611 611 611 611
F-Statistic 2.27 *** 2.51 *** 2.68 *** 2.5 *** 2.64 *** 2.34 ***
R-Square 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11
Root MSE 6.90 6.79 6.72 6.84 6.76 6.78
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01





















In this section the result of the hypothesis testing are provided. Results of the 
hypothesis testing are provided in Table 5.3. In order to test Hypothesis 1 that GAE is 
negatively related to alliance value creation, the natural logarithm of GAE is included. 
The coefficient is negative (β
GAE
: -0.747, p-value: 0.02) and statistically significant, 
thus confirming Hypothesis 1. This means that for every 10% increase in GAE, the 
expected mean CAR will be 0.07% lower [β
GAE
* ln(1.1) = -0.747* ln(1.1) = -0.071]. 
More generally, this indicates that a high initial positive value creation effect for firms 
with low levels of GAE can be expected and this effect declines non-linearly. The 
underlying theoretical reasoning for this is due to two reasons as identified in existing 
literature. Firstly, for inexperienced firms, alliance agreements are reputation-
enhancing, as they provide legitimacy in the industry (Stuart et al., 1999). As 
Sampson (2005: 1022) suggests “it is the existence rather than the extent of prior 
experience that affects a firm’s ability to benefit from current alliance activity”. One 
previously managed alliance can in some cases already effectively improve alliance 
value creation due to learning effects (Sampson, 2005). Hence, it is not surprising that 
the results indicate a high value creation effect at low levels of GAE. Therefore, the 
first alliance which can include the focal alliance is likely to yield the highest returns. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the effect of GAE is then decreasing rapidly and 
non-linearly. Due to inertia in the development of  firm-level alliance capabilities 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) and firms becoming over-confident with the underlying 
processes (Heimeriks, 2010), the effect of GAE on alliance value creation has 
declining effect as experience increases (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2006; Sampson, 2005; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). 
Hypothesis 2 tests whether the Relational experience signal also has a 
significant positive effect on alliance value creation as tested in Chapter 4. Model 2 
provides strong support that Relational experience signal has a strong positive impact 
on alliance value creation (β
Relational experience signal
: 4.90) which is statistically 
significant (p-value: 0.02). This means that also on the full sample of both repeated 
and non-repeated partnerships, Relational experience signal increases value creation 
by around 4% when firms send a signal of positive relational experiences. This is also 
in line with empirical research which has found positive effects of relational 
experience on value creation (Gulati et al., 2009), termination outcomes of alliances 
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(Reuer & Zollo, 2005) and managerial assessments of alliance performance (Zollo et 
al., 2002).  
After the independent effects of firm-level GAE and dyad-level Relational 
experiences on CAR have been tested in Models 1 and 2, the interrelated spill-over 
effect between the two is tested in Models 3 and 4. Model 3 does not provide support 
that firms which signal a positive relational experience but also have high extents of 
GAE, have their effect on the alliance value created by relational experiences 
significantly reduced (β
GAE x Relational experience signal: -2.96, p-value: 0.12). As existing 
research indicates that experiences may have different value with more recent ones 
more relevant than older ones (Sampson, 2005), I therefore conduct a supplementary 
analysis in order to test Hypothesis 3. More specifically, I rely on the GAE of the last 
3 years in order to test whether the relational experience signal is negatively affected 
by the most recent experiences only. Please see Table 5.4 for OLS regression results 
and an interaction graph in Figure 5.3. Both regression results as well as the graphical 
illustration indicate that firms with high levels of GAE accumulated over the last 3 
years are not able to create as much value from their relational experiences as firms 
which have low values. This effect is statistically significant 
(β
GAE last 3 x Relational experience signal
: -4.03, p-value: 0.08). This firstly provides support 
that more recent experiences are more relevant for alliance performance (Sampson, 













Alliance Year 2004 -0.836
(1.35)
Alliance Year 2005 -0.982
(1.51)
Alliance Year 2006 -2.014 *
(1.1)
Alliance Year 2007 -0.322
(1.34)
Alliance Year 2008 -0.053
(1.6)
Alliance Year 2009 -2.438 **
(1.21)
Alliance Year 2010 -1.069
(1.28)
Alliance Year 2011 -1.457
(1.07)
















GAE (log) last 3 years -0.508 *
(.3)
Explanatory variables
Relational experience signal 4.372 **
(1.67)
GAE (log) last 3 years x Relational 









CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable
Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White sandwich 
estimators and firm clustering are in parentheses




FIGURE 5.3: Two-way interaction graph relational experience signal and GAE 
(last 3 years) 
 
Model 4 tests the interrelated relationship between GAE and Relational 
experience using a continuous variable of all previous partnerships, not only the 
signalled ones. More specifically, results indicate that as the level of GAE increases, 
the effect of repeated partnerships on alliance value creation decreases significantly 
(β
GAE x Relational experience
= -0.85, p-value: 0.01). This provides further support for 
Hypothesis 3 for both measures of relational experience and confirms the theory for 
an interrelated effect of GAE and relational experiences. Please see an interaction 
graph in Figure 5.4 which indicates that relational experience one standard deviation 
above the mean has a stronger negative effect at high levels of GAE. 
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FIGURE 5.4: Two-way interaction graph relational experience (continuous) and 
GAE 
 
Hypothesis 4 is tested in Model 5 through a three-way interaction variable. As 
explained above, the three-way interaction effects in Model 5 and also in Model 6 are 
tested by means of Relational experience instead of the Relational experience signal. 
The continuous variable Relational experience has a higher variability as it ranges 
from 0 to 9 instead of the use of the binary Relational experience signal variable. In 
Hypothesis 4, I had proposed that the spill-over effect between high levels of GAE 
and Relational experience is likely to be stronger when the firm is exposed to high 
levels of idiosyncratic uncertainty, thus arising directly from a focal firm’s operations. 
The argument is that such uncertainty creates further demands for the organization and 
increases the overconfidence a firm may have in its general alliance processes. 
Using the continuous Relational experience variable support can be found that 
adding this three-way interaction variable improves the fit of the model and supports  
Hypothesis 4 (β
GAE x Relational experience x FLU: -7.96, p-value: 0.08). In order to interpret 
three-way interactions, both a graphical presentation and a Dawson-Richter slope 
difference test have been suggested and are provided in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.5 
(Dawson & Richter, 2006). Testing the difference in the slope between various two 
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way interactions at both low (one s.d. below the mean) and high (one s.d. above mean) 
levels of uncertainty, this test provides an opportunity to understand the effects of the 
three-way interaction more clearly. The corresponding lines of interest are firstly the 
differences between the black lines with the white markers Lines 1 (High GAE, High 
relational experience) and 3 (Low GAE, High relational experience). These are of 
particular interest as they indicate firms which have high levels of relational 
experience but varying levels of GAE. In order for the spill-over to be confirmed, a 
significant difference between the two would be expected. Correspondingly, 
differences between Lines 2 and 4 may also be expected. 
 
Line 1 in Figure 5.5 indicates that indeed firms do not seem to create more alliance 
value from relational experiences in conditions of uncertainty only when they have 
accumulated high levels of GAE. The corresponding Line 3, however, indicates that 
firms can benefit from relational experiences with high levels of firm uncertainty only 
when they have low levels of GAE. The Dawson-Richter slope test in Table 5.5 
however indicates that the difference between these lines is insignificant (t-statistics: -
1.29, p-value: 0.2). Additionally, differences between Line 2 and 4 are also 
FIGURE 5.5: Three-way interaction graph GAE, Relational experience and Firm-
level uncertainty 
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insignificant (t-statistics: 0.92, p-value: 0.36). Significant differences can only be 
found between the highly positive Line 3 with Lines 2 and 4 which both have low 
levels of relational experience. This indicates that the positive three-way interaction 
effect may primarily be driven by the positive impact that relational experiences have 
under conditions of uncertainty, supporting existing literature (Gulati et al., 2009). 
 
TABLE 5.5: Dawson-Richter slope difference test (GAE, Relational experience 
and Firm-level uncertainty) 
 
In order to further investigate this relationship, I created a dummy variable of 
relational experience. The abovementioned strong positive impact of Relational 
experience may be driven by cases with high numbers of relational experiences. In 
order to investigate whether it may simply be the existence of relational experiences, I 
create a dummy variable of it. Thus, firms which had managed at least one partnership 
before the announcement of the focal alliance received the value of 1 and firms for 
which the focal alliance is the first one with that respective partner received the value 
of 0. As can be seen from the regression results in Table 5.6, the three-way interaction 
is as proposed in Hypothesis 4 negative and significant also for the firms which have 
only managed at least one prior repeated partnership 
(β





Pair of slopes t-value for slope difference p-value for slope difference
(1) and (2) 0.52 0.61
(1) and (3) -1.29 0.20
(1) and (4) 1.53 0.13
(2) and (3) -2.18 0.03
(2) and (4) 0.92 0.36
(3) and (4) 2.24 0.03
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TABLE 5.6: Three-way interaction relational experience dummy x GAE x FLU 
 
 
Figure 5.6 and Table 5.7 illustrate the three-way interaction between GAE, relational 
experience (dummy) and firm-level uncertainty. The difference in this model is that 
no distinction between high or low levels of relational experience is made. Instead, 
through the dummy variable only distinctions between relational experience or no 
relational experience are made. The corresponding lines of interest for the spill-over 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable
Control variables
Alliance years (dummies) n.s.
Absorptive capacity 0.020 **
(.01)















GAE (log) x Relational experience (Dummy) -1.871 *
(1.01)
Relational experience (Dummy) x FLU 8.406 **
(6.75)
GAE (log) x FLU 1.471
(2.02)










GAE x Relational 
experience (Dummy) x 
FLU
Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White sandwich estimators and 
firm clustering are in parentheses
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effect are again the differences between the black lines with the white markers Lines 1 
(High GAE, relational experience) and 3 (Low GAE, relational experience). These are 
of particular interest as they indicate firms which do have at least one relational 
experience but varying levels of GAE. In order for the spill-over to be confirmed, a 
significant difference between the two would be expected. Results indeed suggest a 
significant difference between these two lines (t-statistics: -2.02, p-value: 0.04). This 
provides support for Hypothesis 4 that firms’ overconfidence in general alliance 
management practices and the spill-over onto the effect of relational experiences on 
value creation is exacerbated under conditions of firm-level uncertainty. Thus, this 
indicates that the relevance of the spill-over may be applicable to any level of 
relational experience, not necessarily the amount. Moreover, it indicates the 
importance of uncertainty for benefiting from relational experiences and the opposing 
effect of GAE causing overconfidence under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
FIGURE 5.6: Three-way interaction graph GAE, Relational experience dummy 




TABLE 5.7: Dawson-Richter slope difference test (GAE, Relational experience 
dummy and Firm-level uncertainty) 
 
Hypothesis 5 is also tested in a three-way interaction variable in Model 6 in the 
OLS Table 5.3. The three-way interaction term between GAE, relational experience 
and alliance management mechanisms is positive and significant 
(β
GAE x Relational experience x AMM : 1.82, p-value: 0.01). Initially this looks like it is 
contrary to the hypothesis that alliance management mechanisms exacerbate the spill-
over effect as a negative sign would intuitively be expected. However, as above, in 
order to investigate this further, a graphical investigation and a post-hoc Dawson-
Richter slope difference tests are necessary. 
The graphical results in Figure 5.7 indeed indicate a different effect than 
initially expected. Line 1 with high levels of GAE and high levels of relational 
experience is positively influenced by alliance management mechanisms. This 
indicates that such mechanisms may contrary to expectations of an exacerbation 
moderation effect actually positively moderate the ability to benefit from relational 
experiences at high levels. However, the slope of Line 3 (low levels of GAE and high 
levels of relational experience) is negative. This provides some evidence that alliance 
management mechanisms may have a negative effect onto the relationship between 
relational experience and value creation at low levels GAE. This suggests that alliance 
management mechanisms may have a negative effect onto relational experiences 
independent of GAE. 
Results from the Dawson-Richter slope difference tests in Table 5.8 indicate 
that the difference between Lines 1 and 3 is indeed significant (p-value<0.01). The 
finding can actually be explained by existing alliance capability development 
literature which proposes that firms need to first accumulate experience before such 
mechanisms should be introduced (Heimeriks et al., 2007). Evidence generated from 
Pair of slopes t-value for slope difference p-value for slope difference
(1) and (2) -1.10 0.27
(1) and (3) -2.02 0.04
(1) and (4) -0.08 0.93
(2) and (3) -1.72 0.09
(2) and (4) 1.75 0.08
(3) and (4) 3.07 0.00
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this analysis provides support to this as firms are less capable to create value from 
high levels of relational experience when they also have low levels of GAE but also 
institutionalized alliance management mechanisms. On the contrary, firms can 
mitigate the negative effects of relational experience at high levels of GAE. Thus, the 
hypothesis that alliance management mechanisms exacerbate the spill-over effect 
needs to be rejected. Instead, results suggest that alliance management mechanisms 
can mitigate the negative effects of high levels of GAE and relational experiences but 
instead may have negative impacts onto the relationship between relational experience 
and value creation when firms have low levels of GAE. This suggests that such 
mechanisms are both complementary and substitutable in their effect on alliance 
experience. 
 






TABLE 5.8: Dawson-Richter slope difference test (GAE, Relational experience 
and Alliance management mechanisms) 
 
The control variables are in line with existing literature. Non-listed alliance 
partner has a negative effect on alliance value creation (p-value: <0.01). Partnering 
with functionally diverse partners, such as research institutes, private firms or 
universities may have negative performance implications as it may put demands on 
organizations due to increased complexity and coordination costs (Jiang et al., 2010). 
Additionally, it may be because smaller partners may appropriate most of the value 
created from the alliance itself (Das et al., 1998). Absorptive capacity has a positive 
impact on value creation which is in line with existing literature (Deeds, 2001). 
Relational experiences also have a positive impact on alliance value creation. This is 
in line with existing literature which has found that they may generate alliance value 
through their ability to develop trust and inter-organizational routines, both facilitating 
the relationship among the alliance partners (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo 
et al., 2002). 
 
5.4.3 Robustness checks 
Five different types of robustness checks are performed in this chapter. Firstly, 
building on the above supplementary analysis a different variation of the relational 
experience measure is used. While this chapter builds on Chapter 4 which has 
identified that relational experiences are most effectively measured through the signal 
sent by announcing firms, this is complemented with the continuous variable of 
relational experiences for Models 4, 5, and 6. However, to improve the robustness of 
the results, relational experiences are also measured through the use of, a dummy 
variable of relational experience with a value of ‘0’ if the firms have had no previous 
relational experience or ‘1’ if the firms have accumulated relational experiences of 
Pair of slopes t-value for slope difference p-value for slope difference
(1) and (2) 2.46 0.01
(1) and (3) 2.85 0.00
(1) and (4) -0.20 0.85
(2) and (3) 2.13 0.03
(2) and (4) -1.58 0.12
(3) and (4) -2.21 0.03
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one or more. Results indicate that the spill-over effect also holds when using a dummy 
variable indicating that overconfidence affects the impact of relational experiences 
regardless of the amount of relational experience. As shown above, the interaction 
with firm-level uncertainty is also significant for the dummy variable of relational 
experience. For reference, please see Appendix 5.3 for OLS results and an interaction 
graph of relational experience (dummy) and GAE in Appendix 5.4.  
Secondly, a variation of the GAE variable is used. As suggested by prior 
research, more recent experience tends to be most relevant for firms in developing 
their alliance capability (e.g. Sampson, 2005). Therefore, I follow such research by 
using only experiences accumulated three years prior to the focal alliance. Please see 
Appendix 5.5 for the OLS results. Results indicate that the results hold for the two-
way interactions with strong indications of overconfidence in GAE-related 
experiences built up in the three years prior to the focal alliance. The effect for both 
Relational experience signal hold 
(β
GAElast3x Relational experience signal: -4.03 , p-value: 0.08) and relational experience 
(β
GAElast3x Relational experience: -1.11 , p-value: 0.005) hold, while the effects for the three-
way interactions for firm-level uncertainty and alliance management mechanism 
signals do not.  
Thirdly, I use alternative event windows to calculate the CAR in order to 
check whether results hold. Results for event window (-2, +2) are presented for the 
supported hypotheses in the Appendix 5.6. Fourthly, I check if a subset of the data 
drives the effect. Therefore, as suggested by existing literature (e.g. Lee, 2013), I 
randomly delete 10% of the observations and find support that the results hold. 
Fifthly, I test whether the use of firm size as a control changes the significance of any 




Building on the quality dimension identified in Chapter 4, this chapter 
introduces an interrelationship dimension between firm-level GAE and dyad-level 
relational experience. Following recent theoretical work calling for empirical research 
investigating the interrelated effect between dyad-and firm-level alliance management 
processes (Dekker & Abbeele, 2010; Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015), this chapter 
answers the research question if high extents of firm-level GAE negatively impact the 
effect of dyad-level relational experiences onto alliance value creation. The findings 
indicate support for the theory of an interrelationship between the two types of 
alliance experience, while both firm-level uncertainty and alliance management 
mechanisms have a moderating effect on this relationship. Overall, this chapter 
provides support for the relevance of alliance experience in predicting value creation 
from alliances. 
The independent effects of both GAE and relational experience support 
existing literature. Firstly, findings show that value creation declines as firms 
accumulate higher quantities of GAE indicating that high levels of such experiences 
are detrimental to alliance value creation. This supports prior literature which has 
found that at very low levels these experiences are valuable to organizations as they 
provide endorsements (Stuart et al., 1999) and learning opportunities (Sampson, 2005) 
but that the effects declines rapidly afterwards. Research attributes such findings to 
organizations’ overconfidence in their general alliance management when having 
accumulated significant amounts of GAE (e.g. Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). Secondly, this chapter finds evidence that dyad-level relational 
experiences improve alliance value creation significantly. As this effect is positive 
when not considering the level of GAE a firm has accumulated, this demonstrates that 
these are value-creating for the firm. Such positive value creation effects can be 
attributed to the generation of both inter-organizational and inter-personal trust 
between executives or alliance managers (Abrams et al., 2003; Gulati, 1995a; Zaheer 
et al., 1998) and inter-organizational routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zollo et al., 
2002). Therefore, this supports existing literature which has found positive effects of 
dyad-level relational experiences (Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002).  
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Directly building on the abovementioned findings of the independent effects of 
both GAE and relational experience (quality), this chapter investigates the 
interrelationship between these two types of alliance experience. This study finds 
strong evidence for such an interrelated effect which further suggests that high levels 
of firm-level GAE not only have negative value creation effects by itself but more 
importantly, they may spill over onto the effect that relational experiences have on 
alliance value creation. This confirms expectations from existing literature that 
overconfidence in GAE may have negative effects (Heimeriks, 2010; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). More specifically, findings indicate that such overconfidence 
directly impacts organizations ability to generate trust among each other, and the 
ability to develop inter-organizational routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995a).  
Moreover, this chapter finds that the firm-level uncertainty exacerbates the 
spill-over effect. Two aspects lead to the importance of firm-level uncertainty in the 
interrelationship between GAE and relational experience. Firstly, firm-level 
uncertainty is a condition under which heuristics such as overconfidence are 
exacerbated. Due to the uncertainty, firms and executives involved are reliant on such 
simplification processes in order to make sense of the complexities surrounding them 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Therefore, they are more likely to learn superstitiously 
(Zollo, 2009) The potentially negative impact of such heuristics and learning 
processes can be severe as such conditions require the careful attention of managers 
involved. Secondly, the spill-over is likely to be exacerbated as the importance of 
relational experiences to alliance value creation is higher under such uncertain 
circumstances (Gulati et al., 2009). Relational experience by itself lowers the 
uncertainty as the partner is known and the partnership more likely to be successful. 
However, this study finds that firms can only benefit from relational experience when 
they are not overconfident. Otherwise, the firm-level uncertainty further exacerbates 
the negative effects GAE has onto the relational experience value creation impact. 
This chapter also finds evidence that alliance management mechanisms 
influence the interrelationship between GAE and relational experience. Such 
institutionalization mechanisms however do not exacerbate the overconfidence but 
instead mitigate the negative effects at high levels of GAE. This is partly surprising as 
existing literature had suggested that the combination of the two has negative 
implications on the overconfidence generated (Heimeriks, 2010). Instead, results 
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suggest that alliance management mechanisms only have a negative effect onto 
relational experiences when GAE is low. This supports existing literature that in order 
to benefit from capabilities, these need to be developed sequentially. Experience as 
such needs to be accumulated first before any institutionalizing may offer benefits 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002). Also, in the alliance context, the importance of sequences in 
developing alliance capabilities is found (Heimeriks et al., 2007).  
This chapter replies firstly to calls for studies which have suggested to 
investigate the interrelated effect between the two (Schreiner & Heimeriks, 2010; 
Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015), secondly to studies which have found that many 
unobserved moderating variables in the relationship between the underlying processes 
of relational experience and performance still exist (e.g. Vanneste et al., 2014). The 
identification of the interrelated effect between GAE and Relational experience has 
six contributions to the strategic alliance literature, while also having contributions to 
practice.  
Firstly, the finding for an interrelated effect between GAE and relational 
experience is a logical extension and contribution to studies which find that firm-level 
GAE may have negative effects on performance as firms become overconfident 
(Heimeriks, 2010), inert in their firm-level alliance management practices or that these 
may even turn into a core rigidity (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). 
Such so-called “competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988: 322), “traps of distinctive 
competence” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 103), resulting in an “overconfidence trap” 
(Heimeriks, 2010: 65) on a firm-level alliance management provide even further 
complications for firms than previously expected. This highlights that different types 
of experience may affect each other if they are related to one another but still 
distinctly different, a main requirement for such a spill-over to occur (Zollo & Reuer, 
2010).  
Secondly, by introducing the interrelated experience effect and investigating 
its effect on alliance value creation, this chapter provides clarity as to the large 
heterogeneity in results investigating the performance effects of relational experiences 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). Thereby, these findings 
add to a debate in existing literature if and to what extent relational experiences 
improve alliance performance. While several studies have found positive effects 
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(Gulati et al., 2009; Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002), others have also found 
negative effects (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Therefore it is not 
surprising that the focus of several studies in existing research has been on identifying 
boundary conditions to the effect of relational experience on alliance performance. 
Amongst others, the level of equity involved in the alliance (Zollo et al., 2002), firm-
level uncertainty, solvency and the R&D intensity (Gulati et al., 2009) have been 
identified. While other previous studies have hinted that the level of GAE is important 
in alliance literature (e.g. Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), it has not been identified as a 
boundary condition to relational experience before. The findings may therefore add 
the level of firm-level GAE as another boundary condition to the literature on the 
effect of relational experiences on alliance value creation. 
Thirdly, this chapter contributes directly to a recently emerging research 
direction which has investigated the spill-over of different types of experiences onto 
another in corporate development activities (e.g. Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Mulotte et 
al., 2013). In this stream, existing research has found that such experiences can spill-
over across different corporate development activities such as from M&A to alliance 
(Zollo & Reuer, 2010), or from in-licensing to internal development efforts (Mulotte 
et al., 2013), this study adds to existing literature by finding that such spill-overs may 
also occur within one corporate development activity: Strategic alliances. Moreover, 
this chapter contributes to these studies that firm-specific factors may either mitigate 
or exacerbate such spill-overs. 
Fourthly, this chapter contributes to studies which have emphasized the 
importance of uncertainty in creating value from relational experiences (e.g. Gulati et 
al., 2009). While this finding is supported in this work, I also find that the level of 
GAE may have substantial impacts onto this relationship. Essentially, the 
overconfidence in general alliance management practices may distort the ability of 
firms to benefit from relational experience. Hence, this finding suggests that firm-
level uncertainty and GAE need to be considered together when investigating the 
impact of relational experiences onto value creation. 
Fifthly, this chapter also contributes to existing studies which have 
investigated alliance capability development from alliance experience to alliance 
management mechanisms such as integrating or institutionalizing processes 
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(Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Heimeriks et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 
2007). This chapter finds that the sequential accumulation of alliance experience and 
only then the institutionalization of alliance knowledge is essential. This chapter 
contributes directly to the abovementioned studies that otherwise this may not only 
impact a firm’s general alliance performance (Heimeriks et al., 2007) but also the 
value created from repeated partnerships. 
Additionally, this chapter further provides evidence that relational experiences 
positively influence alliance value creation. This is not widely accepted in existing 
literature as many studies have identified insignificant or negative effects for firm- or 
project-related performance measures (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; 
Pangarkar, 2003) or stock-market based measures of alliance performance (Lee, 2013; 
Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Yang et al., 2015). This study uses a multitude of 
different measures for relational experience and most importantly based on results 
from Chapter 4, by differentiating between repeated partnerships entered for positive 
reasons and repeated partnerships which are entered for network inertial reasons. 
Results for the effect of relational experience quality on alliance value creation as 
identified in Chapter 4 also holds in the full sample used in this chapter. In addition to 
the interrelationship dimension identified in this chapter, this provides further support 
for a quality-based dimension. 
These findings also contribute to practice by suggesting that managers ought to 
be cautious in their management of repeated partnerships when they have accumulated 
high levels of firm-level alliance experience. Effectively building and maintaining 
trust and partner-specific routines between alliance partners can be difficult due to the 
dynamics in a strategic alliance (e.g. Kale et al., 2000). Findings indicate that for 
relational experiences signalled to the market, this effect is less severe. However, 
findings of this study indicate that firm’s own characteristics may inhibit them to 
develop the necessary benefits from relational experiences. The development of 
overconfidence in firm-level general alliance processes may also possibly result from 
codification mechanisms, such as guidebooks on alliance management published by 
industry associations on strategic alliance management. However, this and other 
earlier studies have shown that these effects are decreasing dramatically as firms 
increase experience and institutionalize their practices. This chapter instead 
emphasizes the importance of relational experiences and the significance to be aware 
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of the extent of firm-level alliance experience when trying to benefit from them. 
Additionally, findings may provide insights that particular caution should be paid to 
repeated partnerships under uncertain conditions. The danger of becoming 
overconfident in general alliance processes while at the same time neglecting the 
development of relational capabilities is significant at that stage. Moreover, results 
indicate that the sequence in which firms develop their alliance capabilities should be 
based on levels of experience and only then institutionalization ought to follow. This 
chapter provides evidence that this may negatively impact the benefits derived from 
repeated partnerships. 
 
5.6 Limitations and directions for future research 
This chapter is an attempt to investigate the interrelationship between GAE 
and relational experience in their impact on alliance value creation. This chapter has 
some limitations which may open up directions for future research. 
Firstly, this chapter tests the interrelationship of alliance experiences in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. While this is a regularly used context for the investigation 
of strategic alliances due to their frequent use (Powell et al., 1996) and industry-
specific factors have generally not found to be relevant for the effect of alliance 
experience on value creation (Gulati et al., 2009), this effect may be directly related to 
the biopharmaceutical industry. Future studies may therefore want to investigate 
whether the results also hold in different industries. Secondly, this chapter tests 
alliance value creation of alliances using stock market-based measures of cumulative 
abnormal returns in an event study. While existing studies find that such value 
creation measures also predict alliance performance using more subjective long-term 
measures (Heimeriks et al., 2015; Kale et al., 2002), future studies may wish to 
investigate whether the interrelationship also holds using other measures of 
performance. Thirdly, this chapter relies on previous studies which have indicated that 
overconfidence resulting from superstitious learning is common as firms accumulate 
more experience (e.g. Heimeriks, 2010). Future studies may wish to investigate the 
underlying processes of overconfidence and superstitious learning more precisely. 
Interesting avenues for future research could also be to investigate alliance experience 
for both firms in the dyad. The measurement of alliance experience for one firm in the 
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dyad has been the predominant way and an important means for investors to form 
their opinion on organizations alliance management practices (Gulati et al., 2009; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Park & Mezias, 2005). Future studies may for instance 
wish to investigate whether aggregate experience levels of both partners influence the 
interrelationship between different types of alliance experiences. 
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL AND PARTNER-SPECIFIC ALLIANCE RHYTHMS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON ALLIANCE VALUE CREATION 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 have considered both firm-level alliance and dyad-level 
relational experience and identified a quality and interrelationship dimension of those. 
This chapter shifts from the interrelated perspective back to considering GAE and 
relational experiences separately, however, by considering how these experiences 













Alliance research embracing a temporal perspective has gained increasing 
interest due to the still-significant failure rates (Gulati et al., 2009; Park & Ungson, 
2001; Sampson, 2005; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Shi & Prescott, 2012). In general, 
temporal alliance studies investigate how managing alliances over time can improve 
alliance performance (Shi, Sun, & Prescott, 2012). In addition to research using an 
experience lens (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009), other temporal 
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dimensions include the learning (Hamel, 1991), sequence (Shi & Prescott, 2011), 
speed (Al-Laham et al., 2008), frequency (Standifer & Bluedorn, 2006), and timing 
perspectives (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Most recently, however, a new stream in 
temporal research has emerged relating to alliance rhythms (Shi & Prescott, 2012). 
Essentially, the rhythm is a second-order function of the experience as it takes into 
account how experiences are accumulated over time. The rhythm literature has a solid 
foundation in other corporate development activities, ranging from M&A over 
international expansions to strategic change in general (Hayward, 2002; Klarner & 
Raisch, 2013; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2002). Drawing primarily on absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and time 
compression diseconomies as conceptual foundations (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), 
research provides evidence that irregular rhythms tend to decrease performance, while 
regular rhythms have been found to significantly improve performance (Klarner & 
Raisch, 2013; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Shi & Prescott, 2012; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). 
There are three primary research gaps in the alliance rhythm field, however. 
Firstly, existing research has exclusively focused on strategic alliances in general, 
regardless of the partners, in a so-called general alliance rhythm (GAR). However, 
insignificant negative effects have been found (Shi & Prescott, 2012). Yet, this has 
been investigated for both equity and non-equity alliances in combination. As non-
equity alliances are more challenging to manage (Das & Teng, 1996), I propose to 
investigate the effect in non-equity settings only. 
Secondly, it is, however, surprising that research so far has been silent on how 
organizations accumulate their repeated partnerships with the same alliance partner in 
rhythms over time. As emphasized above, recent research has primarily regarded 
repeated partnerships as cumulative (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009) and has not distinguished 
when these repeated alliance are formed. This is particularly surprising as existing 
research in the field of strategic alliances has found that such repeated alliances need 
to be managed differently from alliances in general with more importance on tacit 
processes such as trust building or inter-organizational routine development (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Generating trust is particularly sensitive to time 
between alliances. Existing research has emphasized that trust ought to be carefully 
developed, with some studies showing that time lapses between repeated alliances 
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should not be too long (Gulati, 1995b) and others have emphasized that trust 
development and maintenance are sensitive processes (Ring & van de Ven, 1994). 
Consequently, it is not clear whether repeated partnerships which follow each other in 
close succession may effectively facilitate such trust-building. In contrast, 
organizations may not benefit from partnerships which had been formed a long time 
ago. In order to provide further clarity into our understanding regarding the most 
effective temporal distance between repeated partnerships and to improve our 
understanding of the heterogeneity in value created from repeated partnerships, this 
chapter focuses on how the rhythm of repeated partnerships influences alliance value 
creation. In order to investigate this, I develop the term partner-specific alliance 
rhythm (PAR) which comprises the temporal rhythm of repeated partnerships with the 
same alliance partner. 
Thirdly, while irregular rhythms have important negative implications for 
performance (Shi & Prescott, 2012; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002), several factors 
may facilitate firms’ ability to manage irregular rhythms (Shi et al., 2012). In the 
context of GAR, existing research has so far used entrainment theory
12
 (see Ancona & 
Chong, 1996) and identified both relationship-, (intra-entrainment i.e. internal 
synchronization with M&A facilitate performance) and competitor-specific factors 
(extra-entrainment i.e. the synchronization with competitor sequences). These may 
significantly impact upon the effect of different rhythms (Shi & Prescott, 2012). 
Related research on M&A rhythms finds that firm-specific factors may also have a 
critical role in moderating the impact of irregular rhythms (e.g. Laamanen & Keil, 
2008). Due to the similarity of both M&A and strategic alliances in their underlying 
processes (Zollo & Reuer, 2010) and the importance of firm-specific factors 
emphasizing heterogeneity of firm characteristics in general (Contractor, 2012), such 
firm-specific factors may also have an important impact in moderating both GAR and 
PAR. Existing literature in the field of strategic management has identified slack 
resources, potential absorptive capacity as two firm-specific factors which may 
significantly impact on a firms’ ability to deal with critical management demands 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Iyer & Miller, 2008) and the firm’s strategic alliance 
management in particular (Kale et al., 2002; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). In addition, 
                                                     
12
 The concept of entrainment has been adapted from the field of biology and defined as the 
“adjustment of the pace or cycle of an activity to match or synchronize with that of another activity” 
(Ancona & Chong, 1996: 251). 
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existing alliance research and Chapter 5 have both indicated that GAE may have a 
significant impact onto the ability to benefit from alliance experience in general and 
repeated partnerships in particular. GAE provides firms with additional experiences; 
however, as indicated in Chapter 5 may also lead to overconfidence in the 
management of alliances which has negative effects onto repeated partnerships. 
However, it is unclear how these firm-specific factors mitigate or exacerbate firms’ 
ability to manage irregular rhythms of alliances. This leads to the following research 
questions: 
What effect do irregular General Alliance Rhythms (GAR) and Partner-
specific Alliance Rhythms (PAR) have on alliance value creation? How can slack 
resources, absorptive capacity, and GAE mitigate or exacerbate the potentially 
negative effect of irregular GARs and PARs on alliance value creation, 
respectively? 
 
In order to answer these questions, the term partner-specific alliance rhythm 
(PAR) is developed and introduced to the strategic alliance literature and its effect on 
alliance value creation investigated. I define PAR as the variability of repeated 
alliances, with the same alliance partner, over a specified period of time. Moreover, 
this chapter also investigates general alliance rhythm (GAR), which has been 
investigated in previous alliance literature (e.g. Shi & Prescott, 2012). This study 
however differentiates itself by only considering non-equity alliances for GAR. As 
these alliances are particularly difficult to manage (Das & Teng, 1996), the 
importance of GAR should be more significant in this context. Moreover, the 
importance of repeated partnerships is particularly salient in non-equity alliances (e.g. 
Zollo et al., 2002), thereby potentially also increasing the importance of PAR in this 
context. The theoretical framework draws on literature of the RBV, absorptive 
capacity, OL and also inter-organizational trust research. I argue that as the capacity 
of the firm to absorb additional experiences is limited (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), 
firms cannot simply add and compress additional alliances in time without incurring 
performance declines (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). I also add an OL perspective to 
existing literature. Existing research finds that balancing the amount of strategic 
activities over time is important as firms need to refresh their experiences in order not 
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to forget previous experiences (Argote, 2012). This also applies when aiming to 
benefit from relational experiences due to the necessity to both develop and maintain 
trustful relationships over time (Gulati, 1995b). Hence, this may require firms to 
carefully manage their alliances by striking a balance between too many and too few 
alliances over time.  Thus, in order to avoid value creation declines, a constant GAR 
and PAR should be maintained.   
This chapter is structured as follows. In the following section, a summary on 
existing literature on rhythm in strategic alliances and the underlying theoretical 
reasoning is provided. Afterwards, hypotheses as to how GAR and PAR affect 
alliance value creation are derived before developing how firm-specific slack 
resources, absorptive capacity and GAE may mitigate or exacerbate these 
relationships. This study draws on the full sample for GAR and the subsample for 
repeated partnerships for PAR. In line with existing literature (Shi & Prescott, 2012),  
I cannot find any evidence for GAR also in settings of only non-equity alliances and 
considering the stock market measure of alliance value creation. However, I do find 
support for the main effects of PAR, while mixed results for the firm-specific 
moderating factors can be identified. Subsequently, the implications of the results are 
discussed, and limitations and future directions of the chapter are presented. 
 
6.2 Theory and Hypotheses  
The management of time is a critical dimension in management research (e.g. 
Abbott, 2001; Ancona, Okhuysen, & Perlow, 2001b; George & Jones, 2000; Mitchell 
& James, 2001). This study draws on time compression diseconomies based on the 
RBV (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and 
OL (Argote, 2012) literature to examine the impact of two different types of strategic 
alliance rhythms by further distinguishing between GAR and PAR. Research on 
alliance rhythms is part of a larger literature stream on temporal dynamics which has 
recently been increasing in the field of strategic management (e.g. Klarner & Raisch, 
2013; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Pacheco-de-Almeida, Hawk, & Yeung, 2015; Shi & 
Prescott, 2012).  
General alliance rhythm (GAR) has previously been defined as “the variability 
of the firm’s (...) alliance activity over a specified period of time” (Shi & Prescott, 
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2012: 1282). It therefore builds on literature examining the frequency and experiences 
of strategic alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000a). Essentially, the rhythm becomes a 
second-order function of the frequency and experience and thereby describes a 
different temporal phenomenon (Shi et al., 2012). Despite increasing research on 
rhythms, this area is still relatively new in the field of management (Ancona, 
Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001a; Shi et al., 2012). Essentially, only very few 
studies have undertaken the step to investigate strategic alliance rhythms in general 
and its effects on performance more specifically (Shi & Prescott, 2012). Most research 
on rhythms has focused on strategic change in general (Klarner & Raisch, 2013), 
corporate development actions, such as M&A (Hayward, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 
2008) or international expansion (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Extending existing 
research in this field, I therefore argue that an irregular rhythm (i.e. a high variability) 
for both GAR and PAR negatively affects alliance value creation as it causes high 
managerial demands which have further been shown to have negative influences (e.g. 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). After that I theorize how slack resources, absorptive 
capacity, and GAE may impact on the relationship between PAR and alliance value 
creation. A graphical presentation of the theoretical framework can be found in 































FIGURE 6.2: Theoretical framework (Chapter 6) 
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6.2.1 General Alliance Rhythm (GAR)  
This chapter proposes that firms’ alliance value creation is higher if their GAE 
is accumulated in a more regular (i.e. even) rhythm. Drawing on previous studies (e.g. 
Shi & Prescott, 2012), the general alliance rhythm (GAR) is defined as the variability 
of all alliances, irrespective of any partner characteristics, over a specific period of 
time. Such a regular rhythm has also been termed an even-paced rhythm (Shi & 
Prescott, 2012). This has been tested in multiple corporate development contexts, such 
as strategic alliances (Shi & Prescott, 2012), M&A (Laamanen & Keil, 2008) or 
international expansion (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). However, it has not 
exclusively for tested for non-equity alliances. While it has been found to be important 
in the context of M&A (Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Shi & Prescott, 2012), up to this 
date no evidence of GARs impact on alliance performance has been found (Shi & 
Prescott, 2012). 
Huy (2001: 613) argues that an irregular rhythm is caused by two primary 
periods: “a pattern of variability in the intensity and frequency of organizational 
activities, typically characterized by periods of accelerated and slowed activity.” In 
essence, GAR (and also PAR) consist of, firstly, periods of major alliance activity, 
followed or proceeded by periods of alliance inactivity. In order to improve 
understanding of the different periods of alliance rhythms, please refer to Figure 6.3 
below for an example. The solid line in Figure 6.3 indicates an example of an 
irregular rhythm. The period between 2004 and 2009 relates to a situation of slowed 
alliance activity or even inactivity, whereas for the period between 2010 and 2011, 
major or accelerated alliance activities can be observed. As shown below, reasons for 
a negative effect of GAR on alliance value creation are caused by both periods. 
FIGURE 6.3: Example of an irregular GAR and PAR 
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6.2.1.1 Periods of accelerated, high general alliance activity 
Periods of accelerated alliance activity influence the ability of firms to learn 
which may cause an ineffective development of alliance capabilities. A large stream 
of the OL literature argues that periods of high levels of activities cause issues in the 
interpretation of these (e.g. Argote, 2012). When organizations are in a period of 
accelerated alliance activity, they may not learn effectively from these changes as the 
time between the alliances is so short that it does not allow them to. This is because 
the accumulation of alliances within short time periods may create information 
overload (Huber, 1991) and thus places significant demands on firms’ managers 
ability to absorb knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As firms are limited in their 
ability to absorb knowledge, overly frequent events can lead to performance declines 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 
1115) state: “Experience that comes too fast can overwhelm managers, leading to an 
inability to transform experience into meaningful learning.”  
In essence, such events of high activity after or preceding periods of 
infrequency are called ‘rare events’ by the OL literature (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 
2009; March et al., 1991). Learning from such rare events can cause difficulties for 
organizations as it prompts an interruption of routine activities which further causes 
issues in firms’ and managers ability to interpret them (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, 
& Weick, 2009). In such situations, managers are also more likely to overestimate 
previous successes (Zollo, 2009). Hence, they may learn superstitiously and thereby 
ineffectively (Zollo, 2009). In summary, the OL perspective proposes that firms 
engage in strategic alliances on a regular basis in order to refresh their knowledge and 
routines on how to engage in these organizational actions.  
Complementing the previous literature streams, Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
focus on the resource-based implications of irregularity in strategic decisions. They 
point out that “asset stocks are ‘built’ or accumulated through a consistent time 
pattern of expenditures or flows” (Dierickx & Cool, 1989: 1509). As such, a rapid 
increase in a strategic activity does not lead to positive performance effects as “the 
time between the anticipation of a problem and its arrival may not be adequate for an 
organization to identify and develop the knowledge, or accumulate the experience, 
required to respond effectively” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 103). Especially in the 
case of alliances, such periods of high activity can overwhelm firms as “each alliance 
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is unique” (De Man, 2014: 8). Despite some similarities across alliances which allow 
for the creation of firm-level alliance capabilities (as described in Chapter 5), 
essentially, alliances require customization of the governance and control structures 
such as contracts and essentially management attention (De Man, 2014). Thus, a level 
of high alliance activity in a short time period can lead firms to be more ineffective in 
managing these. Additionally, most alliances are subject to the danger of opportunism 
by the alliance partner (Das & Teng, 2001; Parkhe, 1993). This is particularly likely in 
the context of non-equity alliances (Das & Teng, 2000b) Thus, when firms are 
engaged in many alliances within a short timeframe, this may cause issues in trying to 
protect valuable firm knowledge (Kale et al., 2000), leading to other firms taking 
advantage of this overload. 
 
6.2.1.2 Periods of decreased alliance activity or inactivity 
The majority of the OL literature has built on the experience curve and 
investigated how organizations can consistently improve performance through direct 
learning. A much smaller stream indicates however that organizations essentially 
‘unlearn’ or ‘forget’ in periods of inactivity (Argote, 2012). Thus, experience may not 
be cumulative but gaps between experiences may be important to consider. In the 
context of strategic alliances, such long periods between new alliances can lead to 
alliance management knowledge decay (Argote et al., 1990; Benkard, 2000). 
Particularly, in high-tech contexts, such knowledge decays quickly and thus frequently 
needs to be ‘revived’ (Argote, 2012; Barkema & Schijven, 2008). As the alliance 
management lifecycle from alliance formation to alliance termination requires 
specialized knowledge, not applying this knowledge may easily lead firms to ‘forget’ 
how it is most effectively applied. The implications of ‘forgetting’ such essential 
knowledge can lead to performance declines in the alliance management as firms in 
some cases may need to build their knowledge from scratch. In order to effectively 
learn, firms need the capability to value and absorb experience and assimilate these 
throughout the firm by means of routines, for instance, in order to maintain their 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, periods of inactivity or 
non-use will lead to declines of performance as absorptive capacity needs to be 
maintained through frequent use (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). From a RBV 
perspective, such periods of inactivity are also not performance-enhancing as the flow 
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of resources does not allow a firm to effectively build up their asset stocks. The notion 
of time compression diseconomies argument suggests that rhythms should be 
maintained constant as irregularity in them decreases the marginal effect of 
investments (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Combining the arguments that periods of both 
low and high alliance activity may cause organizational issues leading to lower 
alliance performance, firms can benefit from an even GAR as it may enable them to 
effectively generate routines in the processes (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). It can be 
expected that alliance value creation is negatively affected by an irregular GAR. 
Hypothesis 1: For non-equity alliances, the more irregular the rhythms of strategic 
alliances (GAR), the more negative its effect on alliance value creation. 
  
6.2.2 Partner-specific alliance rhythm (PAR) 
As indicated in Chapter 5 and in existing literature the benefits from engaging 
in repeated partnerships with the same partner may be more significant and 
sustainable to improving firms’ alliance value creation (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 
2009; Zollo et al., 2002).  As indicated in previous chapters, existing studies identify 
ambiguous effects of repeated partnerships finding both positive (Gulati et al., 2009; 
Zollo et al., 2002) and negative effects (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). 
In order to provide further clarity on this value creation relationship, this chapter uses 
a temporal dimension of repeated partnerships, which has not been used in existing 
literature. This is surprising as the underlying processes of trust and routines are 
sensitive to the temporal development (Gulati, 1995b; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 
2003; Ring & van de Ven, 1994).  
This section first emphasizes the underlying processes that describe how 
repeated partnerships lead to improved alliance value creation through trust 
development and the development of inter-organizational structural routines. 
Subsequently, I develop a hypothesis that the more irregular the rhythm of partner-
specific alliances (PAR), the lower its net effect on alliance value creation is. Similar 
to hypothesis development for Hypothesis 1 I split the arguments into, firstly, periods 
of high repeated alliance activity and, secondly, periods of slowed alliance activity or 
inactivity between repeated partnerships. 
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Increased trust between alliance partners contributes significantly to the 
benefits arising from repeated partnerships (Gulati, 1995a). The intuition behind this 
is simple. As organizations partner repetitively, they are developing trust among each 
other (Gulati, 1995a). This is particularly important as distrust is one of the primary 
reasons for alliance failure (Park & Ungson, 2001). Hence, it is not surprising that 
organizations which have gained trust with their alliance partner are subjectively more 
satisfied with alliance outcomes (Reuer & Zollo, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Therefore, 
trust has been found to facilitate further economic exchanges (Williamson, 1985). 
Firstly, it helps to decrease costly governance mechanisms to protect against 
opportunistic behaviour (Parkhe, 1993) by minimizing the transaction costs as it 
reduces search costs due to the familiarity of the partners (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Gulati, 
1995a). Secondly, it reduces the monitoring costs of the alliance partner during the 
actual alliance exchange as fears of the partners opportunism are reduced (Zaheer et 
al., 1998).  
However, trust is a dynamic process and effectively varies across a ‘spectrum’ 
from trust to distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). As such, trust requires both 
cautious development as well as maintenance over time. As Ring and van de Ven 
(1994: 93) in their seminal article on inter-organizational trust emphasize: “[Trust 
development] requires careful and systematic attention to the concrete processes (...) 
between transacting parties”. This indicates that organizations need to pay significant 
attention to both building and maintaining trustful alliance relationships. Partnering 
too frequently with one partner may not allow for effective learning and reflection of 
previous alliances to judge whether the partner is truly trustworthy. On the contrary, 
leaving too much time between the alliances may lead to decay in trust as the firms 
direction may have changed or the key people involved in the alliance such as 
boundary spanners, executives or the middle management involved in managing the 
alliance may have changed. Hence, despite a previous relationship, trust may then 
essentially need to be re-built (Das & Teng, 1998). Benefits from repeated 
partnerships also derive from shared inter-organizational structural routines such as 
steering committees which are the highest hierarchical level of alliance governance 
(Zaheer et al., 1998). Such structural routines represent platforms in which managers 
from both companies frequently interact and discuss while also providing 
coordination, control, and conflict resolution practices among the alliance partners (De 
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Man & Roijakkers, 2009). In a way, such frequent interaction on steering committees 
further intensifies inter-organizational trust through inter-personal trust (Perrone, 
Zaheer, & McEvily, 2003) which makes structural alliance mechanisms a valuable 
component in improving alliance value creation (Kale et al., 2002). As described 
above, irregular rhythms are caused by infrequency followed or preceded by 
accelerated activity. Drawing on resource-based, absorptive capacity and also trust-
based perspectives, this study proposes that both accelerated, high repeated alliance 
activity and repeated alliance inactivity create different problems for organizations. In 
order to lead to the hypothesis, this study focuses on the two different processes which 
cause an irregular PAR to have negative effects on alliance performance. 
 
6.2.2.1 Periods of accelerated, high repeated alliance activity  
Trust building takes time and requires careful development (Gill & Butler, 
1996; Jones & George, 1998; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). Effectively getting to know 
the partner and waiting for performance feedback may become essential for trust 
building. In periods of high activity, small gaps between repeated alliances may 
therefore not facilitate the development of trust between organizations (Arrow, 1974). 
Essentially, the partnership takes time to generate what Dyer and Chu (2000: 262) 
term: “Social memory” which refers to trust bonds between partner organizational 
members. Similarly, firms need time between partnerships as a so-called “period of 
ambivalence” (Gulati & Sytch, 2008: 180) is present after forming a new alliance. 
This indicates benefiting from trust from relational experiences may take time to 
develop. 
Additionally, partners in repeated alliances need time to learn to contract with 
one another (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). As firms can gain benefits from making 
repeated contracts in the alliance partnership, such benefits are essentially derived 
from the ongoing partnership as lessons about necessary changes need to be made 
(Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Hence, not leaving significant time for such learning to 
occur may negatively impact the benefits derived from repeatedly contracting. 
Moreover, such high alliance activity may also have important implications on 
the development of the firm’s inter-organizational structural routines, such as steering 
committees. Even though both alliance partners may feel that a repeated partnership 
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with a short gap may be appropriate for further extending their collaboration, both 
partners may not be able to develop these inter-organizational structural routines 
effectively and effectively not be able to signal this to investors. This is due to three 
primary reasons. Firstly, the time compression diseconomies argument as used for 
GAR should also be applicable to PAR. As Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue the 
constant flow of resources over time is most effective for building effective asset 
stocks. Thus, when firms decrease the gaps between alliances (i.e. increase the 
alliance activity of repeated alliances) the effectiveness of each alliance is also likely 
to decrease. In order to increase the effectiveness of inter-organizational routines, such 
investments require a constant flow of resources. Secondly, such inter-organizational 
routines take time to develop as they require sufficient performance feedback from 
previous partnerships (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Essentially such routines involve 
significant amounts of coordination and fine-tuning (Zollo et al., 2002). If multiple 
routines are set up at the same time, this may not allow for necessary changes to be 
made to increase their effectiveness. Thirdly, short gaps between strategic alliances 
may place significant demands on organizations absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) which may become overwhelmed and inter-organizational structures 
such as steering committees may not be effectively formed.  
 
6.2.2.2 Periods of slowed repeated alliance activity or inactivity 
Another way in which an irregular, unsystematic PAR harms the effectiveness 
of repeated strategic alliances is when large gaps between alliances exist. Such gaps 
therefore decrease the likelihood for repeated alliance formation (Gulati, 1995b). 
Firstly, such gaps exacerbate the development and maintenance of inter-organizational 
routines. As Dierickx and Cool (1989) also argue non-frequent resource flows cause 
the ineffectiveness of resource development.  Secondly, trust needs to be maintained, 
not only developed (Jones & George, 1998). Leaving large gaps between partnerships 
may lead to trust quickly turning into distrust (Jones & George, 1998). Essentially, 
Gulati (1995b) shows empirically that large gaps of four years or more between 
repeated partnerships have negative effects on the trust maintenance and effectively 
on the likelihood of forming additional repeated partnerships. Thirdly, the 
effectiveness of inter-organizational structural routines may also be affected by large 
gaps between strategic alliances. As Nelson and Winter (1982) have pointed out such 
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‘memory loss’ of potentially “social memory” (Dyer & Chu, 2000: 262) can lead to a 
decay in the effectiveness of a routine which has negative performance implications 
(Anand, Gray, & Siemsen, 2012). Essentially, firms’ knowledge as to how to 
effectively maintain inter-organizational structural routines is subject to knowledge 
decay if not regularly used (Argote, 2012; Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995). 
In summary, drawing on RBV, absorptive capacity and trust perspectives, 
organizations which mix periods of high repeated alliance activity with periods of 
slowed repeated alliance activity or even inactivity (irregular PAR) suffer negative 
value creation implications. This is because both trust and inter-organizational 
structural routines need to both be carefully developed and also maintained. This 
chapter therefore hypothesizes that firms with an even-paced PAR are more effective 
in developing and at the same time maintaining trust and inter-organizational 
structural routines. Not only are investors likely to be influenced by the decreased 
performance likelihood of alliances by an irregular PAR, but also investors in general 
prefer simplicity in such rhythms (Rindova et al., 2010). Thus, an irregular PAR may 
have negative effects on alliance value creation. 
Hypothesis 2: The more irregular the rhythms of repeated strategic alliances with 
the same partner (PAR), the more negative its effect on alliance value creation. 
 
6.2.3 Moderating impacts onto the relationship between GAR and PAR and 
alliance value creation 
The literature on alliance rhythms is still in its infancy (Shi et al., 2012). 
Existing research has so far focused on the identification of moderating factors using 
entrainment theory (Shi & Prescott, 2012) and support has been found that the internal 
synchronization with internal M&A activity (inter-entrainment) as well as the alliance 
activity of competitors (extra-entrainment) may significantly affect the GAR- 
performance relationship (Shi & Prescott, 2012). Nevertheless, existing research on 
moderating factors for GAR is still developing and an understanding of both the 
mitigating and exacerbating factors is still developing. A group of such moderating 
factors which may provide additional explanatory power to the concept of rhythms are 
firm-level characteristics, as also emphasized in the strategic management literature 
(e.g. Contractor, 2012). In one of the key studies on M&A rhythms, Laamanen and 
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Keil (2008) find evidence for the importance of firm-specific factors and the 
experience with M&A in mitigating the effect of irregular M&A rhythms onto 
performance. Additionally, such firm-specific factors have been found to be relevant 
in how firms benefit from strategic alliances (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Kale et 
al., 2002). This subsection therefore investigates how firm–specific factors, such as 
slack resources, absorptive capacity as well as general alliance experience may either 
mitigate or exacerbate the negative value creation effect of irregular GARs and PARs.  
 
6.2.3.1 Moderating role of slack resources on the effect of GAR and PAR on 
alliance value creation 
The key premise of the RBV is that organizational resources help firms to 
achieve superior performance (Barney, 1991). As such, financial resources, for 
instance, slack are an important component for firms (Daniel et al., 2004). Such slack 
refers to resources accumulated either through positive performance in previous 
periods or because of a deliberately accumulated buffer and can therefore be used at 
the firms discretion (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). While some research argues 
that slack resources foster explorative tendencies such as further innovation (Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996), most research finds that slack resources are used for exploitative 
reasons (Levinthal & March, 1993). Other studies have further identified that firms 
can both more effectively exploit and explore as it improves the ability of firms to 
learn (Wiersma, 2007). Existing literature has also found that firms are more likely to 
form acquisitions when they have high levels of slack (Iyer & Miller, 2008). 
As such, I propose that organizational slack can have an impact on mitigating 
exploitative issues caused by irregular GAR. As previous literature in the field of 
M&A and international expansion has shown, an irregular rhythm creates significant 
issues for a firm’s absorptive capacity (e.g. Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002). Using a RBV perspective, this study draws on Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) to argue that the negative effects of an irregular rhythm is caused by non-
appropriate resource flows (i.e. a high variability in them). This is because the 
irregularity of the rhythm creates significant internal pressures, such as managerial 
issues. However, this is where slack resources are most helpful as they provide a “(…) 
cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt 
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment” (Bourgeois, 1981: 30). Thus, slack 
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resources may facilitate the management of an irregular GAR and/or PAR. They may 
help organizations at times of low alliance activity or inactivity and at times of 
accelerated alliance activity. During the latter, they may provide organizations with 
additional management resources necessary to cope with the complex demands of 
irregular rhythms. Additionally, at times of decreased alliance activity, slack resources 
may provide organizations with the ability to possibly retrieve alliance lessons from 
previous agreements and enable the organization not to ‘forget’ these alliance lessons 
(Argote, 2012).  In conclusion, firms with higher levels of slack resources may be 
more capable of managing irregular rhythms. Thus,  
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between an irregular GAR with alliance value 
creation is positively moderated by firms’ slack resources. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between an irregular PAR with alliance value 
creation is positively moderated by firms’ slack resources. 
 
6.2.3.2 Moderating role of absorptive capacity on the effect of GAR and PAR on 
alliance value creation 
As argued above, an irregular rhythm impacts the firm as absorptive capacity 
is either over- or under-utilized (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and may therefore negatively 
affect managers ability to absorb new experiences (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). It may 
therefore be logical that firms which have higher levels of absorptive capacity are 
more effective in dealing with an irregular rhythm. While negative performance 
implications have frequently been attributed to arguments based on absorptive 
capacity, there might be a gap in the literature investigating whether firms with more 
absorptive capacity are actually more capable to mitigate the negative effects of 
irregular GARs and PARs. 
Absorptive capacity facilitates organizations to more effectively value, 
assimilate and apply external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It is comprised 
of potential and realized absorptive capacity which refer to the acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation and exploitation of external knowledge (Zahra & George, 
2002). While potential absorptive capacity refers to the coordination ability of the firm 
to acquire and assimilate knowledge, the realized absorptive capacity refers to the 
exploitation and transformation of knowledge (Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 
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2005). Irregular alliance rhythms primarily cause coordination issues of valuing and 
assimilating external knowledge for alliances in general (Shi & Prescott, 2012), and 
thereby developing and maintaining general alliance knowledge. For repeated 
partnerships, absorptive capacity may facilitate firms’ ability to value and assimilate 
external knowledge about the alliance partner and its trustworthiness. Firms with a 
stronger absorptive capacity may therefore be more effective in developing and 
maintaining a trustful alliance relationship with the same partner over time. Therefore, 
the focus here is on the potential absorptive capacity, hence, coordination ability of 
the firm.  
Empirical evidence indicates that potential absorptive capacity increases 
responsiveness and the assimilation of external knowledge (Deeds, 2001) and 
improves the ability of firms to learn (Lieberman, 1984; Sinclair, Klepper, & Cohen, 
2000). Essentially, firms feel even more comfortable in engaging in alliances as it 
encourages firms to form even more R&D alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). 
Moreover, such an absorptive capacity also refers to a higher in-house ability to 
manage alliances as it may improve the receptivity to external knowledge learned 
from alliance partners (Mowery et al., 1996). Around two-thirds of all investments in 
absorptive capacity are related to the management personnel of the firm (Yanadori & 
Cui, 2013). Of key importance in alliances are those managers, often referred to as 
‘boundary spanners’, who value, assimilate and apply the external knowledge. This is 
particularly relevant as in situations of long gaps between alliances and repeated 
partnerships, for example, as knowledge about the alliance management lifecycle in 
general and related to a specific partner may decay (Gulati, 1995b).  
Due to the significant demands of an irregular GAR and PAR on a firm’s 
absorptive capacity, I hypothesize that firms with higher absorptive capacity in 
general have the capacity to be able to better manage the demands of irregular 
rhythms. For PAR this relates to development and maintenance of trust and inter-
organizational routines. A higher absorptive capacity translates into more boundary 
spanners which are then more capable of developing and maintaining both inter-
organizational and inter-personal trust between boundary spanners of the 
organizations. Also, with respect to an irregular GAR, absorptive capacity may 
facilitate the firm’s ability to conserve and absorb general alliance knowledge. Hence, 
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absorptive capacity may positively moderate the relationship between an irregular 
PAR/GAR and alliance value creation. 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between an irregular GAR with alliance value 
creation is positively moderated by firms’ absorptive capacity.  
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between an irregular PAR with alliance value 
creation is positively moderated by firms’ absorptive capacity. 
 
6.2.3.3 Moderating role of GAE on the effect of GAR and PAR on alliance value 
creation 
As evidenced in Chapter 5 and by previous alliance literature, GAE may have 
negative impacts onto alliance value creation as it indicates that firms are more 
overconfident instead of more competent in managing alliances (Heimeriks, 2010). As 
overconfidence leads to the misattribution of cause and effect and failures are 
attributed to chance, it seems likely that firms are not capable of understanding the 
demands of irregular rhythms. Instead, it may even exacerbate the negative impacts of 
an irregular GAR. As also indicated in Chapter 5, high levels of GAE are also likely to 
impact relational aspects. Therefore, I expect that such overconfidence likely also has 
an impact when firms manage an irregular PAR. In such situations of long and short 
gaps between repeated partnerships, strong efforts by the firm are needed to develop 
and maintain a trustful partnership (Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Moreover, ad-hoc 
management and flexibility are essential in demanding situations of managing 
repeated alliances (Das & Teng, 1998). Due to the overconfidence in GAE, I 
hypothesize that firms’ level of GAE exacerbates the negative effects of irregular 
GARs and PARs. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between an irregular GAR with alliance value 
creation is negatively moderated by firms’ general alliance experience. 
Hypothesis 8: The relationship between an irregular PAR with alliance value 
creation is negatively moderated by firms’ general alliance experience. 
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6.3 Variables and measures 
6.3.1 Independent variables first introduced in Chapter 6 
Following research of rhythms in other organizational corporate development 
activities (e.g. Shi & Prescott, 2012; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002), the general 
alliance rhythm (GAR) and the partner-specific alliance rhythm (PAR) are measured 
through the kurtosis of the general alliance experience or the relational experience of 
the focal firms, respectively. The kurtosis refers to the distribution of observations 
similar to the skewness. Due to data availability issues in Medtrack, I choose to 
evaluate the kurtosis of all alliances the focal firm has managed 10 years prior to the 


















where n is equal to the number of observations, 𝑥𝑖 equals the number of alliances 
(general or partner-specific) in year i, ?̅? represents the average number over the period 
and s refers to the standard deviation. High kurtosis levels indicate peakedness in the 
tails of the distribution, thus leading to irregular rhythms. Low kurtosis levels on the 















Measures for control variables are described in detail in Chapter 3. In order to 
improve readability, an overview of all the measures used in this chapter is provided 
in the Table 6.1 below. 
 
TABLE 6.1: Measures table (Chapter 6) 
Variable name Measures Data source Chapter 6 
Alliance year(s) 0/1 Binary variable for each year in which the 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if partner firm is a non-
public partner (private firm, research institute or 
university), 0 if partner firm is a listed public firm 
Compustat Control 
Slack resources Natural logarithm of cash divided by long-term 




Firm uncertainty Volatility in monthly stock prices in the year 




R&D expenses divided by net sales in the year 





0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is classified as a 
contractual R&D alliance, 0 if it is classified as 




0/1 Binary variable. 1, if alliance is between two 
partners which have their HQs in different 




Number of previous partnerships between focal 




Natural logarithm of total number of alliances of 
either R&D alliance or licensing agreements the 











Kurtosis of all alliances with the same alliance 







6.4 Analyses and results 
6.4.1 Analyses 
This chapter combines the use of the subsample of repeated partnerships as used in 
Chapter 4 and the full sample used in Chapter 5. Separate descriptive statistics (mean 
and standard deviation) and bivariate correlation tables are provided in Tables 6.2 and 
6.3 for the different samples. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the 
full sample are already provided in Chapter 5 with the exception of GAR which is 
added in Table 6.2. GAR is negatively correlated with GAE (-0.30, p<0.01). This is 
not surprising as GAR, as the kurtosis is the second-order function of GAE. 
Additionally, both the level of Slack resources and Firm uncertainty are negatively 
correlated with GAE (-0.37 and -0.43, respectively). 
Table 6.3 is based on the subsample of repeated partnerships and can also be found in 
Chapter 4 with the exception that the sample size decreased from 161 to 154 repeated 
partnerships as 7 repeated partnerships only involved alliances which had been formed 
more than 10 years prior to the focal alliance. Additionally, this table includes PAR. 
Similar to GAR, PAR is also negatively correlated with the underlying number of 
partnerships (in this case Relational experience) (-0.14, p<0.1). Following Aiken and 
West (1991), the variables Absorptive capacity, Slack resources, GAE, GAR and PAR 
in the moderating variables are mean-centred in order to avoid multi-collinearity 
issues. Multi-collinearity is checked by investigating the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). Both the mean values and individual values are below the critical threshold 

















1 CAR 1.65 7.05 1
2 Absorptive capacity 2.60 12.92 0.06 1
3 Firm uncertainty 0.17 0.14 0.09 ** 0.08 ** 1
4 Slack resources 0.29 1.96 0.11 *** 0.09 ** 0.10 *** 1
5 Non-listed alliance partner 0.51 0.50 -0.14 *** -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 1
6 R&D alliance 0.53 0.50 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 1
7 International alliance 0.56 0.50 0.03 0.01 -0.06 ** 0.00 -0.10 ** -0.08 * 1
8 Relational experience 0.48 1.09 0.10 ** -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.22 *** -0.02 -0.02 1
9 GAE (log) 3.81 1.38 -0.18 *** -0.21 *** -0.43 *** -0.37 *** 0.09 ** -0.05 0.10 ** 0.11 *** 1
10 General alliance rhythm 0.13 1.80 -0.03 0.00 0.09 ** 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.30 *** 1
N=611
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01






TABLE 6.3: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (repeated partnerships) (Chapter 6) 
Mean Std. 10
1 CAR 3.19 10.01 1
2 Absorptive capacity 1.21 2.13 0.29 *** 1
3 Firm uncertainty 0.16 0.13 0.27 *** 0.34 *** 1
4 Slack resources 0.19 1.98 0.00 0.05 0.14 * 1
5 Non-listed alliance partner 0.31 0.46 -0.04 0.01 0.15 * -0.02 1
6 R&D alliance 0.53 0.50 0.11 0.16 ** -0.09 -0.14 * 0.07 1
7 International alliance 0.55 0.50 -0.07 -0.18 ** -0.11 0.16 ** -0.13 -0.14 * 1
8 Relational experience 1.86 1.44 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.15 * -0.07 -0.03 1
9 GAE (log) 3.97 1.28 -0.33 *** -0.34 *** -0.47 *** -0.29 *** 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.17 ** 1
10 Partner-specific alliance rhythm 2.17 3.10 -0.15 * -0.09 -0.14 * -0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.14 * 0.12 1
N=154
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
6 71 2 3 4 5 8 9
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6.4.2 Results 
In Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the OLS regression results for estimating alliance value 
creation based on CAR are presented. In order to improve readability, results for the 
full sample and the investigation of GAR are provided in Table 6.4, while results for 
PAR are presented in Table 6.5. Control variables are provided in Models 1a and 1b, 
respectively. Model 2a introduces the General alliance experience rhythm (GAR) 
variable in order to test Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is then tested in Model 2b where 
Partner-specific alliance experience rhythm (PAR) is added to the model. Models 3a/b 
investigates the moderating effect of slack resources on the relationship between 
GAR/PAR and CAR. The same approach is then followed for testing the moderating 
impact of absorptive capacity and GAE and its moderating impact on the relationship 























CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable
Control variables
Alliance years (dummies) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Absorptive capacity 0.012 0.009 0.008 -0.009 0.007
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Firm uncertainty 1.595 1.376 1.440 1.436 1.080
(1.99) (1.91) (1.93) (1.91) (1.9)
Slack resources 0.156 0.135 0.129 0.149 0.139
(.18) (.19) (.18) (.19) (.19)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.370 ** -1.351 ** -1.342 ** -1.329 ** -1.320 **
(.62) (.61) (.6) (.61) (.6)
R&D alliance 0.323 0.280 0.281 0.265 0.306
(.62) (.61) (.61) (.6) (.61)
International alliance 0.598 0.603 0.614 0.571 0.615
(.62) (.63) (.63) (.63) (.63)
Relational experience 0.607 * 0.597 ** 0.605 ** 0.590 * 0.584 *
(.32) (.3) (.3) (.3) (.3)
GAE (log) -0.747 ** -0.906 ** -0.902 ** -0.912 ** -0.936 **
(.3) (.37) (.37) (.37) (.39)
Explanatory variables
General alliance rhythm (GAR) -0.333 -0.346 * -0.318 -0.216
(.21) (.2) (.21) (.15)
GAR x Slack resources 0.032
(.08)
GAR x Absorptive capacity -0.012
(.01)
GAR x GAE 0.083
(.07)
Constant 2.035 * 2.007 * 1.984 * 2.007 * 2.053 *
(1.19) (1.19) (1.18) (1.19) (1.19)
N 611 611 611 611 611
F-Statistic 2.27 *** 2.26 *** 2.16 *** 2.63 *** 2.08 ***
R-Square 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Root MSE 6.90 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White sandwich estimators and firm clustering are in parentheses




MODEL 1a MODEL 2a MODEL 3a MODEL 4a MODEL 5a
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TABLE 6.5: OLS regression results (Chapter 6) (repeated partnerships)  
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable
Control variables
Absorptive capacity 0.724 0.704 0.716 0.699 0.679 0.425
(.83) (.81) (.82) (.7) (.8) (.39)
Firm uncertainty 10.545 10.118 10.000 9.722 9.113 9.344
(7.41) (7.44) (7.38) (7.49) (7.25) (7.21)
Slack resources -0.421 -0.409 -0.455 -0.538 -0.515 -0.699 *
(.35) (.35) (.37) (.34) (.38) (.4)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.072 -1.332 -1.352 -1.598 -1.278 -1.518
(1.41) (1.45) (1.45) (1.57) (1.44) (1.6)
R&D alliance 1.850 1.961 1.997 1.901 1.804 1.712
(1.49) (1.5) (1.5) (1.47) (1.51) (1.45)
International alliance 0.265 0.295 0.191 0.777 0.503 1.232
(1.8) (1.82) (1.79) (1.93) (1.85) (2.2)
Relational experience 0.473 0.352 0.359 0.435 0.393 0.513
(.37) (.37) (.38) (.35) (.36) (.37)
GAE (log) -1.925 ** -1.830 ** -1.989 ** -1.740 ** -1.993 ** -2.094 **
(.76) (.74) (.82) (.72) (.82) (.85)
Explanatory variables
Partner-specific alliance rhythm(PAR) -0.312 ** -0.283 * -0.508 *** -0.378 ** -0.405 *
(.16) (.14) (.17) (.18) (.21)
PAR x Slack resources 0.143 0.137
(.11) (.11)
PAR x Absorptive capacity -0.377 ** -0.327 **
(.17) (.16)




GAR x Slack resources -0.134
(.28)
GAR x Absorptive capacity -0.167
(.41)
GAR x GAE 0.715
(.59)
Constant 1.584 1.812 1.852 1.287 1.583 0.810
(1.7) (1.73) (1.74) (1.77) (1.7) (2.03)
N 154 154 154 154 154 154
F-Statistic 2.41 ** 2.46 ** 2.24 ** 2.49 ** 2.52 ** 1.82
R-Square 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.24
Root MSE 9.35 9.33 9.33 9.24 9.34 9.24
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01







MODEL 3b MODEL 4bMODEL 1b MODEL 2b
Controls PAR PAR x Slack PAR x GAE
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Overall, the r-squares across the models are in line with existing alliance 
experience literature using CAR as alliance value creation measure and even higher 
than most (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). 
For GAR and the moderating effects the root MSE indicates no substantial changes 
indicating the insignificance of the variables in the models. For PAR, even though the 
root MSE is higher due to the lower sample size, the fit is improved. The best fitting 
model is Model 4b in which PAR is interacted with absorptive capacity. 
Model 2a indicates that an irregular GAR has a non-significant negative effect 
on alliance value creation (β
GAR
: -0.33, p-value: 0.11). Hypothesis 1 can therefore not 
be accepted at the 90% confidence level. This result is however in line with existing 
literature which have considered both equity and non-equity alliances and could not 
find empirical evidence for GAR (e.g. Shi & Prescott, 2012). While not explicitly 
tested in this thesis due the focus on non-equity alliances, the difference in 
management requirements between equity and non-equity alliances (e.g. Das & Teng, 
2000b) does not seem to make the temporal management of alliances in regular 
rhythms more relevant. On the contrary, support can be found that an irregular PAR 
negatively influences alliance value creation in Model 2b (β
PAR
: -0.31, p-value: 0.05). 
This means that a one unit increase in the kurtosis, thus irregularity of PAR has a 
negative impact of 0.31% on alliance value creation. This implies that repeated 
partnerships with the same partner which are managed in close succession and/or with 
long gaps in between are valued more negative than repeated partnerships which are 
developed over time and occur in more regular rhythms. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 can 
be accepted.  
Models 3-5 investigate the firm-level moderating factors for GAR and PAR. 
Models 3a and 3b test whether Slack resources moderate the relationship between an 
irregular GAR or PAR and alliance value creation, respectively. No statistical 
evidence can be identified that Slack resources moderate the effect of GAR onto 
alliance value creation (β
GAR x Slack resources
:  0.032, p-value: 0.7). The same applies to 
PAR (β
PAR x Slack resources
:  0.143, p-value: 0.18). This indicates that while slack 
resources may positively influence an irregular rhythm of either GAR or PAR, this 
effect is insignificant. Therefore, both Hypotheses 3 and 4 cannot be accepted. 
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In Models 4a and 4b, the moderating effects of absorptive capacity on the 
relationship between GAR/PAR and alliance value creation is tested. For GAR, 
insignificant negative effects are identified 
(β
GAR x Absorptive capacity
: -0.12, p-value: 0.13). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 cannot be 
accepted. The moderating effect of Absorptive capacity on the relationship of PAR 
and CAR is also contrary to expectations negative but significant 
(β
PAR x Absorptive capacity
: -0.38, p-value: 0.03). While the null hypothesis that Absorptive 
capacity has no impact on moderating the relationship between PAR and CAR needs 
to be rejected, Hypothesis 6 cannot be accepted. Instead, the effect is opposite to what 
was initially expected. Please see Figure 6.4 below for an interaction graph. This 
graphical illustration indicates that firms managing an irregular PAR and also have a 
high absorptive capacity may exacerbate the negative effects of an irregular PAR at 
high levels. This is surprising as the underlying reasons for an irregular PAR were 
hypothesized to be related to a neglect of absorptive capacity itself. 
Model 5a then investigates whether a firm’s GAE may exacerbate the negative 
effects of an irregular GAR onto alliance value creation. No evidence can be found 
that GAE moderates the relationship between GAR and Alliance value creation. 
(β
GAR x GAE
: 0.08, p-value: 0.2). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is not confirmed. Model 6b 
tests the impact of the GAE onto the relationship between an irregular PAR and 
Alliance value creation. A negative moderating relationship had been hypothesized. 
No support can be found for this (β
PAR x GAE
: 0.18, p-value: 0.2). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8 is also not confirmed. Model 6b provides the full model also including 
the GAR variable. Results for the significance of PAR (β
PAR
: -0.40, p-value: 0.05) and 
the interaction of PAR with Absorptive capacity 
(β
PAR x Absorptive capacity: -0.32, p-value: 0.05) are significant. 
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FIGURE 6.4: Two-way interaction graph PAR and absorptive capacity 
 
In contrast to GAR, the results indicate that PAR influences the value created from 
alliances. As a supplementary analysis for the moderating effects of PAR, I also test 
whether partnership-specific factors of relationship years, the relationship length, 
alliance type, and international alliances may either mitigate or exacerbate the 
negative impact onto alliance value creation from irregular partner-specific rhythms. 
These are not found to be relevant as moderating factors for the effect of an irregular 
PAR on value creation. Please see Appendix 6.1 for OLS regression results.  
 
6.4.3 Robustness checks 
Three robustness checks for the main effects of GAR and PAR are conducted. 
Firstly, additional partnership-specific variables are included as controls to account for 
(1) Relationship length (Continuous variable: number of years since the first 
announced partnership between the two organizations), (2) Last relationship 
(Continuous variable: Number of years since the last announced partnership between 
the two organizations), (3) Different alliance type (Binary variable: 1 if previous 
announced alliance between the two partners was a different alliance type to the focal 
alliance, 0 if it was the same alliance type). These controls may take into account 
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whether different partnership characteristics influence the impact of alliance value 
creation independent of their effect on PAR. Results confirm that PAR holds and can 
be found in Appendix 6.2. This suggests that also despite other critical relationship-
factors, maintaining a regular rhythm with the same partner seems important. 
Secondly, previous chapters are followed by testing whether a subset of the data 
drives the effect. I therefore randomly delete 10% of the observations and find that the 
results hold (Lee, 2013). Thirdly, I test whether results also hold in different event 
windows. I can find evidence that the negative impact of an irregular PAR also impact 
alliance value creation in other event windows. Please see Appendix 6.3 for results 
for event window (-1,+1). For this event window, however, I cannot find any evidence 
that the effect of absorptive capacity exacerbates this effect in other event windows. 
Fourthly, I test whether including firm size as a control variable changes the results of 
the hypotheses. Results hold also when including firm size as a control. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
This chapter advances empirical research on alliance experience by 
investigating an emerging perspective on alliance rhythms (e.g. Shi et al., 2012). As of 
now, to the best of my knowledge, only few studies on alliance rhythms exist (e.g. Shi 
& Prescott, 2012), especially considering alliance value creation through stock market 
evaluations. Building on dyadic alliance research which has divided alliance 
experience into GAE and relational experience (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 
2002), this chapter disentangles alliance rhythms into rhythms of alliances in general 
and rhythms of alliances with the same partner. This chapter is therefore an attempt to 
provide further clarity into the alliance value heterogeneity of different types of 
alliance experience. First and foremost, this chapter introduces and finds evidence for 
a partner-specific alliance rhythm (PAR) and makes a theoretical distinction from 
general alliance rhythm (GAR) which has been the focus of the limited prior literature 
(Shi & Prescott, 2012). Secondly, this chapter identifies how firm-specific as well as 
partnership-specific moderating variables influence the relationship between GAR/ 
PAR and value creation.  
This chapter finds evidence that the effect of alliance rhythms onto alliance 
value creation is affected only by rhythms of repeated partnerships, thus PAR. This 
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hints that the underlying processes of GAE and relational experience may indeed be 
different. Firstly, the management of alliances in general relies on the development of 
alliance management processes and institutionalized functions to store and 
disseminate alliance experiences throughout the organization (Kale et al., 2002). 
Secondly, managing repeated partnerships with the same alliance partner requires the 
development and maintenance of trust (e.g. Gulati, 1995a) in addition to the creation 
of inter-organizational routines between partnering firms to facilitate the knowledge 
exchange (Zollo et al., 2002). The results indicate that the latter, more tacit processes 
are more sensitive to temporal dynamics. 
Similar to previous studies, this chapter cannot find evidence for significant 
negative effects of an irregular GAR (Shi & Prescott, 2012). This is even though this 
thesis focuses exclusively on non-equity alliances which provide greater flexibility in 
exchange for a loss in control (De Man, 2014). The use of equity supposedly 
facilitates the management of inter-firm knowledge transfer through aligning alliance 
objectives (Mowery et al., 1996; Oxley, 1997). This comes at the expense of reduced 
flexibility which is oftentimes the reason for forming non-equity alliances (Osborn & 
Hagedoorn, 1997). Contrary to expectations, such non-equity alliances do not place 
more significant demands on temporal alliance management. This is in line with 
existing research that equity alliances may provide a perceived feeling of being easier 
to manage, whereas they are actually not (De Man, 2014). This perception arises from 
the shared ownership which theoretically aligns the interests and partners may spend 
fewer resources in building up the relationship. However, both types of alliances are 
challenging to manage (Das & Teng, 2000b). Thus, no difference seems to be 
apparent also in their management requirements over time. Moreover, even though 
investors are influenced by temporal dynamics of corporate activities (Rindova et al., 
2010), this chapter identifies that this may not relate to alliances in general. 
Furthermore, this chapter is one of the first attempts to investigate the rhythm 
of repeated partnerships (PAR) and finds that the irregularity of the repeated 
partnership rhythm does indeed have a negative impact on alliance value creation. The 
finding that PAR is relevant for firms in their management of strategic alliances might 
be an important one. While there is some evidence that large gaps between strategic 
alliances may decrease trust between partnering organizations (Gulati, 1995b), and 
short gaps may not generate the necessary trust (Gulati & Sytch, 2008) and learning 
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opportunities about the partner (Mayer & Argyres, 2004), existing literature had not 
uncovered the importance of keeping gaps between repeated partnerships short while 
at the same time not accumulating too many repeated partnerships. Such an emphasis 
on balance between repeated partnerships over time adds to the literature and 
emphasizes the challenges organizations face when developing and maintaining trust 
between partnering organizations.  
Surprisingly, this chapter finds that absorptive capacity exacerbates the 
negative impacts of an irregular PAR. This is on first sight against expectations but 
may be explained by findings of existing literature. A strong absorptive capacity 
essentially refers to the ability of the firm to absorb new knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). As indicated by Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) firms which have 
developed such a strong capacity may be able to digest more new knowledge and 
assimilate it within the organization. However, importantly this comes at the expense 
of focusing on internal, local knowledge (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Therefore, firms 
which have higher absorptive capacity levels are likely to focus on exploration and the 
acquisition of external knowledge of other, potentially new alliance partners. 
Maintaining the relationship with an existing partner may however relate to 
exploitation. Such exploitative partner-specific processes require commitment to the 
partnership however (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Therefore, firms with high levels of 
absorptive capacity may actually be more committed to tapping into new areas which 
in turn makes them less capable to manage an irregular rhythm with the same partner. 
In the context of the biopharmaceutical industry used in this thesis, this might mean 
that firms spread their knowledge exploration into several research areas, thereby 
limiting the commitment to single areas and partners and thereby also increasing 
demands for organizations. This finding highlights that partner-specific processes are 
different from the processes required for alliance management in general (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998) 
With the exception of absorptive capacity for the relationship between PAR 
and alliance value creation, firm-specific factors do not seem to provide an indication 
how firms can more effectively manage irregular rhythms for both GAR and PAR. 
There are various reasons why such firm-specific aspects such as organizational slack, 
absorptive capacity or GAE may have limited impact on explaining the effect of 
firm’s irregular GAR (and also PAR) onto alliance value creation. Firstly, such factors 
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may not have a direct impact on the alliance management practices. Instead, these 
factors may provide potential inputs to the alliance management, whereas the ability 
of firms to manage such irregularity depends on the actual allocation of resources to 
the alliance management processes. As indicated by previous research and by results 
in Chapter 5, the resource allocation process to alliance management may not always 
be rational and subject to heuristics such as overconfidence (Heimeriks, 2010). 
Despite their possible impact in mitigating the negative effects of irregular rhythms, 
such potential inputs may therefore not influence investor valuations. The 
insignificant findings for these firm-specific moderating factors may therefore also be 
due to measurement issues. In particular, the measurement of absorptive capacity 
(Zahra & George, 2002) and organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981) is particularly 
controversial. This chapter finds that the potential absorptive capacity is insignificant 
in improving the negative effects of an irregular GAR. Possibly, a better measure for 
potential absorptive capacity in terms of its impact on GAR may however be the 
turnover of key boundary spanners in the time between alliances. Such boundary 
spanners may potentially help to more effectively capture potential absorptive 
capacity. Alternatively, measures for realized absorptive capacity such as the alliance 
capability of the alliance managers involved could help to explain a further factor 
which might mitigate the negative effects of an irregular PAR and GAR. Regarding 
slack resources, budgets for alliance management processes might provide a better 
proxy for potential resources allocated to alliance management even though these are 
likely not known to investors evaluating the incremental value gains through alliances. 
Results indicating that both firm- and partnership-specific factors do not seem 
to mitigate the effects of an irregular PAR are somewhat surprising. However, 
literature on trust development and maintenance argues that the effectiveness of 
repeated partnerships primarily depends on the commitment of the firms to the 
partnership and not necessarily firm-specific factors (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Some 
firms, despite their financial ability, or the absorptive capacity as shown above, may 
still not commit sufficient resources to an effective trust development or maintenance 
(Morgan & Shelby, 1994). Therefore, even if firms possess high levels of such firm-
specific factors, this does not mean that a lack of familiarity with the partner can be 
eliminated (Gulati, 1995a). The insignificance of the partnership-specific factors may 
be related to this argument. For instance, research finds that international alliances are 
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more challenging to manage (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). As indicated by recent 
research, Reuer and Lahiri (2014) find that while international alliances may be an 
important predictor for alliance formation, there are underlying reasons within each 
partnership that influence the success or likelihood for additional formations. 
Additionally, as findings in Chapter 4 indicate, the underlying qualities of previous 
partnerships may influence the success of those. The insignificant findings for 
partnership characteristics identified here therefore may suggest that unique 
partnership characteristics beyond generic firm or partnership factors may influence 
the significance of an irregular PAR.   
This chapter has three specific contributions. Firstly, this chapter contributes to 
experience studies by adding a further temporal dimension to them (Gulati, 1995b; 
Sampson, 2005; Shi & Prescott, 2012). This may further facilitate improved 
understanding of the value heterogeneity of alliance experiences (e.g. Anand & 
Khanna, 2000a; Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2006). This chapter provides further insights into the ambiguity arising from existing 
literature. Studies which have found negative effects of relational experience may 
actually have uncovered these because the repeated partnerships occurred in an 
irregular rhythm or because investors valued such repeated alliances lower. Hence, 
such a temporal measure for repeated partnerships may provide an indication that the 
rhythm is another dimension to the quality and the interrelationship of previous 
experiences.  
Secondly, this chapter provides an extension to studies which have 
investigated rhythms by adding a rhythm of activities between partners. Most studies 
have investigated rhythms investigating distinct strategic actions such as M&A, 
international expansion or strategic alliances in general (Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Shi 
& Prescott, 2012; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). While rhythms are still a very new 
phenomenon which is underrepresented in the context of strategic alliance research 
(Shi et al., 2012), this chapter contributes to the abovementioned few studies by 
introducing a rhythm not only between distinct strategic activities but also between 
distinct partners. Essentially, this also contributes to previous studies on partner-
specific processes such as trust (e.g. Gulati, 1995a; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer 
et al., 1998) by emphasizing that a balance of repeated partnerships is most effective. 
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Thirdly, results of this chapter contribute to abovementioned studies on 
rhythms by providing an event study methodology. Most studies have used long-term 
financial indicators for performance. The significance of irregular repeated alliance 
rhythms on CAR indicates that investors may well be influenced of the timing of 
strategic activities. As evidence by Rindova et al. (2010) indicates, investors are 
indeed influenced by the temporal structure of corporate announcements in high 
ambiguity environments. This study builds on these findings by extending this to the 
context of alliances in general and repeated partnerships. 
More generally, this study has important implications for alliance management 
as well. Existing literature suggests that organizations form strategic alliances 
particularly in situations in which they require resources they do not possess (Das & 
Teng, 2000b; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Hence, periods of accelerated and 
high alliance activity can be expected at times when firms lack such critical resources. 
This chapter suggests that firms need to be careful in such situations as the irregularity 
may provide additional complexity to the alliance management, particularly if firms 
manage repeated partnerships. On the contrary irregular rhythms with new alliance 
partners may not negatively impact alliance value creation. Moreover, this research 
also finds that firms which are focusing on developing their absorptive capacity may 
not be able to manage their repeated partnerships as effectively over time. 
 
6.6 Limitations and directions for future research 
This chapter is not without limitations. Firstly, this chapter uses the 
biopharmaceutical industry as a single industry. This industry is particularly dynamic 
and the impact of such temporal rhythms may also be affected by such industry 
factors. Due to potential issues of generalizations, future research may explore if the 
results are also consistent in other industries. Existing research has found that 
relational experiences are less critical for equity alliances (Zollo et al., 2002). 
However, future studies may wish to investigate whether negative impacts of a 
irregular PAR onto value creation also hold for equity agreements which are different 
in terms of the management requirements. Additionally, the use of CAR as a measure 
for alliance value creation is not without problems. Despite the fact that it is highly 
correlated with managers’ subjective assessment of alliance performance (Kale et al., 
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2002), its use has been criticized due to the inefficiency of the stock market to fully 
assess long-term performance. However, all measures of alliance performance have 
their advantages and disadvantages and all measures are essentially approximations to 
alliance performance (e.g. Kale et al., 2002; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). As firm- and 
partnership-level moderating factors do not have a strong impact on the relationship 
between GAR/PAR and alliance value creation, future research may wish to 
investigate how other moderating variables impact this relationship. For instance, an 
industry environment perspective may also influence the impact for firms to engage in 
irregular PAR. Moreover, while this thesis focuses on value creation implications, the 
field still lacks an understanding of firm’s antecedents to follow particular rhythms 
and reasons to deviate from them. This may further provide another interesting avenue 
for future research. 
 
6.7 Robustness check with regard to Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I had proposed and found evidence for a perceived quality 
dimension of relational experiences. Furthermore, in Chapters 5 and 6, I had identified 
the interrelated and temporal dimension of how alliance experiences are accumulated. 
Findings provide support that both high levels of GAE as well as the irregularity of 
PAR negatively impact firms’ ability to create value from relational experiences. 
While all three chapters test different dimensions of alliance experience, the quality 
dimension as identified in Chapter 4 may also be considered as an outcome of the 
interrelated and temporal dimension of alliance experience. Consequently, the 
significance of the interrelated and the temporal dimension essentially imply that they 
are likely to influence the quality dimension itself. Therefore, as a further robustness 
check to the identification of this quality dimension, a logit model is run which tests 
whether the irregularity of PAR and the extent of GAE influence the likelihood of a 
quality dimension being signalled to investors. Results indicate that indeed the 
interrelated as well as the temporal dimension negatively impact the likelihood of 





TABLE 6.6: Logit model as robustness check for relational experience quality 
dimension 
 
This provides further support to the quality dimension as the other two dimensions are 
found to negatively impact the likelihood of sending a signal of higher quality 
repeated partnerships. This may indicate that both the interrelated as well as the 
temporal dimension are important contributors to the perceived quality of the repeated 
partnership and hints that all three dimensions in combination are essential to 
explaining the significant heterogeneity in how firms create value from previous 


















Total relationship years -0.003
(.08)
Last relationship -0.215 *
(.12)
Different alliance type -0.466
(.4)
Explanatory variables
GAE (log) -0.380 **
(.19)









alliance experiences. (please see Figures 6.5 and 6.6 below for a graphical 
illustration). 
FIGURE 6.5: Predicted probabilities of GAE onto Relational experience signal 
 
FIGURE 6.6: Predicted probabilities of PAR onto Relational experience signal 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis advances the strategy field by further investigating alliance 
experience as an antecedent to value creation. The overarching finding of the thesis is 
that the effect of alliance experience value creation is influenced by various general 
alliance and relational experience dimensions. Existing research finds contradictory 
results as to whether GAE or relational experience actually improve alliance value 
creation (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Goerzen, 2007; Gulati et al., 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002) and can thus be regarded as antecedents to firm-
level alliance or dyad-level relational capabilities, respectively. This thesis finds 
evidence that in order for alliance experiences to create value, the perceived quality, 
the interrelationship among the two types of experience and the temporal rhythms of 
alliance experiences are essential. 
Firstly, partnerships which include a signal of the previous relationship quality 
with the same alliance partner are valued more positively by investors than alliances 
which do not include such signals (Chapter 4). This finding indicates that investors 
believe these partnerships to be superior and perceive that relational capabilities 
arising from trust and inter-organizational routines may have been generated between 
partners in the previous partnership. Therefore, through executives’ sending of such 
signals, investors may perceive the quality of the previous partnership as an indication 
for a more effective repeated focal alliance between the two partners. While the 
signaller, receiver, and partnership characteristics do not influence the effect of the 
signal, financial analysts as intermediaries are particularly relevant in influencing the 
effect of these quality signals. 
Secondly, the extent of firm-level GAE influences firms’ ability to generate 
value from dyad-level relational experience (Chapter 5). Findings indicate that 
investors do not feel convinced that firms can create value from relational experiences 
when they have accumulated high levels of GAE as well. This builds on and extends 
existing studies which have found that high levels of GAE facilitate overconfidence in 
firm-level alliance (e.g. Heimeriks, 2010) or other corporate development activities 
(e.g. Mulotte et al., 2013). Directly contributing to these studies, this thesis indicates 
that the overconfidence effect is exacerbated under conditions of firm-level 
uncertainty. Research in psychology and OL indicates that overconfidence derives 
directly from uncertainty (Levitt & March, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and 
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may lead to further exacerbation of a firms’ overconfidence in general alliance 
processes and thereby undermines the development of relational capabilities from 
relational experiences.  
Thirdly, the rhythm in which firms accumulate dyad-level relational 
experiences but not GAE significantly influences firms’ ability to generate value from 
alliances (Chapter 6). This finding indicates that repeated partnerships need to be 
timed in regular rhythms or firms may not be able to effectively develop dyad-level 
relational capabilities. Moreover, this chapter also finds that the negative effects of 
irregular partner-specific rhythms are exacerbated when firms have high levels of 
absorptive capacity indicating that exploration activities as facilitated by absorptive 
capacity negatively impacts exploitation activities of managing partnerships with 
existing partners. 
The findings of these chapters have several distinct contributions to the 
strategic alliance field but also some overarching contributions to the field of strategic 
management in general. Foremost, all three empirical chapters highlight that 
experience accumulation matters in explaining firm heterogeneity in alliance value 
creation. As alliance experience is an important antecedent to alliance capabilities 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 2009; Wang & 
Rajagopalan, 2015), the different dimensions may therefore indicate that the way 
alliance experiences are accumulated is more important than expected. While 
heterogeneity in value creation from alliance experience has been recognized, existing 
research has focused on identifying various firm and external characteristics that 
influence firms’ ability to benefit from alliance experience, such as firm-level  
uncertainty or alliance types (Gulati et al., 2009; Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). While these studies have contributed to the 
improved understanding of the role of alliance experience, this thesis contributes to 
this line of reasoning by further investigating the alliance experiences themselves 
through the perceived quality of previous experiences, the context in which they occur 
and the timing of them. 
By introducing a quality dimension of relational experiences, the 
interrelationship among firm-level alliance and dyad-level relational experiences, as 
well as a temporal dimension, this thesis contributes to the abovementioned studies 
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which have called for more fine grained analyses of alliance experience. The chosen 
dimensions build on “alternative learning mechanisms (…) beyond the well-known 
“learning-by-doing” processes” (Zollo et al., 2002: 709) and provide a more effective 
explanation than the differentiation into count-based experience or type dimensions 
used in existing literature so far. This builds on and contributes to studies which have 
identified that learning from experience requires interpretation of experience and is 
therefore subject to both internal and external influences which can impact the 
effectiveness of experiences (Levitt & March, 1988). This thesis provides various 
dimensions which may impact the interpretability of previous alliance experience. The 
interrelationship dimension provides an indication that other types of experiences can 
influence the ability to benefit from experience as also indicated by recent research 
(e.g. Mulotte et al., 2013). Additionally, the timing may have negative influences on 
benefiting from experience, while the quality dimension provides an outcome 
dimension of previous experiences.  
Furthermore, these findings also contribute to the field of capability 
development for firms. The differences observed in alliance value creation may 
indicate that the development of alliance capabilities hinges on different dimensions 
of alliance experience accumulation. Therefore, this thesis contributes to studies 
which have emphasized the importance of experience in developing capabilities (e.g. 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Montealegre, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2000; 
Zollo & Winter, 2002). Previous studies have primarily focused on identifying 
mechanisms that improve the effectiveness of utilizing experience in the organization, 
for instance, by institutionalizing mechanisms (Crossan et al., 1999; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). However, this thesis contributes to those studies by 
finding that the way experiences are actually accumulated may also be important for 
capability development. 
Thereby, this thesis also contributes directly to studies in the strategic 
management field which have investigated contingency effects in performance studies 
(e.g. Contractor, 2012). More specifically, this thesis finds that firm-level alliance 
experiences may impact the value creation effect of dyad-level relational experiences. 
This contributes to studies which have investigated experience and their effect on 
performance in other fields and across activities in so-called spill-overs (e.g. Mulotte 
et al., 2013; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). This study finds that such spill-overs may also 
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occur within activities. Thus, experience in one area may need to be considered with 
experience in other related fields in order to fully understand the value creating effect 
and possibly the impact for developing capabilities. 
By investigating different types of alliance rhythms (Chapter 6), this thesis 
also contributes to studies which have used a temporal perspective in both the field of 
strategic alliances and more generally in the strategic management field. In the field of 
alliances, studies have primarily investigated learning (Hamel, 1991), sequences (Shi 
& Prescott, 2011), speed (Al-Laham et al., 2008), frequency (Standifer & Bluedorn, 
2006), timing (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) and most recently rhythms (Shi & Prescott, 
2012). While temporal research has for many decades been considered as “peripheral” 
(Ancona et al., 2001a: 645), there is a growing interest in temporal strategic 
management research (e.g. Ancona et al., 2001a; Ancona et al., 2001b; Laamanen & 
Keil, 2008; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Shi & Prescott, 2012; Shi et al., 2012). In line with 
that, this thesis builds on studies which have found that investors are influenced by 
such temporal aspects (e.g. Rindova et al., 2010), one of the first which finds evidence 
for the impact of rhythm irregularity on investor valuations. Based on earlier results 
which find long-term performance impacts of such irregular rhythms, this finding is in 
line with the market efficiency arguments that investors are effective in utilizing 
publicly available information to predict the impact of irregularity in strategic 
alliances onto performance (Fama et al., 1969). 
This thesis also contributes to existing strategy research which has used a 
signalling perspective (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011). Signalling theory 
differentiates directly between high quality and low quality announcers and thereby 
identifies an effective separating equilibrium between signallers and receivers. 
Therefore, it has been applied in many contexts in which quality is essential, such as 
amongst others in the second-hand car market (Akerlof, 1970), among job market 
candidates (Spence, 1973), for alliance partner choice (Stuart, 2000) or among 
entrepreneurial firms seeking financing from external investors (Janney & Folta, 
2006; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). This thesis essentially provides a way to 
differentiate between potentially low quality and high quality previous partnerships. 
Building on this, findings of this thesis also contribute methodologically to the 
field of strategic alliance experience. As indicated and called for by previous studies, 
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it is essential to notice that the quantity of previous experiences may not be sufficient 
as it provides only “course-grained” indications (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005: 343). 
By investigating whether previous repeated partnerships have been successful 
(Quality dimension), the spill-over effect of overconfidence in firm-level alliance 
experience and dyad-level relational experiences (Interrelationship dimension), and 
the rhythm of both alliance and relational experiences (Temporal dimension), this 
thesis answers calls for studies measuring the “quality of collaborations” (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005: 343) and the “actual nature of interaction” (Gulati et al., 2009: 
1228) instead of only considering “quantity” of previous collaborations (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005: 343).  
This thesis also has significant managerial implications. Findings indicate that 
investors react significantly to various aspects of alliance experience. Thus, their 
sensitivity to firm-specific alliance aspects is high. This has multiple implications for 
managers. Firstly, this thesis indicates that experiences are not simply cumulative but 
instead depend on various contingencies. Managers therefore need to take the various 
contingencies into account in order to create the most value from their alliances.  
Secondly, the finding that investors react to alliance-specific factors indicates that the 
way investors are presented alliance-specific information may influence their value 
creation impact. Apart from references to the previous partnership quality, no 
references to the timing within the investigated press releases can be found. As the 
communication between firms and investors also occurs in other settings, future 
research may therefore wish to examine whether firms conduct impression 
management in conference calls or other information material to investors. As these 
have been shown to actively influence investors (e.g. Kimbrough & Louis, 2011), this 
may provide a fruitful avenue for future research. 
This thesis provides another important step to improving the understanding of 
the value creation effects of alliance experience. It emphasizes that alliance experience 
is critical for firms to create more alliance value than others. Future research may wish 
to examine the underlying processes in more detail. Multiple longitudinal case studies 
may be an option for this. Additionally, while this thesis has identified quality 
indicators of relational experiences, we are still lacking a similar quality indicator for 
general alliance experience besides the recency of experience (e.g. Sampson, 2005). 
Future research may wish to continue along this line of research and identify other 
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dimensions, particularly for general alliance experience, which may help to explain 
the heterogeneity in value created as observed in existing literature. Additionally, 
while this thesis focuses on the short-term value creation which has been found to be 
highly correlated to long-term value creation (e.g. Kale et al., 2002), future research 
may wish to investigate whether the effects also holds for longer timeframes. 
Moreover, research may also investigate whether findings are generalizable in other 
contexts as well. Even though, industry-specific factors do not seem to be relevant in 
the effect of alliance experience onto value creation (e.g. Gulati et al., 2009), the 
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Day relative to announcement
Daily abnormal 
returns











-1 0.59 ** 0.50
0 2.47 *** 0.68 ***
1 -0.21 0.46
2 0.03 0.44 *







10 0.22 ** 0.55 **
Patell Z: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Market model equally-weighted index
Repeated Partnerships (N=161)
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(-1,0) 3.06 *** 66.46%
(-1, +1) 2.85 *** 61.49%
(-2, +2) 3.28 *** 59.63%
(-3, +3) 3.28 *** 64.60%













CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2
Event window (-1,+1)
Control variables
Alliance years (dummies) n.s. n.s.
Absorptive capacity 0.898 0.915
(.83) (.82)
Firm uncertainty 8.320 8.633
(6.72) (6.81)
Slack resources -0.437 -0.535
(.38) (.41)
Non-listed alliance partner -3.180 * -2.847 *
(1.8) (1.66)
R&D alliance 0.584 0.444
(1.47) (1.45)
International alliance -0.988 -0.837
(1.62) (1.64)
Relational experience -0.432 -0.524
(.68) (.72)
GAE (log) -1.829 ** -1.772 **
(.85) (.84)
Explanatory variables




Relational experience signal x Financial analysts -0.281
(.19)
Constant 9.930 * 10.115 *
(5.86) (5.95)
N 161 161
F-Statistic 1.84 ** 2.18 ***
R-Square 0.22 0.24
Root MSE 9.57 9.53
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Control variables
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APPENDIX 5.5: OLS regression GAE (last 3 years) 
 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable MODEL 1 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
Control variables
Alliance Year 2004 -0.568 -0.836 -0.616 -0.821 -0.981
(1.25) (1.35) (1.26) (1.3) (1.31)
Alliance Year 2005 -0.492 -0.982 -0.850 -1.030 -1.263
(1.52) (1.51) (1.53) (1.59) (1.53)
Alliance Year 2006 -1.889 * -2.014 * -1.743 -2.073 * -2.046 *
(1.07) (1.1) (1.05) (1.24) (1.12)
Alliance Year 2007 -0.270 -0.322 -0.283 -0.653 -0.681
(1.33) (1.34) (1.33) (1.5) (1.33)
Alliance Year 2008 0.019 -0.053 0.182 -0.208 -0.029
(1.79) (1.6) (1.79) (1.77) (1.77)
Alliance Year 2009 -2.188 * -2.438 ** -2.288 * -2.684 * -2.655 *
(1.24) (1.21) (1.19) (1.28) (1.25)
Alliance Year 2010 -0.809 -1.069 -0.992 -1.222 -1.551
(1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.37) (1.4)
Alliance Year 2011 -1.201 -1.457 -1.273 -1.869 -1.616
(1.08) (1.07) (1.1) (1.31) (1.17)
Alliance Year 2012 -1.870 -1.697 -1.886 -2.193 * -2.202 *
(1.16) (1.16) (1.15) (1.26) (1.19)
Absorptive capacity 0.010 0.017 0.018 * 0.017 * 0.016 *
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Firm uncertainty 1.574 1.393 1.072 0.065 0.821
(2.03) (1.8) (1.96) (2.38) (1.92)
Slack resources 0.184 0.189 0.211 0.184 0.240
(.18) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.16)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.334 ** -1.273 ** -1.226 ** -1.337 ** -1.269 **
(.62) (.57) (.6) (.61) (.58)
R&D alliance 0.292 0.156 0.291 0.296 0.126
(.62) (.53) (.59) (.57) (.54)
International alliance 0.620 0.519 0.620 0.648 0.686
(.6) (.56) (.58) (.58) (.56)
Relational experience 0.619 * 0.215 1.278 *** 0.981 ** 1.646 ***
(.32) (.27) (.41) (.39) (.48)
GAE (log) last 3 years -0.834 ** -0.508 * -1.008 *** -1.084 ** -1.764 ***
(.35) (.3) (.37) (.46) (.57)
Explanatory variables
Relational experience signal 4.372 **
(1.67)
GAE (log) last 3 years x Relational experience signal -4.034 *
(2.3)
GAE (log) last 3 years x Relational experience -1.113 *** -1.012 * -2.018 ***
(.39) (.59) (.69)
Relational experience x FLU 3.302
(3.79)
GAE (log) last 3 years x FLU -2.876
(3.35)
GAE (log) last 3 years x Relational experience x FLU -3.943
(5.22)
Alliance management mechanisms (AMM) -0.035
(.62)
Relational experience x AMM -1.243
(.94)
GAE (log) last 3 years x AMM 1.323 **
(.58)
GAE (log) last 3 years x Relational experience x AMM 1.774 **
(.85)
Constant 2.586 * 2.425 * 2.730 ** 2.877 ** 2.837 **
(1.21) (1.24) (1.21) (1.21) (1.18)
N 611 611 611 611 611
F-Statistic 2.27 *** 2.68 *** 2.78 *** 2.8 *** 2.61 ***
R-Square 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12
Root MSE 6.89 6.69 6.81 6.78 6.75
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

















APPENDIX 5.6: OLS regression alternative event window 
 
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Event window (-2,+2)
Control variables
Alliance Year 2004 0.775 0.314 0.339 0.672
(1.35) (1.41) (1.44) (1.37)
Alliance Year 2005 0.539 0.225 0.206 0.270
(1.48) (1.48) (1.47) (1.5)
Alliance Year 2006 -2.416 * -2.604 * -2.496 * -2.230
(1.33) (1.34) (1.36) (1.35)
Alliance Year 2007 0.943 1.026 0.800 0.934
(1.4) (1.4) (1.39) (1.39)
Alliance Year 2008 1.955 2.050 1.777 2.090
(2.01) (1.98) (1.76) (2.03)
Alliance Year 2009 -1.756 -1.876 -2.056 -1.765
(1.89) (1.88) (1.82) (1.84)
Alliance Year 2010 1.775 1.752 1.307 1.569
(1.82) (1.79) (1.86) (1.81)
Alliance Year 2011 2.135 * 1.855 1.922 * 2.084 *
(1.19) (1.13) (1.16) (1.18)
Alliance Year 2012 -0.250 -0.150 -0.380 -0.201
(1.27) (1.28) (1.21) (1.26)
Absorptive capacity -0.025 ** -0.023 ** -0.020 * -0.018 *
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Firm uncertainty 0.666 0.907 0.492 0.538
(2.79) (2.81) (2.68) (2.71)
Slack resources 0.234 0.254 0.248 0.254
(.24) (.23) (.23) (.23)
Non-listed alliance partner -1.955 ** -2.037 ** -1.870 ** -1.859 **
(.81) (.8) (.78) (.79)
R&D alliance 0.344 0.245 0.237 0.365
(.77) (.73) (.7) (.74)
International alliance 0.788 0.726 0.685 0.792
(.83) (.8) (.78) (.82)
Relational experience 0.329 -0.036 0.002 0.864
(.36) (.33) (.33) (.54)
GAE (log) -1.037 *** -0.952 ** -0.761 ** -1.163 ***
(.38) (.34) (.31) (.41)
Explanatory variables
Relational experience signal 4.112 * 3.352 **
(2.29) (1.64)
GAE (log)x Relational experience signal -3.243
(2.23)
GAE (log) x Relational experience -0.922 *
(.48)
Constant 1.597 1.491 1.526 1.679
(1.25) (1.25) (1.24) (1.24)
N 611 611 611 611
F-Statistic 2.49 *** 2.41 *** 2.49 *** 2.56 ***
R-Square 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09
Root MSE 8.74 8.68 8.62 8.68
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Alliance years (dummies) 0.682 0.743 0.704 0.701
(.83) (.83) (.82) (.82)
Absorptive capacity 10.635 10.319 10.123 10.344
(7.52) (7.63) (7.44) (7.54)
Firm uncertainty -0.399 -0.391 -0.408 -0.413
(.35) (.34) (.35) (.35)
Slack resources -1.775 -1.580 -1.329 -1.403
(1.62) (1.52) (1.46) (1.49)
Non-listed alliance partner 2.182 1.963 1.963 1.967
(1.52) (1.49) (1.52) (1.51)
R&D alliance -0.039 -0.115 0.295 0.306
(1.8) (1.78) (1.83) (1.84)
Relational experience 0.714 0.138 0.352 0.332
(.45) (.43) (.37) (.36)
GAE (log) -1.645 ** -1.706 ** -1.830 ** -1.798 **
(.7) (.72) (.75) (.74)
Explanatory variables
Partner-specific alliance rhythm(PAR) -0.550 ** -0.601 ** -0.307 -0.234
(.27) (.24) (.27) (.2)
Total relationship years -0.295
(.19)




PAR x Last relationship 0.071
(.06)
PARx  International -0.009
(.31)
PAR x R&D alliance -0.154
(.31)
Constant 3.077 4.108 1.811 1.878
(2.07) (2.49) (1.76) (1.7)
N 154 154 154 154
F-Statistic 2.44 ** 2.3 ** 2.37 ** 2.3 **
R-Square 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18
Root MSE 9.34 9.32 9.36 9.36
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
CAR (in percentage) as dependent variable










PAR x R&D 
alliance
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
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GAE (log) -1.753 **
(.75)




Different alliance type -0.919
(1.42)
Explanatory variables














Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White 
sandwich estimators and firm clustering are in parentheses
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GAE (log) -1.823 **
(.82)
Explanatory variables











Robust Standard Errors calculated through Huber-White 
sandwich estimators and firm clustering are in parentheses
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